


SOCIALISM AND WAR

LOUIS B. BOUDIN.



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By Louis B. Boudin

Author of

"The Theoretical System of Karl Marx," "Government by Judiciary," etc.

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PREFACE.

The six lectures contained in the volume which is herewith offered to the public at large were first delivered at Arlington Hall, New York City, on the six Thursdays beginning with Thursday, November 17, 1914. It was intended from the first that they should not only be delivered orally, but published in book form so as to give them a larger audience. Owing to some untoward incidents, however, the work of publication was delayed; so that their appearance in print will occur almost exactly one year after the oral delivery of the first lecture.

It seemed to me at first that this long delay between delivery and publication made it necessary to undertake some revision, in order to notice some developments or incidents which have taken place, or have become known, since the lectures were prepared about a year ago. But on further consideration I decided to leave these lectures substantially as originally prepared for oral delivery,

as nothing has transpired during this year to change my views on the subjects presented or shed any great additional light upon them, with one exception which will be noted further below.

The lectures as printed in this volume are not, however, in quite the same *form* as when delivered orally. Nor is the substance exactly identical. The exigencies of oral delivery sometimes made it necessary to treat the different points touched upon in the lecture in a different order from that originally intended; and occasionally leave some points untouched upon, when the lecture became too long for delivery in the lecture room. The lectures as here presented are, therefore, not in the *form* in which they were delivered, but rather in the *form* in which they were *intended* to be delivered. The substance remaining the same, except for the omissions in the oral delivery but included in the present volume.

Except in one instance where I have deviated both from the original intentions as well as from the delivered lecture, so as to leave out from the book something that I had treated orally. This omission relates to the last lecture. As originally prepared, and as delivered orally, it contained a somewhat extended review of the attitude taken by the Socialists in the different warring countries to the war. I have decided to leave this review

from the present volume, partly because I did not want to burden it with too much controversial matter; although I have taken great care to make my own attitude to the subject clear, and therefore furnished the criterion by which I believe the action of the socialists in the different countries should be judged. Another circumstance which weighed with me in making the change is the fact that the subsequent developments along this line were such that, under the new circumstances, my original treatment of the subject seemed to me inadequate. It seemed to me best, therefore, to leave this particular branch of my original subject for separate, and I hope adequate, treatment later on.

L. B. BOUDIN

New York, October 17, 1915.

CONTENTS

	Page
Preface - - - - -	iii
I. Clearing the Ground - - - - -	1
II. The Economic Causes of the War - - - -	44
III. The Ideologic Causes of the War - - - -	81
IV. The Immediate Causes of the War and the Stakes Involved - - - -	121
V. The War and the Socialists - - - -	169
VI. Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories - - - -	213

I. CLEARING THE GROUND.

WHEN one decides to put up a building, his first task is to clear the ground upon which he intends to build. This may not be exactly "constructive" work, but it is nevertheless a necessary part of any construction. It is the same in any mental building operation. You cannot do the work of construction properly without first clearing your lot of any rubbish that may have accumulated, or of the old structures that you may find occupying the place where you want to build the new. I have therefore decided to devote this introductory lecture to a discussion of the many current misconceptions about the war and its causes. Incidentally, this critical process may accustom my audience to examine the questions involved from many angles and therefore be in a better position to judge more critically my own performance when I get to the "constructive" part of my task. Let us, therefore, look at the explanations which have

so far been advanced. But before doing so we must formulate the question that the explanation is supposed to answer.

This question presents itself to us in two forms: First: Who or what caused the war? And, second: What is this war all about? These two formulations while, naturally, closely resembling each other, and often covering the same ground, are by no means identical. The second formulation of the question is *deeper*, and also *broader*. It is deeper, because it is not satisfied with finding the "guilty party", but wants the cause, *the reason*, for his guilt. It is broader, because it is not satisfied by finding someone who may be justly said to have caused the war, but wants to know why he was permitted to do so. Or, to put it in another form, the first question is answered by finding *one* "guilty party," whereas the second is not until we have discovered *two* "guilty parties", so to say.

And there is good reason for this *broadening* of the question. We all know that it takes two to make a bargain. And it also takes two to make a fight. One can no more fight alone than he can bargain alone. If one is looking for a fight he must find somebody who is willing to take him up before there can be a fight. If we want to find the

real explanation of this war it is not, therefore, sufficient to find the “party” that started the fight, nor even the thing he was after in starting the fight. We must go a step further and find the reason why the other party to the fight was willing to take up the fight rather than give up the thing the aggressor was after. As you know, this war was started by what is called an “ultimatum,” — a notice to “give up or fight,” — and the party receiving the notice deciding to fight rather than give up. And the real crux of our problem is to find what made the thing demanded and refused so important to the nations involved in the great conflict as to make it worth *their* while to engage in this most bloody of wars about it. In other words, we must find not merely a *first cause*, but an *efficient cause—efficient to make both sides go to war.*

Bearing this in mind, let us look at the events that led up to the war, in chronological sequence, in order to see whether or not we can discover such an efficient cause floating on the surface of the troubled waters.

On July 23rd, the Austro-Hungarian Government sent an ultimatum to Servia making certain demands, and gave as its reasons therefor that its demands were dictated, first, by a desire to

mete out adequate punishment to those guilty of complicity in the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and second, by a desire to stop a propaganda which was threatening the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

We may assume for the purposes of this first step of our investigation that the reasons stated by Austria were sufficient to make that country go to war in case her demands were not complied with. So far so good. But at the very next step we meet with difficulties. Why should Servia have refused to comply with these demands? What purpose could Servia have in protecting regicides? Even republics are now-a-days slow to protect regicides. And surely the government of His Majesty King Peter Karageorgewitch was not exerting itself on behalf of any democratic-republican principles. Nor is there any reason why Servia should want to encourage a propaganda that would bring about the disruption of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Unless she had some particular object in view as a result of that disruption. But then we are only at the beginning of our problem, — that of discovering the *object* that Servia had in either protecting the murderers of the Archduke or encouraging the

propaganda complained of, that would make it worth her while risking such a war.

And the difficulties grow as we go along. For it goes without saying that Servia would not have dared defy Austria had she had no outside backing. So that in accounting for Servia's refusal to comply with the demands of the Austrian ultimatum we must find an object worth fighting for not only for Servia but also for her backers. That brings us to Russia.

What did Russia have *at stake* in this Austro-Servian controversy, or what other *object* may she have had, that made her back up Servia? Indeed, the Czar of Russia, whose grandfather died at the hands of regicides and who has himself spent most of his life in fear of regicides, must have had some very strong reasons in backing up Servia that would make him not only risk a world-war but act as the protector of regicides. You will recall Wilhelm's letter to Nicholas in which the German Kaiser urged upon his Russian cousin their *common interest* in punishing regicides. To my mind this was the most telling appeal that could be made to the Russian Czar. And yet, it remained without an effect. What was it that robbed this appeal of its efficacy?

The official explanation that Russia went into

this world-war in order to protect a “Slavic” nation against an alien race, is, of course, a mere hollow pretext, — a pretext that would hardly be advanced even by Russia except for home consumption, and, perhaps, for the most gullible and ignorant foreigners. We all know that the non-Russian Slavs are much worse off in Russia than in Austria. The Poles are Slavs. And yet that did not deter Russia from instigating the partition of Poland. Nor from ruthlessly destroying all signs of national life among the Poles within the Russian Empire. Nor yet from otherwise oppressing them in such a manner as to gain their everlasting hatred. And even the Balkan nations themselves have had occasion to find out what Russian protection of its “little brothers” of the southern peninsula really meant. With the result, among other things, that Bulgaria is playing the role of a German dependency from fear of Russian aggression. Clearly, therefore, the “protection of a Slav nation” could not have been the real moving cause which made Russia enter upon this world-conflict. *What was it?*

After Russia came Germany. Russia having declared her readiness to “protect” Servia against Austria, Germany came upon the scene with the announcement that if Austria was not permitted

by Russia to have her way with Servia, she, Germany, would go to war with Russia, and, if necessary, with Russia's allies. What *interest* did Germany have in this quarrel? History fails to disclose any particular love or affection between the members of the royal house of Hohenzollern and the Princes of the Hapsburg family. If history discloses any predilection at all in that regard, it is to fight each other rather than fight *for* each other. Surely the killing of the Hapsburg Prince could not cause Germany's hosts to form in battle array. Nor was there anything in the "propaganda" complained of by Austria to cause Germany to go to war. Viewed from a purely German-national point of view that propaganda could only be welcome to Germany. The disruption of the Austro-Hungarian Empire — assuming that the "nefarious propaganda" could really have that effect, as was asserted by the Austro-German statesmen—would mean the attainment of the dream of German patriots for generations past,—a real United Germany. The continued existence of the Hapsburg Empire is depriving Germany of her choicest provinces, of the most ancient seats of German culture, of the most German part of Germany. Why, then, should Germany enter upon the most stupendous struggle the world has

ever seen in order to preserve the integrity of the Hapsburg Monarchy?

The official answer is that Germany was bound to Austria by treaty, and therefore had to come to her assistance. But this answer, like the "Slav brother" answer of Russia, cannot be taken seriously even in Germany. How can it be? Has not Germany herself declared, almost in the same breath, that treaties were mere "scraps of paper" when serious interests are involved? If the mere exigencies of a campaign were, according to Germany's own declaration, a sufficient reason for the breaking of a treaty which involved the commission of a crime besides, it goes without saying that the existence of a treaty could not possibly make Germany engage in a war in which, as she herself claims, her very existence is at stake. Besides, there were, as a matter of fact, no such treaty obligations. The terms of the Triple Alliance bound its members to come to each other's rescue only in case of a defensive war. Austria was clearly the aggressor. This was the position officially taken by Italy, the third member of the Triple Alliance. It is interesting to note that Italy's course has found many defenders even in Germany, and in quarters where the defensive character of the war waged by the Teutonic Allies

is vehemently insisted upon. These German defenders of Italy assert that Italy's vital interests dictated a policy of neutrality, and that this absolved her from her treaty obligations towards Germany and Austria. If these arguments are good enough to excuse a faithless ally they would most assuredly have been found more than sufficient to justify Germany's course had she desired to stay out of the fight—aside from the fact that if Germany had desired to stay out there would have been no fight. It is therefore clear that treaty obligations could not have caused Germany to enter into this war. She evidently must have some object—some *vital interest*—of her own, to assert or defend which she is fighting. What is it?

Then France took a hand in the matter and decided to join in the war. France was far removed from the seat of trouble and had no apparent interest in the original quarrel, nor in any of its complications, except as an ally of Russia. But we have already seen that "treaty obligations", as such, do not make nations go to war. And France is no exception to the rule: Had she no interest of her own she certainly would not have gone into this terrible war. What, then, was France's reason for going to war? An attempt

is made of explaining France's entry into the war by her desire to revenge herself on Germany, for the injury and humiliation suffered by her forty-four years ago. It is, to say the least, passing strange that a country burning with the passion of revenge to the extent of being willing to risk the eventualities of a war like the present one, should have been able to restrain herself for a generation and a half, and that the flames of this passion should burst forth now when most of those who have witnessed the injury and felt its effects most keenly have died out and a new generation has arisen to whom the wrongs of 1870-1871 are but a distant tradition. The truth is, that at no time was the feeling for revenge less prevalent in France than at the time immediately preceding the outbreak of this war. Besides, going to war under the conditions under which this war opened was certainly a poor way of revenging herself on Germany. You must remember that France was hardly half prepared for a war like this, and her allies were even less so. It was also well known that Germany's first move after the declaration of war would be to overrun France. Even if this should not mean final disaster for France, it would certainly mean at least enormous sacrifices. Such sacrifices are not made in order

to redress injuries which have been quietly borne for forty-four years.

Then comes the entry of England, even more of a puzzler, when only the surface of things is considered, than the action of the countries we have already discussed. England was not a party to the original quarrel. She is neither kith nor kin to the Serbs. She had no apparent interest in protecting the murderers of the Austrian Archduke; nor in the propaganda looking to the "disruption" of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. She even had no "treaty-obligations" to fall back upon. Her own explanation is that she went to war because Belgian neutrality had been violated. I shall not enter here upon a discussion of the question as to whether or not England's claim to be the protector of small nations, and particularly those that have been formally declared neutral by international agreement, is well founded. Although I do not hesitate to state my conviction that England's protection of small nations had about it the air, although perhaps not the brutal manner, of Russia's protection of the Slavs. It is not necessary to enter here upon such a historical discussion for the reason that England's attitude in the present war is quite sufficient to disprove any claim, if such be advanced, that England went

into this war for the only purpose of protecting the principle of the inviolability of neutral nations.

It should be recalled that Belgium is not the only country whose neutrality has been violated by Germany in this war. Before Belgium was invaded, the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg—a country neutralized by international agreement in the same manner as was Belgium—had been invaded by the German army. And yet England did not say a word about it, so far as we know. England never claimed and does not claim now that the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg caused her to draw the sword. There certainly is no particular sacredness about Belgian neutrality that would put it in a class by itself as compared with the neutrality of other “neutral” countries, such as Switzerland or Luxemburg. Why, then should England bear with equanimity and without so much as a protest the violation of Luxemburg’s neutrality, and at the same time be ready to go to war for the violation of the neutrality of Belgium?

Now, this does not necessarily imply, as some assert, that England’s claim that she was moved to enter into this war by the violation of Belgian neutrality, is sheer hypocrisy. That is a question

which need not be gone into here. It is sufficient for our purposes that England's discrimination between Luxemburg and Belgium proves that if England did go into the war because of the violation of Belgian neutrality, it is not because of her desire to protect the *principle* of neutrality, but because of some *vital interest* that she has in maintaining the neutrality of Belgium. And we are consequently confronted with the problem of discovering that *interest*.

And while we are about looking for efficient causes we must not restrict ourselves to those who willingly entered into the fight, but look into the case of all of those who *are* in the fight whether willingly or not. This includes Belgium. I have said in the beginning that it takes two to make a war. And while it is true that Belgium did not go to war in the same sense that the other warring countries did, she nevertheless took up the fight, having refused Germany's demand for a "peaceful" passage through her territory. This action on the part of Belgium requires just as strong reasons as does the action of the countries which formally went to war. In fact even more so. For the consequences to Belgium were immeasurably more serious, and there can be no doubt of the fact that Belgium could not but realize the

consequences to herself of her defiance of Germany's wishes. On the other hand, it does not seem, on the surface of things, that any harm could have resulted to Belgium from a compliance with Germany's demands. Why, then, should Belgium have taken the awful risks consequent upon the defiance of the greatest and most ruthless military power of modern times?

The idea that Belgium would permit herself to be "crucified" on the altar of the neutrality principle—the "scrap of paper" which her more powerful neighbors signed only to tear up whenever it proved an inconvenience—is too absurd to contemplate. What *interest* did she have to preserve? The official documents do not disclose any. It may be added that Belgium did not even have any "honor" to protect. Belgium is not a Great Power, and there is therefore nothing "dishonorable" for her in submitting to the demands of Germany; and her compliance would not have involved any loss of position in the "council of nations" as she had none to lose.

The very fact that she was a "neutral" country took her out of the category of states, great or small, which claim such position. Her position was rather that of a *ward* of the so-called Concert of Powers. By the treaty of neutrality she had dis-

claimed all pretensions as a military power, relying on her own arms for the defense of either her interests or her "honor". She put herself frankly at the mercy of her stronger neighbors. This put all considerations of so-called *honor* out of the question. And the only thing that could have possibly induced her to pursue the course that she did would be some great and vital interest. *What was it?* No representative of Belgium has so far given us any intimation thereof. Nor has it been suggested by her opponents. The claim has recently been put forward on behalf of Germany that long before the outbreak of the present war Belgium had made an arrangement with either France or England or both to pursue the cause which she actually did follow in the present war. But as to *why* she would have done so, no explanation is vouchsafed us.

The result of our examination of the surface of things for the discovery of an efficient cause for this war, has thus proven fruitless. The nearest we could get to it has been the discovery of an apparent reason for one of the original parties to the quarrel, — that is, if her own declarations be taken at their face value; — but absolutely no reason whatever for the other party to the quarrel to take Austria up, nor any reason for the other

countries to intervene and turn what was on its face a local quarrel into a world-war. There evidently must have been some other reason or reasons than those professed by the parties engaged in this war,—some reason lying deep below the surface of things, a reason deep enough and comprehensive enough to be an efficient cause for a conflagration embracing almost the entire world.

In leaving the surface of things and the explanations offered by the combatants themselves, we are confronted with a maze of suggestions as to who or what caused this war, in which it is at first glance rather hard to find one's way. But after a while we discover that after all they are merely variations on a few easily recognizable themes: It is interesting to note in his connection, F that the only thing on which most of those who have so far offered any explanation for the war agree, is, that whoever or whatever may be to blame for it, capitalism—that is the economic conditions under which we are living—is not to blame for this war. This it true even of Socialist writers, and is in striking contrast to the opinions expressed by Socialists on the same subject prior to the outbreak of the present conflict. L

When we come to classify the explanations

offered we shall find that they fall under six heads:

The first, and most prevalent in this country, is that the German Kaiser is at the bottom of the whole trouble. This is also the view of most American Socialists. "The German War Lord did it, with his little hatchet Militarism" shout most American Socialists in chorus.

Next in importance, because of their number and vociferousness, come those who put the responsibility for this war upon the Russian Czar.

Then come those who say that it is all due to England's jealousy of Germany's growing trade.

Then comes a class consisting, as far as I can ascertain, of Joshua Wanhope—a Socialist writer of some standing and chief editorial writer of the New York *Call*, the most important Socialist newspaper in this country—who puts it up squarely to Rothschild.

These four explanations, as you will have noticed, put it up to some particular person, group of persons, or nation. Then there are two which put the blame on more general causes: One is that "autocratic institutions" did it, in their desire to stem the rising tide of freedom and democracy; the others is that "the ruling classes" did it — not the ruling class of any particular country but the

ruling classes as a whole, in their desire to crush the oncoming revolution.

Now let us see what there is to these explanations.

The first explanation—that the German Kaiser did it—should not detain us very long. Mr. Wanhope, whom I have already mentioned, has disposed of this contention in an article which appeared in the Sunday *Call* last August, under the title “Was the German Kaiser Framed Up?” In this article, in which Wanhope advances his remarkable theory that Rothschild did it, he incidentally, and as a preliminary step, disposes of the German-Kaiser theory so effectively and in such a brilliant manner that I can do no better than refer you to that article for detailed and comprehensive treatment of the subject. I shall therefore limit myself here to a summary of his argument. In substance it is this:—

It is utterly absurd to imagine that one man could bring on such a war as the present one. It is particularly absurd for any Socialist to make such an assertion. The Materialistic Conception of History, which is the basis of all Socialist theory, would have to be turned inside out before such an explanation of the war could be accepted. But you need not necessarily accept

the Materialistic Conception of History in order to see the absurdity of blaming it on the Kaiser. All you need is to use some common sense. No war, much less a war like the present one, can be carried on without the expenditure of immense sums of money, such as the War Lord could not possibly raise without the assistance and active co-operation of the Money Lords. Alone he was utterly powerless to cause this war. He cannot therefore be considered the *real* cause of the war, and we must look elsewhere if we want to get to the bottom of this business.

All of which is undoubtedly true, and quite self-evident. And I may add, that the assertion that the German Kaiser did it, by, through, or for Militarism, does not really *explain* anything. It reminds me very much of the *explanation* of the mechanism of the world which ascribes the stability of our planet to the fact that it is supported by a gigantic whale or turtle. The German Kaiser went to war because of Militarism. But Militarism is no more a first cause than the enormous whale or turtle on whose back the Earth was supposed to rest. The phenomenon which we call Militarism itself needs an explanation. It too, must have some *cause*. So that this and similar explanations, like the aforementioned explanations

of the world-mechanism, simply put the problem one remove further back. They are really no *explanations at all.*

The reasoning that disposes of the Kaiser theory of the war, also disposes of the Czar theory. If the German Kaiser could not have caused the war, the Russian Czar most assuredly could not. Neither his military nor his financial powers are at all comparable to those of his German cousin. Furthermore, it must be said in defence of the Czar that whatever his transgressions may be, the crime causing war cannot be laid at his door, for he was clearly not the prime mover in this drama. The first and last steps in the opening chapter of this world-drama were taken by the Teutonic Allies. The curtain opens on Austria delivering her ultimatum to Servia, making demands which it was clear could not possibly have been complied with without Servia giving up her independence. And it closes on Germany declaring war on Russia and France, refusing to submit anything to arbitration as requested by the Czar. All that the Czar did was to declare his readiness to go to war if Austria insisted on crushing Servia. He may not have been pacific, but he was certainly passive. The active parts were clearly played by his opponents. He

could not therefore have caused the war. At most he may have helped his opponents, whoever or whatever may have been the real *moving cause* of this war.

The theory that Sir Edward Grey — alias English jealousy — caused this war is not in any better condition as an explanation of events than either of the two theories examined so far. England was not only not the prime mover in the events that led up to the war, but she was actually not in it until the war was well under way. It is conceded that England tried to have the Austro-Servian dispute settled by arbitration; also that she was ready to stay out of the war upon certain conditions looking towards the protection of Belgium and France. This would seem a rather strange course for the country that wanted to bring about the war. But let us pass that over. Let us assume that all this was part of a deep-laid scheme by which “perfidious Albion” sought to inveigle her innocent competitor into a disastrous war, — a war, by the way, which this same innocent competitor assures us England never had the slightest chance of winning. For, as is well known, England is not only very jealous, but also extremely stupid. Does that, after all, explain this war?

I think not. To begin with, English Jealousy, like French Revenge, woud have to be of a queer kind to cause a war between Germany and England just now. As is well known, Anglo-German relations were much more amicable during the period immediately preceding the war than they had been at any time during this century. This condition was due in no small degree to England's readiness to make concessions to Germany, a readiness which sometimes surprised the Germans themselves, but which fully accorded with England's declared policy of keeping out of a great war as long as she could. It was this policy that kept her out of a war with Russia since the Crimean War notwithstanding their traditional and continued enmity, due to the serious divergence of interests and intense competition of these countries on the Asiatic continent.

But there is even more serious objection to the English Jealousy theory. At most it could explain only England's participation in the war. Just as French Revenge could explain only French participation in it. Neither could explain the participation of all the other nations. In other words, either of these theories might at most explain the *participation* of the respective countries to which they apply in the World War, but

neither separately nor together could they explain the bringing about of a World War. England and France, it should also be remembered, are ancient enemies. The Fashoda incident is still fresh in our memory. Granted, however, that English Jealousy and French Revenge are sufficient to account for France and England now joining hands against the common object of their aforesaid respective national attributes, how could these have caused Russia to take the position which she took on the Austro-Servian question, which was the pivot on which the question of peace and war hinged after Austria set the ball rolling by her ultimatum? Assuredly Russia was not going into this greatest of all wars known to history merely to help her ancient enemy, England—many of whose people even now openly declare that the alliance with Russia is a disgrace to their country, and with whom, it is even now freely asserted, she will ultimately have to go to war in order to settle their Asiatic and Mediterranean accounts.

Then there is Belgium to baffle us still further. Why should Belgium sacrifice herself on the altar of English Jealousy of Germany?

English Jealousy as an explanation of the great World War is, therefore, a complete failure.

So we must turn to the next explanation in

order, — Mr. Rothschild. I bespeak your earnest attention for that gentleman. For, fanciful as the Rothschild theory seems to be, and utterly erroneous though I hope to prove it, it is a laudable attempt to cut away from the dry rot and the beaten tracks in which most of the discussion about the causes of the present war has been wandering. It has at least the merit of originality and of considerable ingenuity. The substance of this theory is, that Rothschild, disliking the Kaiser, “sicked” him on to the Allies, giving him the money necessary to wage war on them, in the hope that the poor Kaiser would break his neck in the enterprise. To use Mr. Wanhope’s own expressive phrase: The Kaiser was “framed up” by Rothschild, who was acting the part of an international *agent provocateur*.

Unfortunately, the theory of a “frame up” does not “hold water” upon closer scrutiny. It is confronted at the very outset with the difficulty that every argument which Wanhope advances to prove the absurdity of the idea that one man could cause such a world-war as is the present conflict, can be advanced with equal force against the idea that one man could do it even if that one man were Rothschild. Rothschild is by no means in a better position to accomplish that

gigantic feat than is the Kaiser. Of course, by "Rothschild" Mr. Wanhope does not mean an individual, but the great banking interests. But it must be remembered, that by "the Kaiser," and "the Czar", when used in this connection, is not meant the persons of Wilhelm II, or Nicholas II, but the group of which these two worthies are the respective heads, otherwise known as "The Military Machine", "The Military Clique", "Junkerdom", "The Grand Ducal Cabal", "Hofcamarilla", etc., etc. In other words: The Military Party in Germany and whatever may correspond to it in Russia. And if the German Kaiser and the Junkers who compose the Military Party in that country could not bring about the war then surely Rothschild with his group of bankers could not do it.

The preference which Wanhope gives to Rothschild over the Kaiser, as a cause of war is based on the assumption that Rothschild has sufficient money for war-purposes while the Kaiser hasn't. But this assumption is clearly unwarranted. "Rothschild" has no more money for such purposes than "the Kaiser". Bankers never lend their own money. If those who borrow from bankers, including the governments which borrow from "Rothschild", would depend on the banker's own

money they would be very badly off. In fact a man who lends his own money is not a banker. He is an *investor*. It is of the essence of banking that you lend *other people's money*. But when it comes to lending other people's money you must ask them whether they want their money loaned and to whom. Of course, that does not apply to lending small sums, nor of comparatively large sums, made up of small-fry deposits. But when it comes to lending the many billions of dollars which the German Kaiser needs to carry on this war the gentlemen bankers must ask the capitalist class, who alone can furnish it. And if the capitalist class as a whole does not want the war, the money will not be forthcoming, either through the bankers or otherwise.

Of course, the bankers are themselves an important and very influential portion of the capitalist class. But they are not *the* capitalist class by any means. And as a separate group they are by no means a more substantial economic group than the Kaiser and the "Military Party". Mr. Rothschild's importance is not in his own right, so to say, but by virtue of the fact that he usually represents the capitalist class. And his importance, therefore, adheres to him only so long as he does in fact represent the capitalist class. The idea,

therefore, that Mr. Rothschild as Mr. Rothschild, that is in his character as banker, representing only the banking interests *as such*, could, without reference to the capitalist class as a whole, furnish the Kaiser with the sinews of war is utterly fallacious. This makes it unnecessary for us to discuss the reason given by Wanhope for Rothschild's dislike of the Kaiser which led him to arrange the "frame up". That is, in so far as those reasons are sufficient for Mr. Rothschild in his narrow and limited character of banker with special banking interests. There is still the possibility that Mr. Rothschild is speaking in his larger capacity of leader of the capitalist class, representing not narrow banking interests as such and distinguished from the interests of the capitalist class as a whole, but the entire capitalist class, or at least its controlling economic powers. But then Mr. Rothschild expands into the capitalist class not only in his money-furnishing capacity, but also in the reasons for the dislike of the Kaiser. That is, the dislike of the Kaiser must be by the capitalist class, or at least its most important section, and then the question is to be answered: "What's the matter with the Kaiser?" from the capitalist point of view.

The suggestion is offered that Mr. Rothschild—

that is, the capitalist class—does not like the interference of autocrats in his business, and therefore prefers the republican or parliamentary form of government. But this suggestion is insufficient on its face as a reason for the “framing up” of the Kaiser. In the first place, it must be conceded that autocratic as the German Kaiser undoubtedly is, he is considerably less so than his cousin the Russian Czar. That he should be singled out for destruction while his cousin of Petrograd is not only let alone but actually made a pet of is certainly strange. As a matter of fact the liking of the capitalist class for republican-democratic forms of government is a mere tradition. It would be no difficult matter to prove that while the capitalist class can and does thrive very well under republican-democratic forms of government, and under certain circumstances actually prefers them, its ardor for these forms of government has not only cooled off considerably during the life of this generation, but has actually largely turned into its opposite. So that, on the whole, the capitalist class to-day not only gets on very well with “the Kaiser”, but grows to like his government more and more from day to day. In fact, the only kind of autocratic government of which the capitalist class still disapproves—in so

far as it still does disapprove of *any* kind of autocratic government—is the obsolete one of the Russian type.

And yet we are asked to believe that Mr. Rothschild, representing the capitalist class, overlooked the Russian Czar, indeed entered into alliance with him, but singled out the German Kaiser for destruction.

But let us pass that for a moment. Let us assume that for some reason as yet undiscovered by us the capitalist class does not approve of the Kaiser, and that its business-committee, the “banking interests”, have decided to put him out of business. Is it at all likely that they would go about it in the manner assumed by the *Rothschild theory of the war?*

It should be remembered that the Kaiser could not be where he is, nor *what* he is, if the capitalist class disapproved of him as thoroughly as must be assumed in order to make this theory at all intelligible. If the capitalist class disapproved of the Kaiser as seriously as all that, he could no more maintain himself as the head of the German people than Mr. Huerta could as the head of the Mexican people when “we” disapproved of him; but if he could perchance maintain himself at the head of the governmental machine of Germany, it is beyond

possibility that he could not maintain that government in the degree of efficiency which it has attained, and, above all, he could not maintain the German army in that degree of efficiency that makes it the formidable weapon of warfare that it undoubtedly is. To maintain the German army in its present state of efficiency "three things are needed — money, money, and money."

If it were true, therefore, that the capitalist class wanted to put the Kaiser out of business, the surest, indeed the *only* way of accomplishing that result would be for them not to give him the money which was necessary to put his government and his *army and navy* in their present state of efficiency. That would probably have compelled him either to entirely abdicate or to change his attitude towards the capitalist class by instituting such *reforms* in the government of Germany as the capitalist class might demand. And if he should prove utterly unamenable to reason, *then* it would have been time enough to call in outsiders. And then it would hardly have been a war, it would probably have been called "intervention"—an enterprise much less costly, and, above all, much more certain of the desired result than a war like the present one. It would seem an utterly absurd and extremely unbusinesslike way

of "framing up" the Kaiser to first give him all the money he needed for the purpose of so perfecting his war-machine as to make it well-nigh unconquerable—if not actually so—and then try to beat him at his own fighting-game.

The absurdity of the idea becomes even more apparent when we recall that according to Mr. Wanhope's own statement—a statement undoubtedly true — even with his military machine in its present state of efficiency, the Kaiser could not have entered upon this war without the funds supplied to him by Mr. Rothschild, representing the capitalists. In other words, without these funds his war machine could not have functioned on a war basis. He could not therefore have gone into the war, or if he did go into it he would not have maintained himself for any appreciable length of time. Why, then, did the capitalist class furnish the Kaiser with the necessary funds to give him the fighting chance, a fighting chance which he, in his collective capacity undoubtedly a good "fighting-man", considered good enough to risk a war of aggression on, a fighting-chance, indeed, which may yet prove Mr. "Rothschild" to have made a grievous error in his calculations as to the outcome of the fighting. The idea is simply preposterous!

You must remember that this war is no play matter even for the capitalist class. I know it is the fashion among Socialists to assume and assert that the burdens and miseries of war are borne wholly by the working class, and that for the capitalist class it is a sort of picnic, abounding in fun and excitement, besides being a good business. I shall not enter here upon a discussion as to how far this is true of war in general. But as to the present war, I must say that the idea is utterly baseless. This war is certainly no picnic for any social class. Certainly not to the capitalist class, either in the Alliance or the Entente countries. It is even doubtful whether it is good business. The destruction of property is entirely too great for that. As to the destruction of life it is so appalling, and so indiscriminate as to class, as to make the sacrifices of the capitalist class very real and very substantial. In fact, from their point of view their sacrifices are much greater than those of the working class, which has nothing but its limbs and lives to offer for its country. Of course, this last assertion on the part of the capitalist class is due entirely to its narrow-minded capitalist outlook upon the world and inhabitants thereof. But even this erroneous claim is of importance when we come to

consider the likelihood of the capitalist class going into this war either thoughtlessly or needlessly. For even an erroneous idea born of narrow-minded class-bigotry is a real psychological factor which may exert a great influence upon action.

There can, therefore, be no doubt of the fact that the capitalist class is backing up this war with its money and its lives not because it wanted to "frame up" somebody so that he may break his neck, but because some great capitalist interests are involved; interests for which it considers it worth while to make great sacrifices in lives and money—which accounts for the enthusiasm displayed by the capitalist class for this war in all the belligerent countries, by the capitalists fighting on the side of the Kaiser at least as much as, if not more than, by the capitalists of the countries fighting against him. What is that *interest*? So that we are still on the quest for the interest of any of those engaged in this war.

And our labors are not likely to be better rewarded by an examination of the two remaining explanations. That this is a war of "autocratic institutions" on the one hand against Freedom and Democracy on the other is a proposition which needs only to be stated in order to be refuted. For when you have stated it you will find yourself at

a loss to point out which is which. And unless it is known in advance on which side you are no one will be able to tell which you refer to as "Autocratic Institutions" and which as "Freedom and Democracy." It seems to me quite self-evident that in a war in which Germany, Austria and Turkey are ranged on the one side and Russia, France and England with Japan on the other, it is quite impossible for any quibbler on either side to claim that the war was *started* either by Freedom and Democracy to stamp out the remnants of Autocracy or by Autocracy to stem the "rising tide of Democracy". It seems to me self-evident that were this a struggle between Autocracy and Democracy as such, the alignment of powers would have been quite a different one. If *anything* can be considered certain in international affairs it is this: *In such a struggle the Czar and the Kaiser would be fighting side by side instead of against each other.*

So there remains only the explanation that the ruling classes of all the countries engaged in this war, have brought this war about in order to stifle the revolutionary movement.

I must confess I am somewhat biased in favor of this explanation, — it accords with an opinion long held by Socialists that when the capitalist

class of any country finds itself threatened by internal revolution it will resort to external war in an attempt to weaken the working class physically and morally. It must also be conceded that it is the only explanation offered thus far which shows any appreciation of the laws of cause and effect and of the relation in which a means stands to its object. Those who take this view at least can point to the fact that this war *has had* the result of practically destroying the international Socialist movement, or at least incapacitating it for decades to come. At least that will in all likelihood be its effect, unless this madness is carried so far — the war carried on so long — that it will bring the entire capitalist system to the verge of collapse, when the sheer weight of the accumulated misery shall have caused a decided revulsion of feeling on the part of the working class. If, therefore, the purpose of the ruling classes had been the disorganization of the working class and the crippling of its emancipatory movement, they certainly could not have selected a better means of accomplishing their purpose than the present war.

And yet, notwithstanding the obvious temptation to ascribe to a ruthless and crafty foe the deliberate designing of a certain baneful result

which his acts have brought about, I am sure that a careful and dispassionate examination of the actual facts will not justify such a conclusion. The break-down of the international labor movement was undoubtedly a prize well worth making some sacrifices for. But neither the condition of the movement in the different countries during the time immediately preceding the outbreak of the war, nor the manner in which the war was brought about, nor yet the manner in which it has been conducted since its outbreak, at all accord with the theory of either a real or a sham battle between the different groups of the ruling classes for the purpose of destroying the revolutionary efficacy of the working class.

The idea of this war being a sham battle as far as the ruling classes of the different countries are concerned, and that the war is a "frame-up" upon the working class, deserves to be classed for absurdity and preposterousness with the theory that Rothschild "framed up" the Kaiser. In fact it goes that theory one better. For that theory at least concedes the reality of the fighting on the part of all concerned, while this proceeds upon the assumption that the only real fighting is done by members of the working class. But as I have already stated before, in this war at least, the ruling

classes fight with might and main as much as the working class. There is certainly no sham about the fighting in this war, and this applies about equally to all concerned. So that the only version of this theory that can be seriously considered is that one, or some, or all the countries engaged in the present war deliberately brought about this greatest of conflicts in an effort to avert an impending revolution or throttle a growing revolutionary movement.

The efficacy of fighting a foreign enemy as a means of suppressing an internal enemy, has been brilliantly vindicated in this very war, the causes of which we are investigating. The recipe is, however, of ancient origin, and has been repeatedly tried with marked success by sundry rulers and ruling classes in ancient as well as modern times. War might well be called the grave of incipient revolutions. But, on the other hand, war might with equal propriety be called the mother of revolutions, for many a revolution was born of war, or at least had its birth hastened by war. And we do not have to go far afield into history in order to find examples of war-born revolutions. The present French Republic is the result of a revolution brought about by a war, — the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71; and the last great war

preceding the present war, the Russo-Japanese War, had as its aftermath a revolution, — the Russian Revolution.

This double-character of war as a preventive of revolutions and as a cause of revolutions, naturally requires extreme care in its handling whenever it is desired to make use of it in its first character. Two circumstances must unite before any ruler or ruling class will resort to it as a means of combating a revolutionary movement: the danger of revolution must be *imminent*, and the prospective war must have some inherent element of popularity. War is a serious matter for any country, at any time. It is particularly serious for a country threatened with revolution, both as a war and as a possible revolution-breeder. Going to war to prevent a revolution is therefore in the nature of a capital operation, which no one would be foolhardy enough to undergo unless the danger sought to be avoided is so imminent as to make death almost a certainty if the operation is not risked. On the other hand, no matter how grave the danger, the operation will not be undertaken unless the circumstances are such as to give some chance of success instead of insuring the end which it is desired to avoid. An *unpopular* war would be almost sure to hasten an impending re-

volution, instead of averting it. Let us therefore make a brief survey of conditions in the countries engaged in the present war in order to ascertain whether they were such as to justify the assumption that all or any of them could have caused this war in order to prevent an impending revolution.

There was Austria-Hungary, who set the ball rolling. I do not think there is a man living who would dare to assert that there was in that country the slightest indication of impending revolution, not only imminent but even remote. It is true that in Austria at least there was a strong Socialist movement, but the movement was of a kind that, whatever else might be thought of it, surely no one could think for a moment that it would or might break out into revolt at any time within the near future. And by this I do not at all mean to reflect on the revolutionary character of the Austrian Socialist movement, although one is very much tempted to do so, seeing the way they reacted on the call to arms issued by their government. Hindsight is proverbially better than foresight. And we may now from the vantage-point of after the fact safely place a low estimate on the revolutionary character of the Austrian Socialist movement. But we do not need our post-bellum

experience to take the revolutionary measure of the Austrian Socialist movement. "Revolutionary" being used here in the sense and from the point of view of the government which is supposed to be seeking to suppress it. In this sense "revolution" means an acute eruption. For a government will no more attempt to prevent an "evolutionary" revolution by means of a war, than an individual would attempt to cure by a capital operation one of those chronic ailments with which men often live to die of old age.

And what was said of Austria is equally true of her ally and mentor, Germany. The Socialist movement in Germany was, indeed, considerably stronger than in Austria. But to offset that, the spirit of orderliness, decorum, and "evolutionism" was much stronger in the German movement than in the Austrian. Its determination not to be provoked into a *premature* fight was well known. Whether from choice or necessity it had long ago resolved to attain its purposes by legal ends, and it was quite certain in July, 1914, that it would not take the initiative to transfer the fight to extra-legal fields; at least, not unless something quite extraordinary happened to swerve it from its former course.

So much for the Austro-German combination.

And substantially the same is true of the other side.

There was, indeed, a very serious strike in Russia immediately preceding the war. But it was certainly not of a character to warrant a resort to war. And of all European rulers the Russian Czar was the least likely to be tempted to resort to war as means of suppressing a revolution. The disastrous effects of the Russo-Japanese War on the internal affairs of his Empire were too fresh in his memory for that. It may also be stated parenthetically that had the Russian Czar really found himself in such a critical situation as to require a resort to such heroic measures, his good friend and cousin of Berlin would have come to his assistance, and if there had been a war at all it would have assumed an entirely different character.

Of Russia's allies, neither France nor England were threatened with any revolutionary movement that anybody was aware of. In France there were some individuals who talked loud, but the old saying that "barking dogs don't bite" seems to have been specially cut to fit them. They had barked for years without doing anything in particular. It may also be remarked that they did not even bark their loudest about this time. So

there was no occasion for any extraordinary measures in the way of revolution-preventing. And certainly not the slightest reason for a war on that score.

England hadn't had a revolution nor any real revolutionary movement in so long a time that the idea of England going into this world-struggle in order to avert a revolution strikes one like an echo from Gilbert and Sullivan. As far as we know neither the Parliamentary Labor Party, nor the Independent Labor Party, nor the British Socialist Party were at all likely to institute a revolution within the near future. It is true that there were two disturbing factors to ruffle England's peace of mind in the persons of Mr. Hilaire Belloc and Sir Edward Carson. But the danger was hardly imminent enough to require immediate mobilization. Mr. Belloc's mystical speculations had hardly assumed definite enough shape to make immediate action urgent. And Sir Edward's differences with His Majesty's Government were of a kind that are never settled by the same means as are differences between ruling classes and the "lower orders". If Sir Edward's opposition had really become very serious the chances are that the dispute would have been terminated by Sir Edward becoming His Majesty's Government and

Mr. Asquith turning into His Majesty's Opposition.

In short, the very first element of a situation requiring a war to suppress "the rising tide of the revolution" — namely the presence of that "rising tide" — is entirely lacking. As without a threatening revolution there could be no war to suppress it, it is unnecessary to discuss the second question, namely, whether the war could have been expected to be popular enough to prevent a revolution if one had been threatened. Nevertheless, I shall say, "for the purposes of the record", that the war *did have* all the chances of proving a very popular one in all the countries concerned. But this raises another and very interesting question: Why *is* this war so popular? In the lectures which are to come I shall therefore endeavor to answer not only the question "What brought about the war?", but also the question: "What makes this war so immensely popular?"

II

THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE WAR

IN my first lecture I stated that, in this country at least, it seems to be agreed on all sides, even among Socialists, that economic conditions or economic development *did not* cause this war. And I intimated that I did not share this well-nigh universal opinion, and was inclined to agree with what is, or rather used to be, considered the Socialist view in such matters and ascribed the gigantic struggle now raging in Europe to economic causes.

The opposition to, or dissent from, what might be termed the economic view of the war, was thus stated by a Socialist in a Socialist publication,— Dr. Isaac A. Hourwich, writing in the *New Review*:

“There is a tendency among orthodox Socialists

to blame everything upon capitalism, and more specifically upon the capitalist class, or 'the capitalist governments.' This habit of thought is particularly strong in the United States, where the capitalists are the dominant, although not the only power in politics. As I have had occasion to show elsewhere, even in the United States the capitalists and the wage-workers are not the only social-economic classes. In Europe there is no nation whose government can be scientifically defined as a 'capitalist government' . . . The manufacturers of armaments are the only group of the capitalist class that is directly interested in militarism. The Imperialistic adventures further the interests only of a limited group of manufacturers, directly or indirectly interested in the export trade with the Colonies. Nowadays piracy is no longer an integral part of maritime trade, as in the days of the Phoenicians. German manufacturers can safely ship their goods to South America in competition with English manufacturers, without the protection of the German navy. It is therefore misleading to seek the causes of this war in the wiles of 'the capitalist class.' "

Now, while I acknowledge myself belonging among those here referred to as "orthodox Socia-

lists", and intend to present here their point of view, I have no sympathy whatever with the manner in which some of them attempt to explain the phenomenon of war generally and the present war in particular. Such hackneyed phrases as "wars are the result of capitalism", "capitalists need new markets", etc., etc., unfortunately so much in vogue among Socialists, are either false or meaningless. And I do not at all blame those to whom such formulas are offered as a ready-made *explanation* of all wars—without any real attempt to look into the facts of the particular situation—for rejecting them as an unwarranted attempt to "blame it" all on capitalism, and an easy way for the mentally lazy to escape the necessity of studying a rather complicated problem. That *all* wars were *not* the result of capitalism is, of course, self-evident, as quite a considerable number of wars took place before the capitalistic era. But it is not even true that capitalism is particularly warlike, as a glance into the pages of history will conclusively show.

On consulting any reliable history we shall find, for instance, that the *XIX Century*, the century which saw the greatest development of capitalism, was far from being a war-era. On the contrary:

compared with the two or three centuries that preceded it, it was of a distinctly peaceful character.

We shall find, furthermore, that England, the classic country of capitalism in the XIX Century, was very far from being a warlike nation during that century. Whatever may have been John Bull's reputation for bellicoseness in the days of long ago, he was a distinctly pacific individual during the past one hundred years. We are therefore confronted with the indisputable fact that the most capitalistic nation in the most capitalistic age was distinctly peaceful.

In fact, an examination of the chronology and geography of wars during the last couple of hundred years might easily lead us to the conclusion that the world instead of becoming more warlike with the growth of capitalism was steadily becoming more and more pacific under its influence. Let us consider this: The "civilized world", that is, the capitalistic world, hasn't had a general war in a hundred years—since the close of the Napoleonic Wars; and no great war in forty-four years—since the Franco-Prussian War. The Russo-Turkish War of 1878 was hardly a great war; and even that was thirty-six years ago. In fact, the Franco-Prussian War was not

only the last great European war, but was the last war of any kind waged by any of the capitalistically developed nations of Europe among themselves. All that there was of war, in Europe, since then was confined to one spot—the most uncapitalistic corner of Europe—the Balkans.

The conclusion that capitalism is—as such—peaceful, would, however, be just as erroneous as the contrary assertion that it is, by its very nature, warlike. The truth is, that capitalism—as such—is neither peaceful nor warlike. Different groups within capitalist society are either peaceful or warlike as their interests, or supposed interests, may dictate. There is, therefore, very seldom any unanimity of opinion in the capitalist class as to the desirability of war at any given time in any given nation. Nevertheless, it must not be assumed that the capitalist class as a whole and the nations which it dominates are utterly devoid of character on the subject of war and peace; or that this character stands in no organic connection with its capitalist economy. A careful examination of “all the facts in the case” will show that the question of war and peace is deeply rooted in the economy of nations. Our conclusion must, therefore be: capitalism is neither peaceful

nor warlike, but has its peaceful and warlike moods, corresponding to different phases of its development.

Without going into detail it may be stated as a general proposition that the life-history of capitalist society may be divided, for our purposes, into *three epochs—two of them warlike and one peaceful*. In its youthful days capitalism is combative—its growth from infancy to manhood being accompanied by a series of wars in which its distinctively capitalistic character asserts itself. After it has reached to “man’s estate” capitalism grows pacific; and its attention, in the prime of its vigor, is directed mainly to household economy, in the belief that a well-ordered household and “attention to business” are the sure basis of prosperity. But after capitalism — understanding under that term a society based on the principle of free competition—has passed its zenith, when on the downward grade, it develops extreme irritability of temper and returns to the warlike mood of its earlier days.

The history of England well illustrates this proposition. There was a time when England was a very warlike country. The two hundred years which elapsed from the accession of Eliza-

beth to the close of the Seven Years' War witnessed an almost unbroken procession of English wars; and it was during these two hundred years that England established her position as the leading commercial and manufacturing country of the world. But with the close of the Seven Years' War, when England finally established her position in the vanguard of commercialism and reached her capitalistic majority, so to say, she "settled down" and entered upon a pacific era. And she continued in her pacific mood until the day before yesterday. It is true that she fought the great Napoleonic Wars during the early part of this period. But the Napoleonic Wars were quite exceptional in their character, produced by exceptional circumstances, and do not militate against England's generally pacific character during the period under consideration. During the one hundred years which elapsed between the close of the Napoleonic Wars and the outbreak of the present war England practically had no European war, hardly any real war in fact. Certainly nothing that could compare either in size or importance with any of the great struggles of previous epochs in her history or with the great struggle now raging.

I have searched my memory for the record of any European war conducted by England during the past one hundred years, and the only thing that I can recall is her participation in the Crimean War. But that certainly was no war, as far as England's participation in it was concerned. It was merely a warlike incident or episode. And those who are familiar with that incident will recall that the English capitalists were dragged into that war against their will. The true representatives of capitalism were strongly opposed to that war, and when England was finally dragged into it, her half-heartedness in the affair limited her participation therein to the sending of an expeditionary force.

That incident occurred sixty years ago, and since then England has been at peace with all her European neighbors. She has manifested the same pacific character in other quarters of the globe, and down into the modern imperialistic era. Let there be no mistake about it. Notwithstanding her exceptional position as a world-empire with interests in every quarter of the globe, England was not a leader of nations in the modern era of imperialism, but modestly followed the lead of others, principally that of Germany.

It is sufficient to look into the history of the so-called "partition" of Africa, during the past thirty years or so, to find the proof of this assertion. Those who have followed the manifestations of modern imperialism in that part of the world will doubtless recall that back in 1882, when Germany started on her Imperialistic career, Germany made a proposition to England for "joint action"—joint occupation or partition—of the Western coast of Africa, particularly Southwest Africa. That was at a time when Germany was a much weaker power than she is to-day, and her imperialism much less vigorous. England, on the other hand, was the undisputed mistress of the seas, and in possession of South Africa, which brought at least Southwest Africa within her "sphere of influence", when viewed from the modern imperialistic point of view. And had England been as imperialistic as Germany, or as she is herself to-day, she would either have gone into the joint adventure with Germany, or grabbed that particular slice of Africa herself without any partners. But that was in 1882, and England was still dreaming dreams of peace. So she did not make any move, with the result that, after a couple of years of waiting, Germany con-

cluded that there was nothing either to expect or to fear from England; she therefore undertook the job single-handed and occupied what is now known as German South West Africa.

The same story, in a general way, is told by the history of the occupation of the eastern coast of Africa. For years England refused to take advantage of the many opportunities which presented themselves to her for the purpose of strengthening her position in that region by extending its dominion.

A very marked proof of England's general pacific character even as late as 1890, and the remoteness of the possibility of war to the minds of her statesmen, is shown by her cession of the island of Heligoland to Germany in that year. If you will bear in mind that the first big naval defeat suffered by England in the present war was inflicted upon her by the Germans using their naval base at Heligoland, you will appreciate how important a strategic position Heligoland is, and how little England must have thought of war with Germany in 1890. How times have changed since then! To-day even the most pacific of Englishmen, those who are opposed to England's exacting any kind of "compensation" from Ger-

many after a successful termination of the war, still insist, when discussing the terms of peace as they ought to be, on making an exception of Heligoland. This England should have back by all means. And yet she gave it away freely less than twenty-five years ago.

Now, as I have already stated, this apparent love for peace is not at all a characteristic of the English nation. There was a time when England was one of the most warlike nations of Europe. And as I shall attempt to show later on, England is again becoming warlike. But for the present we are interested in her pacific period. It is, of course, hard to determine upon an exact date when the change from the earlier warlike period to the pacific one which I have just been discussing occurred. Such transitions are more or less slow and gradual. In a general way it may be said, however, as already intimated, that the early warlike period of English Capitalism closed with the Seven Years' War. The first manifestation of England's turn to a more pacific mood was her management of our War of Independence.

It may perhaps jar on the sensitive ears of our good patriots, but the truth must be told—and the truth is, that the success of our War of Independ-

ence was due not so much to the prowess and love of liberty of the "embattled farmers" at Bunker Hill and Lexington or to the military genius of George Washington, as to the fact that England did not care to exert herself overmuch, and to make great sacrifices in order to keep us. If England had wanted badly to keep the Colonies, there is no doubt but that the war would have had another result. Of course nobody can tell now whether England could in any event have managed to keep us as a dependency until the present day. But it is safe to say that she could have retained us as a colony for a considerable time after 1783. That we gained our independence at the time we did was due mainly, if not entirely, to the fact that England did not really care very much whether we remained a subject colony or became a free and independent nation. Of course, if she could have kept us without a fight she would have done so. But the practical question that confronted England was not whether or not she wanted to keep us, but whether or not she was ready to wage a *real* war in order to keep us. And this she decided in the negative.

I stated in my first lecture that it takes two to make a war. And that before two states will go

to war there must be an object worth fighting for, for both sides. In our War of Independence we had a great object to fight for—independence. But England did not think that depriving us of our independence was object enough for her to wage a great war about. And so after making a show of fight, sufficient to find that we were in earnest and ready to fight a big fight, and that her own people did not think the fight worth while, official England capitulated, and allowed us our independence. In this connection it is well to remember that about thirty years after the conclusion of the War of Independence we waged a second war with England, the War of 1812. And if you will consult a serious history you will find that in that war we got a sound thrashing from England, notwithstanding the fact that we were then a much bigger people, with over thirty years of existence as an independent nation, and that England was exhausted by a generation of war in Europe—the great Napoleonic Wars. If England could “lick” us in 1812 she would have had no trouble in doing so thirty years earlier, had she really cared to.

But why did she not care?

Of course, we all remember Burke's great

speech on Conciliation with America—the beautiful periods and fiery invective in which he proved our right to independence to his and our satisfaction, but which when stripped of their oratorical garb simply proved that the English public opinion which he expressed did not consider America worth fighting for. Of course, being a true orator, Burke only glided on the surface of things. You will not, therefore, find the true reason for England's unwillingness to fight in order to retain us, in his celebrated oration. But you will find it in a less celebrated, though no less important work—Adam Smith's *Essay on Colonies*. Smith's Essay was the meat of the meal of which Burke's Oration was the dessert, or rather the sparkling champagne.

As you know, Smith was the father of classical political economy—the sacred gospel of Capitalism in its vigor of manhood. And his *Essay on Colonies* is part of this gospel, twin-brother and necessary corollary to the main article of faith—Free Trade.

The sum and substance of the Essay is that colonies are not worth having. Smith's major premise—proved by a long and rather devious process of economic reasoning—is that exclusive trade

between the “mother-country” and the colony, or preferential tariffs in favor of the “mother-country”, are harmful not only to the colony and the world at large, but also to the “mother-country”. The proper policy, therefore, to be pursued by the “mother-country” is to permit the colony to trade freely and on equal terms with the world at large—free trade for the colonies. It then follows as an irresistible conclusion that colonies are nothing but an unnecessary trouble and expense. If France and the rest of the world, can trade with an English colony on the same terms as England herself, England not only does not derive any special benefit from “possessing” the colony, but is in fact at a disadvantage, because she must meet the competition of the whole world as if she didn’t “own” the colony at all, while at the same time carrying the burden of her civil administration and military protection. “Possessing” a colony, under such circumstances, is like possessing a white elephant.

This is the spring that fed the well of Burkian oratory. It flowed freely for over a hundred years, determining the character not only of a good deal of English oratory but also of English colonial and foreign policy.

Towards the close of this period, just one hundred years after our War of Independence, we find England doing in South Africa what she had done a hundred years before in North America. As I have already stated, England was rather tardy in asserting her rights of sovereignty in the Southern part of the African continent. It took some time and considerable complications before she asserted her overlordship over the two Boer Republics adjoining her settlements at and near the Cape. Shortly after she did bring these two republics under her protecting wing, the Boers inhabiting them followed our example of a hundred years before and declared their independence; and upon England's refusal to accede, they took up arms to fight for their freedom. The "embattled farmers" of the Boer country, like our forefathers of old, defeated the English at their Bunker Hill—which they called Majuba Hill—and England speedily gave in, concluding a peace whereby it recognized their independence. Much as in our case.

But here the analogy ends. The Boers, also, had another war with England—some fifteen years after their War of Independence. But the second Boer War took an entirely different course

from the second American War. Or, rather, the course of the war itself was similar enough, for England was victorious in both. But the results were as dissimilar as they could possibly be. After the War of 1812, England, her victories notwithstanding, was content to leave not only our independence unimpaired but our territory undiminished, never attempting to take away a foot of our soil. But when the second Boer War was over the two Boer Republics were no more; England insisted on robbing the Boers of the independence of which she had practically made them a free gift only a few years before.

But during the few years which elapsed between the first and the second Boer War a change of spirit had come over England and over the world at large. The new imperialistic era had set in. When the first Boer War took place, in 1884, the wave of the new imperialism was just beginning to rise. But it had not reached England yet. England was still the classic land of Capitalism—the land of *classic* Capitalism: of classic political economy, free trade, Manchesterism generally, including Adam Smith's *Essay on Colonies*. But during the second Boer War Joseph Chamberlain, of Birmingham, was the director of England's colonial policy.

The change was significant. For a century Manchester was the leading city in England, industrially speaking. It was the center of England's textile industry, which meant of the world's textile industry. And the textile industry was the leading industry of the capitalist world. Capitalism meant textiles. Manchester was, therefore, the industrial capital of the world. Its political representatives were the typical statesmen of Capitalism. Its philosophy was *the philosophy* of Capitalism.

Birmingham does not deal in textiles. It is the city of iron and steel, the headquarters of the iron and steel industry of England. Its peculiar influence on English politics is of recent date, but quite marked in its character. In 1895 Joseph Chamberlain, that is to say, iron and steel, entered the cabinet in a leading position—symbolizing the entry of iron and steel into high place in politics in recognition of the fact that the centre of gravity in the industrial world had shifted from textiles to iron and steel. To-day iron and steel is the leading industry of Capitalism. Capitalism is in its Iron Age. If you want to know how the capitalist world, the world of business, is faring—if you want to touch the pulse of Capitalism—you look

for the market reports on iron and steel. And if you are looking for the real power in present-day politics in the most highly developed countries of the world you will be wise to mark the representatives of the great iron and steel industry.

The official entry of iron and steel as a leading factor of English politics has a peculiar interest for us in connection with the subject which we are discussing. Some of us still remember the gasp of surprise with which the world received the announcement that Chamberlain had selected the Colonial Office as his particular field of activity in the Government of which he was to be the leading factor. Until then the post of Colonial Secretary was considered a minor one in the English Cabinet. And the world looked on in astonishment as Chamberlain passed the Chancellorship of the Exchequer—which he should have taken had he followed tradition—and the other great posts, until he reached the Colonial Secretaryship, almost at the bottom of the list.

But the entry of Chamberlain into office meant not only the entry of a new industry into a leading position in English politics, it meant a radical change in the entire character of politics,

It meant, indeed, the opening of a new era in the history of Capitalism—the era of “Colonial Policy” and “World Politics”. Or, at least, England’s entry into the New Phase. This great change was symbolized by the raising of the Colonial Secretaryship to a place of first importance in the English Cabinet. But it had more than symbolical significance. Chamberlain meant business. He did not take the Colonial Office because of a mere whim or for sentimental reasons. It was in order to give a new course to English colonial policy. Within a few years the full significance of the change became apparent: the Boer War was fought and the Boer Republics blotted out, repudiating not only England’s former policy with reference to the Boer settlers in South Africa, but her entire colonial and foreign policy of more than a century. And, incidentally, classical political economy and the whole philosophy of Manchesterism.

It is true that the triumph of the new principle, the triumph of Birmingham over Manchester, was by no means complete. The old order is fighting for its life, and the fight is still going on. But the indications are abundant that notwithstanding England’s comparative backwardness—

as evidenced by the fact that Chamberlain could not carry with him even his own party for the whole length of his colonial and tariff policy—the new order is making constant if not rapid gains. England is taking her place in the Imperialistic procession.

Modern Imperialism, as I have already indicated, is the politico-social expression of the economic fact that iron and steel have taken the place of textiles, as the leading industry of Capitalism. And imperialism means war. Textiles, therefore, mean peace; iron and steel—war.

In order to see the reason *why*, we must hark back for a moment to Dr. Hourwich's criticism of the so-called "orthodox" Socialists, which I quoted at the beginning of this lecture. You will remember his scoffing at the idea that Germany had to go to war in an effort to sell her goods—which is supposed to be the position of "orthodox" Socialists.

This supposed orthodox-Socialist view was recently expressed by a representative of the Socialist Party of this country in a public lecture. This Socialist spokesman said, in substance, that we send missionaries to Africa in order to teach

the poor, benighted heathen negroes to wear trousers and silk hats, and after our missionaries have succeeded in their task we go to war for the chance to sell the trousers and hats thus brought into fashion.

In criticism of this position Dr. Hourwich says, that, whatever necessity there may be for the employment of missionaries in order to *create* a market for trousers and silk hats, there is absolutely no necessity for the employment of military force in order to *capture it*. The market once there Germany had as good a chance to sell as England, even though England be "Mistress of the Seas", and even though the particular market be located in territory colored on the map with the color of the British Empire. English supremacy on the sea does not interfere with the shipment of cargoes from Bremen to Africa or any other quarter of the globe. And English overlordship over any particular territory does not interfere with the freedom of the world to trade therein.

This criticism seems to be justified. In fact it is so. Or, rather, it was so. For it does not take account of the recent developments of the economics of Capitalism. It is about a generation

behind time. It was applicable during the period of textiles—during the period when trousers and silk-hats, and other textiles, constituted the backbone of industry and foreign trade—but it does not apply to our epoch. Dr. Hourwich is quite right in his assertion that we do not have to go to war to get markets — for textiles. And we didn't, so long as textiles were the ruling industry—an era which coincided with the period when England was practically in possession of the world market and maintained a policy of free-trade therein.

But it is quite different now, when iron and steel products have taken the place of trousers and silk-hats. And here we must pause for a moment to consider the part played by foreign trade in the economy of a highly developed Capitalism. Incidentally we may, perhaps, get a glimpse of the causes which relegated textiles to the rear and pushed iron and steel to the front.

The basis of all capitalist industrial development is the fact that the working class produces not only more than *it* consumes, but *more than society as a whole consumes*. It is this which permits the enormous accumulation of wealth which is the distinguishing characteristic of the

capitalistic era. A capitalist society, therefore, always has a surplus-product on hand, which it must dispose of in order that it may "progress"; that is, continue to accumulate wealth. It therefore always depends on foreign markets for its healthy development. Of course, this "foreign" market need not be foreign in the political sense, but only in the economic—that is it must be of a lower order of capitalistic development. Such a market, in order to serve the purpose, must be an absolute absorbent, and not merely take goods in exchange for other goods of as high an industrial order.

As capitalist industry began to develop in spots, and took a long period of time before even the foremost capitalist countries became completely, or even predominantly, industrialized, this "foreign" market could for quite some time be found at home. That is to say, the industrial centres of any given country could dispose of their surplus products to the agricultural districts of the same country. This could not be done, however, without "industrializing" these agricultural districts. The old-fashioned agricultural community with its natural economy forms only a poor market for the products of an industrial economy. It is only

when this community emerges from its natural economy and starts on the road of "progress" to industrialism that it begins to count as a "customer". But once a community starts on the road of "progress" there is no way of stopping it. The districts which were once the customers of the industrial centre, absorbing its surplus-product, are soon its competitors, so that the nation as a whole produces a surplus-product which can only be disposed of in a foreign market,—this time "foreign" in the political sense. The foreign market can only be in a foreign country, but it has not lost its economic meaning—for the foreign country must also be on a lower plane of capitalistic development. And so we find the countries of a higher stage of capitalistic development disposing of their surplus-product to countries on a lower stage of that development.

But that cannot last forever. For soon there are more countries producing a surplus than there are countries in a condition to absorb it. Most of the countries touched by the magic wand of capitalistic development soon produce a surplus-product of their own. On the other hand, those countries which have not been touched by that development are not in a condition to absorb

the product of the other industrialism,—they have neither the taste for their consumption nor the means with which to buy them.

It is doubtful whether a legion of missionaries could convert a sufficient number of Central African negroes to the fashion of wearing trousers to keep even a moderate trouser-factory in New York busy. But even if missionaries were exceptionally skilled and in good luck, our New York trouser-manufacturers would still be sans customers if they had to depend on the Central African trade,—not with the missionaries but with the negroes. For a customer in the commercial sense of the word is not merely a man who wants to buy something, but one who can also pay for what he wants; and the poor African Negro has nothing with which to pay for the luxuries, the use of which the missionaries may teach him.

The capitalist world as a whole finds itself compelled to *create* new markets—manufacture customers, as it were—by stimulating the development of undeveloped countries, “civilizing” them, hot-house fashion, by means of all sorts of “improvements”, such as railroads, canals, etc. This has a double effect: on the one hand it will ultimately create a new market by bringing a new country into the vortex of capitalistic develop-

ment. But its more immediate effect is that the building operation itself creates a demand for the exportation of goods—steel and iron goods. Although incidentally it may also help the exportation of some textile goods. When a railroad is being built in Africa, at an expense of, say 100 million dollars, it usually means the exportation from the domain of capitalistic production of probably 80 or 90 millions worth of steel and iron goods. The balance of the money is used for the hire of labor in Africa to do the work of actual building, and a portion of that money at least would then go to the negroes who might be induced to do some of the hardest work. These negroes would then be in a position to pay for their trousers and silk-hats, and the work of the missionaries in teaching them their wear would produce some tangible results. Hence the world-wide phenomenon of “the exportation of capital” which has accompanied the rise of iron and steel to the leading place in capitalistic economy.

But this phenomenon of the exportation of capital in the form, principally, of iron and steel, from economically developed to economically undeveloped countries, where it is invested in permanent improvements, principally railroads, is

only part of a wider phenomenon—that of the distribution of production within the domain of capitalism itself in such a manner that its more developed parts produce principally means of production, while its less developed portions produce means of consumption. This is due to the fact that when a country enters upon the career of capitalistic production it begins with the production of consumable goods, doing it usually with machinery purchased abroad. So that when the new-comer within the family of capitalist nations turns from a customer of its older capitalistic brethren into their competitor, it does not do so in all fields of production. On the contrary, it continues to remain their customer for a long time to come. Only it does not buy from them any more textiles and other consumable goods as it used to, but machinery and means of production generally. The competition of the new-comer in the production of consumable goods leads to a shifting of production in the older—industrially more developed—countries. These countries now produce, proportionally, more machinery and other artificial means of production and fewer consumable goods. Generally speaking, it may be said that the capitalist world as a whole puts

its savings, its continued accumulations of wealth, into means of production,—iron and steel. It is therefore natural that the production of iron and steel should become increasingly more prominent in those countries where this saving process—the accumulation of wealth—is most rapid.

It is this that has led to the supplanting of textiles by iron and steel as the leading industry of the most highly developed industrial countries; and, therefore, of capitalism as a whole.

Now, this change from textiles to iron and steel as the leading industry of the most highly developed capitalism, is the real cause of the change which we have noted in the character of capitalism from a peaceful to a warlike mood. It is this that has brought about the Imperialistic era in which we live. It is this that is the general cause of the present war.

And the reason is simple. Iron and steel are not sold, and cannot be sold, in the same manner as trousers and silk-hats or any other similar goods. Of course we are not speaking of scissors and knives and such-like small wares. But of the real heavy iron and steel goods with which "permanent improvements" are made.

The sale of textiles is, comparatively speaking,

a very simple affair. If you want to sell trousers and hats to the natives of some primitive community in Asia or Africa, and your missionaries have done their missionary work, all that it is necessary for you to do is to send your cargo of goods with an alert sales-manager in charge, and the job is done. If you can undersell your competitor, the market is yours. If you are a German you need worry very little about the English flag that may happen to be flying, actually or figuratively, over the community in question.

But the situation is quite different if you want to sell these same natives some of your locomotives, cars, rails and other iron and steel goods that go into the building and equipping of a railroad. You cannot just ship a cargo of this kind of goods in charge of a sales-manager and sell them to the natives. The only way to do that is to build the railroad yourself. And here the question of the flag becomes a matter of the utmost importance. While a German, for instance, can sell trousers and hats in British South Africa as freely as he could in German South-West Africa, or in the Fatherland itself, he would find insurmountable difficulties in his way if he were to try to build a railroad through any of the

British dominions. The free-trade policy which England has so far maintained in all its colonies as to textiles does not apply to iron and steel. Not only does England reserve to her own capitalists the opportunities of building railroads throughout her vast colonial dominions, but she is very jealous of other nations in the matter of building railroads even through so-called "independent" countries, if they happen to belong to the "backward" class — such, for instance, as Turkey, Persia, or China. Of course, the other countries, the countries that erect tariff walls even against foreign textiles, build regular fortifications to protect their "nationals" against competition in iron and steel. When we come to discuss the special causes that led to the present war, I shall have occasion to illustrate what I have here put before you in abstract terms by citing concrete examples from the actual practice of what has come to be called World-Politics. But right here I must explain before closing the present lecture, at least in a general way, why England, who still maintains her free-trade policy as to textiles and similar goods, takes a different attitude when it comes to selling iron and steel by means of railroad building in "backward" countries.

The explanation lies in the fact that the method of "selling" and receiving payment for the iron and steel used in the process of "civilizing" backward countries has certain peculiarities which exclude free competition. Supposing a set of enterprising people have conceived the idea of selling some iron and steel to the natives of Africa by building a railroad, say, from the Cape to Cairo, in accordance with the scheme of that great Empire Builder, Cecil Rhodes. How, do you imagine, would they proceed? Just go ahead and ship rails, cars, locomotives, and money to Africa, and build? By no means. Such a railroad might be a wonderful civilizing agency; but it is a very poor investment from the ordinary commercial point of view. The ordinary merchant, whether he sells textiles or steel, wants *pay* for his wares, and the ordinary investor wants *dividends* on his investment. In order, therefore, that the building of a railroad may be "practicable" from the business point of view, it must be a dividend-paying proposition. But that is exactly what your Cape to Cairo railroad couldn't be, what *no* railroad built through these "backward" countries teeming with beautiful railroad projects could be. That is, not if it were to be

built in the ordinary way, by ordinary private individuals, on their own hook and responsibility. That's why "civilizing" railroads are not built in that way. The main part of building such a railway is not the work of building the railroad itself, but that of getting the "concession." Now there are some people who imagine that a "concession" is a sort of permit to build a railway. As a matter of fact it is an agreement for the mode of payment for the iron and steel and other accessories which go into the building of the railway, other than from the collection of fares for the transportation of passengers or goods, which could not possibly be sufficient for the purpose.

The first thing, therefore, that our set of enterprising gentlemen who wanted to build the Cape to Cairo Railroad, or engage in some other civilizing enterprise of that nature, would do, would be to apply for a "concession." The application, directed to the ruling power of the country to be civilized by the enterprise, would state in substance, that the applicants have conceived the great idea of building the railroad; that such a railroad would result in incalculable benefits to the country through which it is intended to run; that it would transform the country from a

wilderness into a paradise, and raise its population from poverty to affluence; but that before all of these beautiful things would happen, and the railroad be in a position to pay a dividend from its own earnings as a carrier, or even pay running-expenses perhaps, the applicants, if left to themselves, would go bankrupt and the enterprise go to smash. As good and sensible business-men the applicants could not, therefore, even dream of carrying out their magnificent projects unless they were secured against loss and guaranteed a fair profit on their investment.

Now, there are two or three ways in which the building of a railroad which cannot pay expenses in the ordinary business way, may become a very well-paying business to the "concessionaires". They may either receive a direct money-subsidy from the government through whose domain the railroad is to run; they may be given grants of large tracts of land, particularly valuable mineral lands, the exploitation of which would bring an immediate return; or they may be given monopolistic rights to the trade of the country, or at least some branches of the same. Most concessions contain some or all of these features—
are, in fact, mortgages on the future of the

country, and usually very onerous mortgages.

And here comes the real difficulty of this mode of selling iron and steel. Some of these benighted heathen governments are very slow in appreciating the beauties of these railroad projects; some of them positively object to being *railroaded* into the pale of civilization, or at least dislike to pay the fare for the trip. Sometimes their reluctance in giving concessions that would pay is so great that they cannot be obtained except at the point of the bayonet; and no concession is ever granted except through the interference of the "home" government, at least by the use of moral suasion. And where several sets of "concessionaires", belonging to different nations, ask for the same concession, that set will get it whose "home" government can, and is ready to, exercise the greatest pressure.

That no great power under the circumstances will give concessions for railroad building to foreigners is self-evident. England may be willing enough to let German merchants sell hats and trousers to the natives of her colonies on terms of equality with her own citizens, trusting that in a field of free competition her citizens will at least have an equal chance. But she certainly

cannot be expected to mortgage the future of her colonies to German capitalists in a monopolistic enterprise. If her colonies are to be exploited in this fashion, her own capitalists are there for the purpose. They, too, have considerable steel on hand, and are very anxious to dispose of it in some profitable way. Each great power, therefore, tries to keep her colonies as a special reservation for her own capitalists wherein they may dispose of *their* surplus-products, invest *their* accumulations of wealth,—which, as we have seen, now consists of iron and steel.

But this is not all. The colonies which these great steel-producing nations possess may not be sufficient for the purpose of absorbing all of their surplus-product; or the prospect of good returns from an investment in these colonies may not be as good as that to be found elsewhere. Besides, a prudent business-man should have his eye open to the future. What may be sufficient for present purposes, may be inadequate at some future time. A reserve must therefore be created. Our Governments from Steel must, therefore, do what Chamberlain, following Lord Roseberry, so felicitously called “pegging out claims for posterity”. Or, at least, the unappropriated field

must be kept open and unappropriated by others until *we* shall be ready and able to assert our claims thereto. In a word: the disposal of the surplus-product of the modern industrial nations has ceased to be a matter of trade carried on by the individual, and has become a matter of armed force, actual or potential, used by large groups, called Nations. Hence the phenomenon which we call Modern Imperialism.

III.

THE IDEOLOGIC CAUSES OF THE WAR.

IT has often been charged that the Socialists—or at least those old offenders, the “orthodox” Socialists—see nothing in history but the play of “blind economic forces”, leaving no room for any spiritual or ideal forces or motives. And since the outbreak of the present war the charge has been made in our own press that in discussing this war the “orthodox” Socialists see only low material forces and fail to recognize the higher ideal motives, etc. The very title of this lecture is a sufficient refutation of the charge of the failure to recognize any so-called ideal motives for or causes of this war. But I must warn you against a possible misunderstanding: please do not imagine that I believe the present war to have had a double set of causes, one economic and one ideologic. On the contrary, I believe that at bot-

tom there is only one set of causes: the economic changes which I have endeavored to describe and explain in my last lecture.

But these economic forces do not work either automatically or mechanically. They work through the medium of human beings,—and the entire complex machinery of the human organism, both individual and social, comes into play. The Good Book says that Man does not live by bread alone. In the course of his eventful history on this planet he has developed a taste for certain delicacies, certain faculties besides those of digesting his food, and certain wants besides those of filling his stomach or his pocket. In a word, he has certain mental and spiritual faculties and wants alongside of the more material ones. This has led the great majority of people to the belief in the dual character of human nature, dividing it into a “higher” or spiritual part, and a “lower” or material one, into a “body” and a “soul”. Having thus split up the human entity into two, the philosophers began to quarrel as to which rules which: the “materialists” claimed that the “lower” element of human nature rules the higher one, the body is supreme over the soul; while the “idealists” claimed that the soul always manages

to get on top, and that it is therefore the power that "makes history". Then came the compromisers, who are not wanting anywhere, and tried to compromise by putting the two halves of human nature on terms of equality side by side, sometimes helping each other and sometimes counteracting one another in the business of shaping human conduct and making history. It is the belief that "orthodox" Socialists are "materialists" in the above sense, that has brought upon them the reproaches of some "idealists" or eclectics for the alleged neglect of "ideal" causes or motives in appraising historical events generally and the present war in particular.

Now, I am neither an "idealist" nor a "materialist" in the above sense. Nor yet an eclectic. I have no occasion to belong to any of the said denominations, because I do not start out by splitting up human nature and dividing it into upper and lower regions. I take it as one harmonious whole, notwithstanding its multifarious complexity of functions and wants. The great harmonizer of human nature is a certain faculty with which man is endowed, which the great German poet Schiller described as the capacity "of transforming the work of necessity into a work of his free choice and *of raising the physical necessity into a moral*

one." This faculty permits the individual to see his material needs in the glamour of spiritual and moral ones.

To this should be added another thing, which the great German poet may have overlooked. And that is the fact that the individual neither creates his own world, nor does he dwell there alone; both his physical (material) as well as his moral (spiritual) necessities are fashioned for him by the society in which he lives. And it is this society, as a whole, which possesses that remarkable faculty of which Schiller speaks, of "raising the physical necessity into a moral one". And when society has thus raised its physical necessities into moral ones, the seeming contradiction between the rule of the material forces in history which is plain to any discerning eye and the high motives and lofty ideals which, it is equally plain, have actuated so many of the great actors in the important historical dramas—a contradiction which has baffled so many historians—entirely disappears. For society's physical necessity has become the individual's moral necessity, for which he is ready to sacrifice his individual physical necessities and comforts in a transport of pure idealism.

In my last lecture I endeavored to explain the present war from the point of view of society's physical necessities. In the present lecture I shall show you how this material necessity had been raised into a moral one, and attempt to explain this war from the point of view of the individual's moral necessities.

The "moral" or "spiritual" conceptions, as distinguished from material or economic ones, used in the discussions of this war, are those of nationalism, racial affinity, and culture. We shall do well, therefore, to begin our discourse with a historical examination of the development of the conceptions or ideas of Nation, Race, and Culture.

The conception of the Nation, in our sense of the word, is of comparatively modern origin. During the Middle Ages there was no such thing in Christian Europe. When order emerged in Europe from the chaos of the great migrations, by the establishment of the feudal system, European society was, on the one hand, broken up into innumerable small fragments, each leading a separate existence; and, on the other, these innumerable fragments of humanity formed one common group, referred to collectively as Christendom.

The inhabitants of the different parts of the continent may have had some characteristics common only to the dwellers within a certain geographical area, which distinguished them from those making their home in a different part of the continent. But those characteristics were not strong enough to *unite* the dwellers of any large geographical area into what we would call a Nation, or to mark them as quite alien to those living elsewhere. The masses of the lower strata of the population were broken up locally into small groups, each forming a separate political entity, and each having a language, and often a religion, of its own. On the other hand, the upper crust, the carriers of whatever intellectual life there was then in Europe, formed one nation, with a common culture,—they had *one religion, one language, and one literature*. This unity of the whole of Christendom in everything that was not merely a local custom, was symbolized by the Pope and the Emperor,—one representing the spiritual and the other the political unity of all Christian Europe.

Towards the close of the Middle Ages, with the beginning of the development of our modern commercial and industrial era—the breaking up of the old feudal order and the substitution

therefor of what has come to be known as the bourgeois or capitalist economic system—this social and political aspect of Europe began to change. On the one hand the local differences began to disappear, making great bodies of people spread over large areas of land more akin to each other in manners, customs, religious observances, language, and modes of thought. On the other hand, the spiritual and political unity of the upper crust of Christendom began to break up. Capitalism needed larger economic units for its development. The small groups therefore began to coalesce and amalgamate into larger units which would permit the larger economic life which is the characteristic of the new era. But this very process of coalescence and centralization into larger economic units had as a necessary corollary a process of separation and division, separating and dividing the larger groups, when formed, from each other. The same process that made people within a certain large territory more akin to each other, of necessity made them more different and distinct from people outside this territory and inhabiting some other large district, whose dwellers were acquiring a homogeneous character of their own.

This double process of coalescence and division

usually found its limits and lines of demarcation—marking off the territories within which the process of coalescence and between which the process of separation should proceed—in some well-defined geographical characteristics of the European continent. The sea and the great mountain-ranges usually marked the boundaries of the several divisions into which Europe was to break up. The dwellers within these boundaries were separated from the rest of Europe and started on the road towards the formation of one political, economic, social, and linguistic group—towards the formation of the Modern Nation.

Thus arose the Modern European nations, each with its own language and separate and distinct social, political, and economic life: England, France, Spain, the Scandinavian countries, Russia, Italy and Germany.

With the breaking up of the homogeneity of Europe and the formation of separate nations, each constituting a separate political state, there began to develop separate and distinct *national cultures* in place of the common European culture which prevailed during the Middle Ages. The first great manifestation of this new development was the Reformation. Contrary to the assurances

of our school histories and similar sources of information, the Reformation was least of all a religious movement. In so far as it did not directly aim at economic results, it was essentially a political movement resulting from economic conditions.

On its formal side—that is in the separation of the “reformed” churches from the Church of Rome, and the denial of the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff—the reformation was merely a solemn registering of the fact that Europe had broken up into separate nations. That each of these nations, having a separate economic life, must also constitute separate political, spiritual, and intellectual entities. That henceforth there would be no common church and no common language, as well as no common empire. The Roman Emperor, the Roman Pope, and the Latin Bible had all become anachronisms, survivals of a common nation-less Europe, and must all go. Henceforth each Nation was to have its own independent political head paying no allegiance to any Emperor; its own independent church paying no tribute and recognizing no sovereign outside of its own national jurisdiction; and its own literature, with the vernacular Bible as a symbol of its freedom from Latin tutelage.

The independence of national development secured in the Reformation, while registering the act of separation, was itself a means of furthering it, and the development of Europe has continued along national lines during the entire formative period of Capitalism.

This formative period of Capitalism, the period when the different sections into which Europe broke up at the close of the Middle Ages were developing their own independent economic existence along capitalist-industrial lines, is the first of the two warlike periods of Capitalism of which I spoke in my last lecture. The wars of this period were conducted, principally, for what might be called natural territorial limits; that is to say, for the establishment of political units which would be economically self-sufficient and independent.

For this purpose it was necessary that the political unit—the “country”—should be of sufficient size to give the development of the economic forces elbow-room. And since freedom of intercourse is one of the essentials of economic development along capitalistic lines, the larger the area comprised within a given political unit the better. There was, therefore, a general striving

to bring within the domain of one political unit everything that could be easily communicated with,—the sea and mountain ranges being considered natural boundaries. At the same time it was necessary to so arrange the boundaries of the political unit as to contain “within its own four corners” the raw materials for its industries and the other accessories of production. And as natural wealth in raw materials and other accessories of production is not evenly distributed on the surface of our globe, it was sometimes found necessary to break through the so-called natural boundaries in order to make the political unit self-sufficient economically. As great mountain ranges formed impassable barriers, the only way of supplying the deficiency of a country in natural wealth would be to establish over-sea colonies in regions rich in the particular article in which the home country was deficient. This could, of course, be done only when a country was bounded on the sea at least at some point.

At the same time the sea was indispensable as a means of intercourse with the outside world, the world which was the market for the products of the countries' soil and manufactories. Hence the struggle of inland countries in this formative

stage of Capitalism for the extension of their boundaries almost invariably assumes the form of a *march to the sea*.

Politically, that is, *internally*, this formative period of Capitalism is characterized by the consolidation and centralization of governmental power,—by the growth of absolutist monarchical institutions. In this connection it may be well to point out that the opinion so prevalent in our intellectual circles, and so often expressed in print since the outbreak of the present war, that monarchy is a remnant of feudalism, is anything but intelligent. As a matter of fact, feudalism is absolutely guiltless of the offense of establishing the institution of absolute monarchy. As far as Modern Europe at least is concerned that institution is due entirely to the political activities of the bourgeoisie. During the formative period of Capitalism of which I have just spoken, the rising industrial bourgeoisie created the institution of absolute monarchy as a means, on the one hand, of abolishing feudal restrictions upon trade and industry, and, on the other, of consolidating large areas into one political and economic unit and of successfully marching to the sea.

But feudalism overthrown and Capitalism firmly established—the National territory self-

sufficient, industrially, and the sea freely and easily accessible—the bourgeoisie becomes peaceful and settles down to develop its home industries,—manufacturing textiles.

Ideologically the reign of textiles is characterized by what might be called, collectively, "liberal ideas". "Liberalism", as a system or circle of ideas means: politically,—republicanism and democracy; in the domain of international relations, — the "open door" and peaceful cosmopolitanism; in philosophy,—classical political economy and utilitarianism. Culture and civilization—which have been growing nationalistic since the break-up of the European community of the Middle Ages, the disappearance of the universal Latin literature, and the creation of separate national churches and literatures, reflecting the national life and national struggles—again become the *common* heritage of humanity. Only, the concept of humanity now becomes much broader than during the Middle Ages, when it was practically limited to Christendom. "Humanity" now means what the term implies — the entire human race; and culture and civilization not only lose their narrow nationalistic character, but they become truly universal,

making no distinctions on account of race, religion, or color.

The three branches or divisions of the "liberal" view of life which I have indicated—its ideas of political institutions, international relations, and the laws governing human relations generally—are closely knit together and form one organic whole. The demand of the representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie for a republican form of government and democratic political institutions generally, on the one hand, and the peaceful cosmopolitanism of their international policy, on the other, were not mere accidents of "personal union", (to borrow a term from European public law), but two phases of the same cast of ideas. And both were only the logical consequence of their view of the laws which governed the basic relation of man to man,—the relation of producing and consuming social wealth.

The general view of the world, developed during the classic age of Capitalism, under the aegis of textiles, may be summarized as follows:

The economic activities of man are subject to certain natural and immutable laws, which shape the conduct of the individual and his relations to his fellow-men in society. These laws dictate to the individual the best—most profitable—

course for him to follow in his economic activities, and the individual follows them, therefore, freely and eagerly in his natural desire to get all he can out of this world for himself. But this world of ours, instead of being a "vale of tears", a place of misery and suffering, as we had been told by some ascetic moralizers, is in reality so happily arranged and organized that when every individual follows his own selfish bent of always looking out for himself, there results a perfectly harmonious whole which redounds to the benefit and prosperity of society at large and every individual member thereof. The selfishness and acquisitiveness of individuals, instead of clashing with the interests of their fellow-members in society, are really of great benefit to them.

There is only one pre-requisite to this happy result; and that is, that the individuals should be enlightened enough to understand their own real and permanent interests, so that they may not act from a mistaken notion as to what that interest really is and thereby injure themselves as well as their fellow-men. Practically all of the misery which the human race suffered in the past, and to which a large portion of it is still subject, is due, on the one hand, to such mistaken notions by individuals as to what their own true interests re-

quire, leading them to act in a manner injurious to themselves and to others, and, on the other hand, to a failure to understand the true character of the natural laws governing the economic relations of men, resulting in attempts to interfere with their own free play by man-made laws. This last circumstance is the most important. For when left to himself man will soon come to understand his own true interests; and the harm resulting from individual mistakes as to what is good for one's self is comparatively small and negligible. The real source of human misery is, therefore, the attempt by organized society to interfere with the free play of the *natural laws* of economics, due to ignorance of their true character.

The true remedy, therefore, for all human ills, is to let well-enough alone; to permit the beautiful symphony of our economic world to be played by the instruments naturally attuned thereto, undisturbed by any interference from the outside. And the only condition for the Millennium is *enlightenment* sufficient to prevent such interference. The economic laws of nature are not only immutable, but omnipresent and all-pervasive. They are independent of time and space. In their presence all human beings are equal,—

all being subject to their power and influence, without distinction as to race, religion, or color. Potentially all human beings are alike; for all are not merely *subject* to the same economic laws, but all have the fundamental faculty of acting under the influence of these laws in a manner not only beneficial to themselves but to humanity at large. They are all properly attuned by nature to participate in the economic symphony, which is merely another name for *civilization*. Civilization is our name for the material conditions of well-being brought about by the free play of the economic laws of nature, taken together with the enlightenment which leads to the abolition of all artificial restrictions upon these laws, thus giving them free scope. This civilization is, therefore, the common heritage of mankind; being nothing more than the *natural* condition of mankind, unhampered by any artificially created barriers to its natural progress. Fundamentally, all men are equal; all individuals within each nation, and all nations within the human species.

Of course, there are nations and races at different stages of civilization. So there are individuals within each civilized nation at different stages of enlightenment. But these differences

are merely of degree, not of kind. It is simply a question of the *awakening* of the latent faculties inborn in humanity, or the degree of such awakening. Not only are the races which we rank lowest in the scale of civilization naturally *capable* of attaining the highest pinnacles of this civilization; but the labor of doing so would not be so very arduous, as they are in the fortunate position of not being hampered by a large accumulation of historical rubbish of a semi-civilization, consisting mainly of artificially created barriers to the free play of economic laws, which must be swept away before true civilization is attained.

The “politics” of this view of the world of human interests are simple. At “home”—in the internal management of the nation—the government should be republican in form and democratic in substance. But above all, have as little of it as possible. Since Nature has been good enough to provide a set of laws for the government of the human race which work so well, the best thing that society can do is to let nature put in the good work of her laws, and permit the individual to work out his own salvation by obeying nature’s directions. The only thing man can do in this connection is to reinforce nature’s commands by punishing

those who foolishly break her laws. In short, government has only police duties to perform, watching against any infractions of nature's code of laws. Of course, it would be a good thing if organized society could help nature along by providing means of enlightening the hitherto unenlightened as to the meaning of her laws — *education*. But even enlightenment should not be forced upon the unwilling by compulsory means. Nature has herself provided such magnificent incentives and rewards for enlightenment, and the dangers from artificial laws and compulsions of any kind are so great, that it is advisable to rather take a chance on a possible small dose of ignorance than on compulsory education.

And the same policy applies to international relations. Nations, like individuals, should enjoy equality in the "family of nations". And the only thing essential in their intercourse is freedom from artificial barriers. In a world of free trade each nation will be able to work out its own destiny; and while acting economically from purely utilitarian motives, will contribute to the general welfare of humanity. This equality of treatment should be accorded not only the so-called civilized nations, but also those on a lower plane of development. And while it may be advis-

able to lend a backward nation a helping hand, leading her on the road to a higher civilization by according her means of education and enlightenment, this should not be done by forcible means. The interests of civilization should be left to the free action of economic laws in a world of free intercourse between nations living on terms of equality.

The "liberal" view of the world, which I have just sketched, with its democratic-cosmopolitan politics, was the ideologic expression of the economic practice of manufacturing and selling textiles. And it prevailed as long as its economic basis was secure. With the passing of textiles passed also Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Herbert Spencer,—who but yesterday were the great pillars upon which rested the temple of bourgeois ideology. New times require new Gods, —and new priests to minister to them. Our Iron Age has its own God,— Moloch, the God of Iron and Steel. And Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and Herbert Spencer were superceded by a new set of priests and prophets, who serve the new God after a new fashion and preach to the faithful a new creed.

The new creed—the creed of Imperialism—bears to the new practice, the practice of selling

iron and steel through military and diplomatic "agents", the same relation that the old, "liberal" creed bore to the old practice of selling textiles peacefully through ordinary travelling salesmen by under-bidding your competitor. It is *the raising of the physical necessity of selling iron and steel into a moral one.* That does not mean that the moral pretensions of the new creed are necessarily hypocritical. On the contrary, it may be taken for granted that individually and psychologically considered the followers of this creed often act from as "lofty" and "ideal" motives as their predecessors of the "liberal" school, or as any high-minded "idealist" of whom we have any record. We are simply witnessing the transformation of *social necessity* into *individual morality.*

I shall therefore endeavor to give you a description and exposition of this new creed as I see it, without any attempt at passing any moral judgment upon it, but simply giving you my explanation for its existence. I must say a word of warning however in this connection: The creed being a new one, its votaries have not yet had the time to systematize it. Its gospels have not yet all been written, and those that have been written have not yet all been collected and brought into proper relation to one another. Its Bible is still

fragmentary. What I shall present to you here is, therefore, only my own systematization and elucidation of this creed as I gather it from the fragmentary writings and scattered remains of its apostles that have come under my observation. Another thing: It must not be assumed that this creed suddenly emerged from the brain of an Imperialist Apostle fully panoplied, like Minerva from Jove's forehead. Nor that all those whom we may properly class as Imperialists have carefully thought out all the positions, implications, and logical consequences of the different articles of this creed. The truth is that the Imperialist Creed is still in the making, and its different articles have not yet been settled by any Holy Imperialist Synod. But its essential characteristics and general tendency have become sufficiently marked to permit of fairly accurate description.

Now, the cardinal point of the Imperialist philosophy, the basic position upon which everything else depends, is the denial of the liberal idea of natural economic laws operating, automatically, upon all human beings. Or, viewing the matter from a different angle, it denies the essential equality of the different races of the human species. Not merely their equality of present condi-

tion, but the possibility of their common development along certain lines of culture and civilization. That is to say, the Imperialist denies that all the races of humanity are endowed with the same *capacity* for development, the capacity for developing the same civilization under the same circumstances. According to this philosophy, the Creator, in making the human species, created it in different molds which we term races, and endowed these races differently, setting before them separate goals and outlining for them different courses of development. And these endowments, goals, and courses, are not merely different, but of unequal value. Some races are, therefore, *superior* to others. Or rather, there is one "superior" and a number of "inferior" races. The superior race was destined to rule the world, and therefore cast in heroic mold and endowed with kingly or aristocratic characteristics; while the other, the inferior races, were created after a different pattern, of inferior clay, and endowed with common plebeian characteristics, such as befit races destined forever to remain subject and subordinate in the scheme of things to the rule and tutelage of the superior race. The obvious mark of distinction between the races is the color

of the skin: the white race was intended by the Creator not only to rule the world generally, but to lord it over its brethren of a darker hue.

The implications of this theory of creation are obvious. The "inferior races", which means the generality of mankind outside the few hundred millions of the white race, have practically no rights which we need respect. They have no right to independence, because they were meant by their Creator to be *subject-races*, and bow to our will. They have no right to be permitted to work out their own destiny, because their destiny is given in the color of their skin—the destiny of slavery and subjection—and they could not possibly attain any other destiny no matter how much freedom we gave them. Furthermore, we have no right to give the inferior races their freedom,—that is, leave them alone to work out their own salvation. The rulership of the earth and the inhabitants thereof given to the White Race by God Almighty is not a mere privilege which it may exercise or discard at pleasure, but a duty which it cannot shirk. The White Race can no more voluntarily renounce its right to rule, than the "inferior" races can escape their destiny to be ruled. It must—

"Take up the White Man's burden—
And reap his old reward:
The blame of those ye better,
The hate of those ye guard—
The cry of hosts ye humour
(Oh, slowly!) toward the light:—
Why brought ye us from bondage,
Our loved Egyptian night?"

This story, with variations, is told us over and over again; not only in song but in ponderous volumes of a highly respectable, scientific appearance, and with all the outward apparatus of great learning. And usually the *variations* are considerably to the disadvantage of the "inferior races". The *poet* of Imperialism at least holds out the hope that the "inferior races" may turn "slowly toward the light", and places upon the White Man a sort of duty of ultimately leading them "from bondage". Not so the *scholars* of Imperialism and its *statesmen*: to them the destiny of the "inferior races" holds no ray of hope; they are mere beasts of burden, to do the drudgery in working out the White Man's "higher destiny", and the only duty of the White Man towards them is to treat them as should a good *master*.

But such a theory cannot stop just there. In

the form in which we have just presented it—making one grand distinction between the White Race and the rest of the human species—this theory is neither logical nor sufficient for the purpose of “raising into a moral necessity” the “physical” necessities of the iron and steel business.

There is no logical reason why the human species should be divided into two divisions—white and non-white—and the dividing process then stopping. Why should the great divisions not be subdivided further? There is absolutely nothing in the color of the skin which should make it the only mark of distinction: the color of the eyes or of the hair, and many other things might serve such a purpose just as well. Besides, there might be marks of distinction of quite a different order—spiritual, instead of merely physical. Particularly, within the aristocratic White Race itself, singled out by the Creator to lord it spiritually over the rest of mankind.

And the practice of Imperialism proves that there must be such further distinctions. The White Man’s burden is, of course, a thankless job—as Kipling assures us. And yet we find the different branches of the White Race, called na-

tions, vying with each other in their enthusiasm for a chance to carry it. And not only that, but they are actually ready to jump at each other's throats and slaughter each other in their efforts to monopolize as much of this "burden" as possible. The grand division into white-superior and non-white-inferior races supplies the justification of slaughtering "inferior" human beings of the non-white races in the process of carrying out the pre-ordained scheme of giving the White Man the rulership of the world; but it fails to supply a justification for the slaughter of fellow-white-men, all of whom have a common interest as against the "inferior races", but no apparent divergent interests among themselves.

And, as Goethe said long ago, "*am Anfang war die Tat,*"—"the Practice is the Thing." So the theory received a further extension and elaboration which made it at once more logical and more serviceable.

In its fully developed form, the philosophy or creed of Imperialism does not lay any particular stress on the sharp division between the White and the other races of the earlier days of this theory, but rather emphasizes the distinctions between the different nations of the same race,

particularly the White race. And although the general terminology, particularly the word "race", is still used, the meaning given to the terms is quite different. Instead of one "superior" White race, there are now many White "races"—the word "race" being now practically synonymous with "nation"—and the distinctions between the subdivisions of the White race are as deep-seated and all-important as those between the White race as a whole and the colored or "inferior" races. The term "inferior" itself has now lost its original, somewhat technical meaning, of non-white, and assumed its etymological meaning. Every race is "inferior" to *The Race*. The other White races may not be quite as inferior as the colored races, but this is a comparatively unimportant detail in the scheme of Creation and the course of History. The all-important fact is that the Creator in his wisdom has singled out one particular race, *the Race par excellence*, and has set it upon a course of development whose particular object and destined mission it is to serve as an embodiment of the particular virtues and characteristics which the Creator intended to finally prevail in the world. None of the other races or nations, whether white or colored, have any of these special charac-

teristics or possess any of these particular virtues. And while there may be degrees of inferiority, and some other white races may possess virtues and characteristics of their own which make them in a way superior when compared with other, more inferior races; all are just "inferior" and on a common plane when compared to the one Chosen People, whose mission and destiny it is to be the *carrier* of The Virtues.

The logical corollary to this theory of created races, is the negation of a *common* human civilization. Not only is civilization not common to all humanity in the sense that not all the branches of the human species have attained, or can ever attain, to the same level of civilization; but in the more important sense that there are such fundamental differences between the "civilizations" of the different races and nations which have achieved the same—or what has hitherto been considered the same—level of civilization, as to make these "civilizations" essentially foreign to each other. The differences being not of degree, but of kind; so that one race or nation can never achieve the civilization of another race or nation. At least, not to the extent of becoming an active *carrier* or propagator thereof; although it may

submit thereto and in some passive way acquire its virtues at least sufficiently to enjoy its benefits.

In order to emphasize this point and in a measure at least explain its mysteries, a new term has been coined; or, rather, a new meaning has been given to the old term "culture", and a new distinction drawn between it and the term "civilization". According to the most approved Imperialist use of these terms, the term "civilization" refers to external and material achievements, while the term "culture" is reserved for the qualities and achievements of the spirit. Bearing this distinction in mind, the Imperialist philosophy asserts that many races and nations may have a common civilization, but not a common *Culture*. Further, that Culture is the thing—in so far as the world and its destinies are concerned—and that the nations which we were wont to regard as upon an equal plane of civilization—taking the word in its broader meaning, which includes things spiritual as well as material—are really of different value and worth as far as the Historical Process is concerned. For while they are all on the same level of "civilization", in the new, restricted sense, they still are the carriers of different *cultures*—only one of them being the carrier of the real Culture,

the Culture *par excellence*, which is destined to rule (and redeem) the world.

Before leaving this fascinating subject it should be noted that in the terminology of Imperialism purely intellectual achievements are classed with the external or material things, and not with the spiritual; are therefore part of "civilization" and not of "culture". *Just what* culture in the new sense is, has never been defined; and it is considered to be something really indefinable. It is a mystical quality inborn in a race or nation, constituting its *essence*; a sort of metaphysical entity, like the Kantian "*Ding an sich*", which can only be described negatively, but which has, nevertheless, very positive and serious results. Its principal sphere of operations is History. It is here that it makes itself felt, and it is here that its characteristics may be observed and studied.

Perhaps the most important conclusion drawn by the Imperialists themselves from these considerations, is that a nation's institutions are not part of its "civilization" but of its "culture". The point is very important, as it is determinative of the "home politics" of this movement. It may perhaps best be evaluated when compared with the old "liberal" ideas on the subject. According to the "liberal" theory the development of

humanity towards a higher civilization develops, as part of this "civilizing" process, a higher form of political institutions—republican-democratic—which all nations are bound to adopt when they reach the high level of civilization for which these institutions are appropriate. In fact, these institutions are themselves powerful engines of civilization, and whenever and wherever adopted aid materially the further course of development.

This the new philosophy denies; and it insists that political institutions are not part of the common "civilization" of mankind, but of its separate and distinct "cultures". Republican and democratic institutions are not part and parcel of, nor do they correspond to, any higher degree of civilization than aristocratic or monarchical ones. Nor are republican and democratic institutions better *per se* than aristocratic or monarchical ones. On the contrary, a nation whose "culture" is not republican or democratic and whose "genius" has not evolved any such institutions, would be going backwards and betray its own "spirit" if it were to adopt such institutions. In fact, when history is consulted it will be found that republican and democratic institutions in any nation with a "culture" fit to survive, may, on the whole, be considered a mark of inferiority, unless they be

merely the manifestations of a temporary "liberal" aberration, of an ailment whose chief symptom is a failure to appreciate "the true meaning of empire."

The truly Chosen People has therefore either never adopted such institutions, or will soon discard them as "incompatible" with its destiny of World-Empire. The Chosen People is a Superman among nations, and must strive to dominate the world. But a nation cannot successfully play the Superman among nations, while it is governed on the principle of the equality of all men. *Imperialism must begin at home.* But it is a world-philosophy which knows no basic distinctions between "at home" and "abroad". The entire world and its destinies are encompassed within its vision. And it dreams no mean dreams.

It rejects wholly, as mean and petty, the ideas of the "liberal-utilitarians" about "the greatest good to the greatest number." This world was not created for the low and petty bourgeois idea of insuring good, middle-class living conditions for a "level" mass of humanity. The real purpose of creation was to carry out the esthetically beautiful idea of developing a giant race of Supermen as its crowning glory. This race of Supermen, which shall possess the most remarkable Spirit,

endowed with rare and indescribable qualities, shall develop a Culture which shall be the greatest testimonial to the wonderful wisdom and power of the Creator.

To this end and purpose the Creator has singled out the Chosen People, and endowed it, as a race or nation, with those wonderful qualities which make the essence of its Spirit. Of course, it is not every mean individual member thereof that possesses these great qualities, but the Race or Nation *as such*, in its collective capacity. For the time being these qualities are incarnated in the Supermen within the Nation, its great geniuses who are especially destined to carry out the purpose of the Creator by "leading" the Chosen People on its historical course of destiny, gloriously superior to the vulgar considerations of the mere material well-being of the masses of the people.

For the Destiny of The Nation is to diffuse its "Culture" among the nations, exterminating the cultures which it may find opposing its own, so as to bring dominion to the only true Culture, for the greater glory of God. In order to accomplish its mission—from which it is mortal offense to shrink—the Chosen People must seek to subdue the entire world politically and dominate it econo-

mically. For experience has shown that "Culture" follows the flag. History teaches us this lesson: that inferior races or nations, whether white or colored, fail to appreciate the beauties of a higher culture, and are utterly unable to acquire it even passively, unless and until they have been forcibly placed under the political tutelage and economic domination of the superior race whose culture is to be extended. In this connection it must be remembered that its language is a nation's most characteristically national means of expression. In fact it is part of its own flesh and blood, and possesses some of those very mystic qualities which constitute the essence of the national character and the basis of its special Culture. The most potent means, therefore, of spreading the culture of any given nation among alien peoples is to make them use the *language* of that nation. But that can only be done when the nation of the higher Culture politically dominates the peoples among whom this culture is to be spread. And in this material world of ours political dominion is inseparable from economic dominion. Hence, the cultural mission of the Nation becomes of necessity a striving to dominate the entire world economically and politically—a striving for World-Empire.

In this struggle for "the higher good", the nation cannot brook any opposition, and it must use all means at its command. If it falters in its course, if it does not dare to use any available means, out of cowardice or considerations of petty bourgeois "morality", it is doomed; for it has thereby proven that it lacks real superiority, that it is not a Superman among nations. It is the essential characteristic of a Superman among individuals that he is superior to the considerations of common morality. He has his own morality, the pivotal consideration of which is *success*. Everything that furthers his cause, brings him success, is moral. For he is but an instrument of Destiny working out the Higher Will, which cannot be obtained by merely human morality. The same is true of Nations. The Superman among nations not only has the right, but is commanded, to disregard ordinary morality. Whatever furthers its course is moral. Whatever or whoever obstructs its course obstructs the progress of humanity to its ultimate goal, and is therefore immoral or criminal.

Since the beginning of the present war many good people woke up with a start to find very responsible German scientists, men of letters, and statesmen, declaring, in effect, that the German

people were superior to every other people on earth, and that warlike aggression on the part of Germany against its neighbors is justified by the mission of the German people to spread its "Culture" among the other and inferior nations. Good people *usually* wake up with a start, for the reason that "good people" usually do not wake up until very late and until something very startling (to them) happens to wake them up. That is what makes them "good", by definition. Those who wake up early are classed among "dreamers", "visionaries", "utopians", etc. As a matter of fact, there was nothing startling about these declarations; except, perhaps, their extremely brusque form. Their substance had been announced to the world time and again in quite unmistakable, if more polite, language.

And it should be noted here, "for the record", that these announcements have been received with an ever-increasing amount of respect and favor. In fact, the basic ideas underlying these declarations were already becoming quite popular. So much so, that to those who have followed the rise and progress of these ideas it must seem quite amazing how the same "good people" who acclaimed these very announcements—when made in polite language and with the learned apparatus

of a pseudo-science—as the last word in science, should be so startled and show so much resentment when they were made with directness and brusqueness, which the extraordinary situation should certainly excuse if not fully justify.

It must also be added here that, while Germany was in the lead in developing this new philosophy or creed, and perhaps far ahead of the other nations in popularizing it, she was not alone in this good work. Much has been said since the beginning of this war about Treitschke, Nietzsche, and other German apostles of the new creed; and the impression has been created that their Imperialistic philosophy is an exclusively German product and has its adherents only among the citizens of the Fatherland. This is unfair to Germany as well as to the Imperialistic philosophy. The philosophy of Imperialism is a general phenomenon of the highly developed capitalistic countries, and has had its apostles and propagandists in France and England as well as in Germany. It may be noted here as significant in this connection, that Houston Stewart Chamberlain, one of its great "scientific" exponents, is a born Englishman, although a German by adoption; and that while he wrote his great treatise expounding this theory, in his adopted German tongue, and it

was in Germany that it achieved its greatest popularity, it was translated into his native English under high auspices and achieved considerable popularity in England also.

This is true not only of this philosophy in general, but practically of all of its details. It may strike us, for instance, as rather strange that a scientist like Prof. Münsterberg should assert that Germany would be taking a step backward if she were to exchange her semi-autocratic and semi-feudal monarchical form of government for a more democratic and republican form. And we are likely to assume that this is a purely German mode of thought, due to the teachings of that same Treitschke and those other awful Germans whom the war has brought to our notice. A study of the intellectual development of Europe during the last half, and particularly during the last quarter century, will disclose, however, that the apostasy from republicanism is quite a general phenomenon among the up-to-date intellectuals of that quarter of the globe, and that the monarchical and aristocratic principles have been growing steadily in favor. Furthermore, if we scrutinize carefully American intellectual development for a generation past, we shall find that the intellectual current away from democracy and republicanism

and towards aristocracy and monarchy, has been wafted across the Atlantic and has made visible inroads upon our own political ideas.

IV.

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR AND THE STAKES INVOLVED.

IN the preceding two lectures I endeavored to show that the present war was the result of general causes, causes rooted deeply in the latest phase of capitalist economy and the moral and intellectual ideas produced thereby. In my last lecture, in discussing the ideologic causes of the war, I stated, however, that Germany was leading the rest of the so-called civilized world in the development of this modern Imperialistic — that is, warlike — philosophy or creed, and leading far in advance of its competitors. It is this leadership in a general movement that has made Germany the aggressor in this war. Of the fact of German aggression in this war, there can be no doubt. In fact, it is hardly denied. Or rather, the denials, if any, are of a purely formal character, and do not touch the substance of the

issue. But it would be a mistake to think, as some evidently do, that Germany fell on peaceful Europe like a hungry wolf on a flock of sheep. Without any desire to minimize the guilt of Germany—and I may say right here that in my opinion the guilt of Germany cries out to heaven — there is no denying the fact that the other civilized nations share in her guilt. Germany does not stand in this respect in a class by herself, but is merely “a leader of men”, *primus inter pares*.

And there is a reason for this leadership. But this reason has absolutely nothing to do with any racial or national characteristics of the German people. It might seem to be “just retribution” that Germany’s undoubted guilt as the aggressor in this terrible war should be put to the credit of the German national character, in accordance with those race-theories which she herself has so assiduously been developing for a generation past. But however “poetic” such justice might be, it would not be historic justice — which is the only justice. The fact is that Germany’s leadership in Imperialism, and her consequent aggression in this war, is due to the same economic factor which has produced the general phenomenon of which it is part and parcel. The most striking fact in the history of our own times is undoubtedly the truly

marvellous economic development of Germany. But when you analyze the economic development of Germany into its constituent elements, you will find that she excels particularly in those industries which have given our era its warlike character.

Of course, this war, like all great historic occurrences, is the result of a concurrence of many contributing causes. But I do not hesitate to say that the most important cause—that cause which gives it its character and which may therefore be regarded, speaking generally, as the true cause of the war—is the fact that since the beginning of this century Germany has become the largest producer of iron and steel in the world; and that she has been making such rapid strides in that particular industry that in 1910 she produced twice as much iron and steel as England, her nearest competitor. Just look at the table showing the production of iron and steel by the leading countries of the world in that particular field, outside of the United States, since 1850. It is illuminating:

WORLD'S PIG IRON PRODUCTION.
(Reduced to tons 2240 lbs.)

	1850	1890	1900	1910	1911	1912
Germany ..	350,000	4,584,882	8,381,373	14,559,509	15,404,648	17,586,521
Gt. Britain.	2,300,000	7,904,214	8,959,691	10,012,098	9,718,638	8,839,124
France	405,053	1,931,188	2,669,966	3,974,478	4,309,498	4,870,913
Russia... ..	227,555	912,561	2,889,789	2,992,058	3,531,807	4,133,000
Aus.-Hung.	250,000	910,685	1,472,695	2,153,788	2,056,839	2,276,141
Belgium ..	144,452	775,385	1,001,872	1,822,821	2,072,836	2,307,853

You will notice that in 1850 Germany produced only about 15 per cent., considerably less than one-sixth of the amount of iron and steel then produced by England. In half a century Germany increased her production of iron and steel to such an extent that she ran England a neck-and-neck race for the world-championship in that line of production. And only twelve years later her production of iron and steel was fully twice that of England. And those of you who have followed the development of international relations during the last quarter-century will undoubtedly have noticed that the crucial point in the change from a peaceful to a warlike attitude came towards the end of the last century; that is about the time when Germany was catching up with England in the production of iron and steel. Since then Germany has been far in advance of the rest of the world in the production of iron and steel, and simultaneously the war-spirit which has been developing throughout the world has been making particularly rapid strides in Germany.

But in order that you may not get a one-sided view of this war, I intend to go into some detail as to its immediate causes; touching, incidentally, upon some contributing causes to which I previously alluded. And first of all, it is well to re-

member that the present European conflict is really two wars rolled into one. We all know that there are two theatres of war, an eastern and a western one, with Germany-Austria between them. But this division of the conflict is not merely geographical; it is also historical. It is not merely that there are two fields of operations, but actually two separate wars, each having its own separate cause and its own character, historically considered. The war of Russia and Servia against Austria and Germany in the East belongs to an entirely different historical epoch, when considered from the point of view of the development of capitalism, than the war of Germany against France and England in the West. And so it happens that Germany is not only the geographical connecting link between the two theatres of the war, but also the historical connecting link between the two wars and their different characters.

You will doubtless recall what I said about the two warlike epochs of capitalism, separated by an era of peace. Now, the two wars being waged in Europe may be distinguished, generally speaking, by a reference to the characteristics of the wars of those two epochs of capitalism. The war now being waged in the east of Europe belongs to the

first warlike period of capitalism, the purely Nationalistic period, at least as far as Germany's opponents are concerned; while the war waging on the western war-theatre belongs to the second, Imperialistic, period of capitalist development.

The principle characteristic of the wars of the first historical epoch here in question, is, as I have already stated, that it is part of an attempt to get to the sea,—the march to the sea, as I called it. Now, most European countries reached the sea early. Those are the countries in which the modern national states were rounded out early, and which attained very early a comparatively high degree of commercial or industrial development. Such were England, Spain, France. These are countries either entirely surrounded by sea, or having natural boundaries on the landside, in the shape of huge mountain chains, separating them from their neighbors. But there was the great plain of central and eastern Europe, inhabited by Germanic and Slavonic tribes, with admixtures of such foreign elements as the Hungarians, and Finns, and Turks, wherein there were no *mountain chains* to delimit the places of habitation of the different races and to give each a well-defined course towards the sea. The result was great confusion. A sort of modern migration of

the nations. A migration in which "the nations" in the primary sense, that is the peoples themselves, did not, indeed, move about very much, but in which "the nations" in the political sense did considerable stretching and moving of their limbs in an effort to reach the sea.

This was particularly true of Russia, which was originally entirely cut off from the sea. A primitive pastoral or agricultural country can very well be satisfied to remain an entirely inland state. Not so a country which has started on the road of commercial and industrial development, or one which intends to do so. The entire history of Russia during the past two hundred years is therefore nothing but one great struggle to get to the sea. It was Peter the Great who turned Russia's face towards the West and Capitalism — or at least he symbolizes that turning point in Russian history — and it was the same Peter the Great who started Russia definitely on her march to the sea. She is still on that march; for she has had a long road to travel, and many battles to fight before she could get there. She is therefore still in the first warlike period of capitalism, trying to establish herself as a rounded out, self-sufficient economic unit with free access to the outside world for an exchange of products. And until she gets

there her economic development along capitalistic lines will be thwarted and her growth stunted, so that no matter what her extent of territory and military power, she will remain virtually a colony of her western neighbors, an object of economic exploitation.

Now, when Peter the Great decided to start Russia on the road of capitalistic development he cast about him for an opening into the wide world for his "lines of communication", and he saw the Caspian and the Black Seas to the South and the Baltic to the North. He started on the move in both directions; and his successors have kept to the warpath ever since, with the result that Russia now completely controls the Caspian, controls a very large part of the Black Sea, and has a firm footing on the Baltic. But the Caspian is nothing but a big inland lake. It is important for some parts of the Asiatic trade; but it does not lead into the wide open world. The same is true of the Black and Baltic Seas. With this all-important modification, however: while they are both practically inland seas, each has an outlet into the open sea; from the Baltic there is a road leading into the North Sea, while from the Black Sea there is a passage into the Mediterranean. But both of those avenues into the open sea are controlled by

others: the road from the Baltic is practically controlled by Germany; while the door which leads from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean is kept shut tight by the Turk, who guards, like Cerberus of old, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, so that Russia may not get through.

Of late you have been told a good deal about Russia's ardent and long-cherished ambition to possess Constantinople. And you have no doubt been told a great deal about the reasons for it: its being the imperial city of the Byzantine Emperors, to whose Empire the Russian Czars are supposed to have succeeded; and the mother-city of the Greek Catholic Church, the official Russian Church, of which the Czar is the official head; of the religious traditions connected with St. Sophia; and a lot of similar stuff. All of which is good-enough filigree; the substance which it covers being, that Constantinople is the lock on the door opening from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, and the great Ocean beyond. For the possession of this lock, Russia has fought a century-long fight with the Turk, a fight that cannot cease until the lock is in her possession or until it is removed and the door left open. The peculiar thing about the struggle for Constantinople is that Russia would have been in possession of that historic

city long ago, the Turk being entirely too inadequate as a guard of this all-important point, if it were not for the fact that other and more powerful opponents of Russia kept the "Sick Man of Europe" in his place, in order to keep Russia out.

Considerable has been written by those who deal in destinies, about Russia's alleged "destiny" in the Far East, that is, Eastern Asia. These wise-acres were particularly loquacious immediately before the Russo-Japanese War, when it seemed as if Russia had all but forgotten about the Near East (which, by the way, means the West to Russia, to embark upon great schemes in the Far East. According to these dispensers of "destinies" Russia was really an Asiatic State, and her future lay in her Eastern interests. In short, the "destiny" of the Russian people required them to face East.

The truth is that Russia's policy in Asia—aside from the general characteristic of acquisitiveness, which she shares with all other capitalistic countries in her stage of development—has been dictated by her general desire to get to the sea, as modified by the policy of her western neighbors to keep the western passages barred before her. Finding the way into the North Sea and into

the Mediterranean barred, the Russian statesmen have hit upon the idea of reaching the Ocean by pushing eastward instead of westward. Russia has attempted to do what Columbus set out to do, only reversing the direction: Columbus wanted to reach the East by sailing west; while Russia wanted to reach the West by going east. Columbus would have got there had he not found America lying in his way. Columbus was obliged to turn back; the way to the East had to be found by sailing south; and only now, after four hundred years has Columbus' original design been accomplished through the cutting of the Panama Canal. Russia would have accomplished her purpose had she not found the Jap lying in her way. Japan barred Russia's way as effectively as did America that of Columbus. The Russo-Japanese War put an end, for the time being at least, to Russia's attempts to get to the West by way of the East.

This reopened and made acute the Near Eastern — that is, the Balkan — question. Having been foiled in the East, Russia was bound to try the West again; steering, like Columbus's successors, a southern course. The Balkan question has two aspects: the relation of the Christian population of the Balkan Peninsula to their former

overlord, the Turk, and the conflicts between the different groups into which this population is broken up, on the one hand; and, on the other, the relation between Russia and Austria, both of whom want to fish in troubled waters. Latterly, the latter aspects of the Balkan question have become complicated by Germany's design upon the Balkan Peninsula as part of her imperialistic or Pan-Germanistic schemes.

In order to understand the different interests and antagonisms which enter into the Balkan question, as well as their bearing on the larger political interests and antagonisms engendered by Modern Imperialism, it will repay us to examine the geographical and economico-historical bearings of the Balkans a little more in detail.

A glance at the map will show that in some respects the Balkan peninsula resembles the Spanish peninsula. Each forms by its southern extremity a passage-way into the Mediterranean Sea, separating Europe from other parts of the world. The Strait of Gibraltar, which forms the gateway from the Western Ocean into the Mediterranean Sea separates Europe from Africa; while the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, forming the passage-way from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, divide Europe from Asia. The import-

ance of the Strait of Gibraltar from a commercial, and therefore, from a strategic point of view is universally recognized as of the first magnitude. The Bosphorus and Dardanelles may not be quite as important in one way, as they do not connect with the ocean. But in other ways their importance may even surpass that of Gibraltar.

In the first place the Strait of Gibraltar is not easily controlled. Notwithstanding the natural strength of Gibraltar, no power could effectually control the Strait by land fortifications alone, against a strong naval power; while the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles can be controlled against the greatest odds, owing to the extreme narrowness of these channels. The Bosphorus is, in this respect, the most remarkable channel in the world. In its narrowest part it is hardly half a mile wide. The Dardanelles channel is not much wider. And the two together, with the Sea of Marmora between them, permit of such a combination of land and sea defenses as to make it absolutely impregnable under ordinary circumstances. But the Bosphorus is even more important for peaceful pursuits than as a military stronghold. The Strait of Gibraltar separates Europe from Africa, and separates them most effectively. This gulf cannot possibly

be bridged. At least not in the present state of science. But the Bosphorus can be bridged as easily as any ordinary river or rivulet, and trains can be sent across it from Europe to Asia without any difficulty whatsoever. While it forms a passage-way uniting the East with the West by water, it also forms a passage-way running North and South on land uniting Europe with Asia in a most effective and most convenient manner.

Another important feature of Balkan geography must be noted. Unlike its Western counterpart, the Balkan peninsula turns its widest side towards the continent, and has no mountain-range frontier forming a barrier between itself and the continent, such as the Pyrenees. On the other hand, it is itself broken up into several divisions by mountain-chains running across it. The result was that while the Balkan Peninsula always formed one of the most coveted corners of the earth, it was naturally in a very unfavorable position for the formation of a big Balkan Nation. To this should be added, that about the time when the development of capitalism was forming strong consolidated nations in the west of Europe, the Balkan Peninsula was the principal seat of power of the Turkish invader of Europe,

lying prostrate in his iron grasp for several centuries.

We are often told that the Balkans are inhabited by a mixture of nations forming no racial unit, thus accounting for the continued strife among the different elements of the population of that peninsula. To my mind that is merely another way of saying that the Balkan Peninsula is still in a primitive stage of development. A close examination into historical facts would probably show that the ethnic elements on the Balkan Peninsula are not more diversified than those which went into the composition of many a great nation which is now looked upon as a racial and national unit. The "diversity of races" on the Balkan Peninsula is not an ethnographical, but a *historico-geographical* fact. Whether the geographical or the purely historical element has contributed more to this result is now hard to tell. But it may be asserted without fear of contradiction that the historic process of economic development has surmounted greater heights than the Balkan Mountains, and that these mountain ranges cannot stand permanently in the way of the organization of one Balkan Nation, if the *historico-economical* process should favor the formation of such an entity.

For the present, the Balkan territory is broken up into a group of struggling, wriggling nationalities, with Turkey in possession of its southern base and in control of the all-important Bosphorus-Dardanelles passage. This gives color and direction to the Balkan Question. The "Question" is two-fold: On the one hand it is the question of "How long shall the Unspeakable Turk be permitted to remain in Europe?" And on the other it reads: "Who shall inherit the Kingdom of Turkey in Europe when the Turk shall have been driven therefrom?" And the latter question has itself a double aspect. It may mean: How shall the territory of the Balkan Peninsula be divided among the different "nationalities" now inhabiting it? And it may also mean: What outside Power shall succeed to the political influence over the Balkans which was once the Turk's?

Of the great European Powers there are two that come into consideration directly in connection with the last query: Russia and Austria. Both of these Empires abut in territory on the Balkan Peninsula, and they have for a long time been in almost continual struggle for influence therein.

Russia's interest in the Balkans is plain. It is part of her March to the Sea. She needs

Constantinople, and has been trying to get it for more than two centuries. But she couldn't get there except by marching her armies south through the Peninsula, expelling the Turk from Europe on the way. Politically this has assumed the form of a policy of "liberation" towards the Balkan Slavs. Russia asserted a right and duty of protecting her "younger brothers", the Southern Slavs, against oppression by other nations, and of "liberating" them from the "foreign yoke" whenever that was deemed necessary by her to save them from oppression. And she has "liberated" the Balkan Slavs to a very large extent. The existence of the present kingdoms of Roumania, Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro, is largely due to her efforts. But as the "liberation" of the Slavs was merely a means to an end, and that end — the possession of Constantinople — has not been achieved, she could not rest on her "liberation" laurels and leave the Balkans to the Balkan nations. In fact, this end made Russia's work of "liberation" in the Balkans of a peculiar kind. She wanted the Balkan Slavs freed from the Turk, *but she did not want them united and strong.* A strong Balkan nation or federation of nations might form just as strong an obstacle to her acquisition

of Constantinople as the Turk himself,—or even a stronger. For Turkey is in a process of decay, while a united Balkan nation would be likely to constantly grow in power.

In this effort to keep the Balkan Nations weak and dependent on their neighbors, Russia had the full sympathy and co-operation of her great rival on the Peninsula, Austria-Hungary. The Dual Empire has reached the sea; but her position on the sea is a very precarious one. Her two sea-ports, Trieste and Fiume, are both practically Italian cities, and her loss of both may be only a question of time. But even with both of these ports, she considers her position on the sea unfavorable so long as she is confined to the upper corner of the Adriatic, and other powers are in control of the outlet from the Adriatic into the Mediterranean. She has therefore been casting very longing glances upon the western coast line of the Balkan Peninsula, as well as upon the northern coast-line of the Aegean.

In addition to this, and quite independent of her appetite for additional coast line, Austria is very anxious that the western coast line of the Balkan Peninsula should not fall to Servia, who is very anxious to get it, and to whom it would naturally belong if the Balkan nations were per-

mitted to develop independently. As Servia is situated to-day, without an outlet on the sea, she is to all intents and purposes an Austrian colony, being economically subject to Austria, through whose territory alone her exports can reach the outside world. This is particularly unfortunate for Servia, because her exports come in direct competition with the exports of the Hungarian agrarians, and the Austro-Hungarian tariff policy is naturally shaped so as to put her at a disadvantage. The impulse to march to the sea which is ever-present in countries with a capitalistic development is, therefore, particularly keen in Servia just now. But Austria, naturally, does not care to lose such an object of trade exploitation as Servia in her present condition presents to her.

There are, also, purely political reasons why Austria does not want Servia to come into possession of the western coast line of the Balkan Peninsula, or of any part of it. Servia with an outlet to the sea means a strong and prosperous Servia. Such a Servia would naturally present a centre of attraction to the many millions of Serbs dwelling within the Dual Empire, and to all the other Slavs who are suffering under Magyar domination in the Hungarian part of the Empire. This might tend to break up the entire Empire. For

the great love which the Magyars now bear the Dual Empire — in such striking contrast to their separatist tendencies of two generations ago — is due entirely to the fact that the Empire permits them to keep their Slav population under subjection. Hence Austria's general policy of keeping the Balkan nations from forming an independent confederation strong enough to expel the Turk and withstand all outside influences.

The result of this sympathetic bond of common interest between Russia and Austria to keep the Balkan nations from controlling the Balkan country has been the seething caldron of jealousies, animosities, and armed conflicts which make up the recent history of the Balkan Peninsula. Each of these two powers has sought by intrigue to accomplish the double purpose of keeping the Balkan peoples disunited, and of increasing her own influence at the expense of the other, so as to be in direct line of succession to the Turk, when "The Sick Man of Europe" finally breathes his last.

Such was the Balkan situation when Germany discovered that she, too, had an interest in that part of Europe. But here we must pause a little to examine Germany's situation generally. Germany occupies a very anomalous position

among the great national states. The Germans have not yet accomplished the task which the other great peoples of Europe have accomplished — that of forming a national state. The German Empire is not such a state. On the one hand it includes many elements that are not German, and on the other hand it does not include many important portions of Germany proper. Let me illustrate. If you go to any part of France you may be sure that French is spoken there. The

same is true of England. But not of Germany: There are many parts of Germany where the German language is a foreign tongue, and where the population must be coerced into speaking it against their will. Again, if you want to look for the centre of English culture, you will naturally look to London, and for the centre of French culture to Paris. But if you want to look for the centre of German culture you might look either to Berlin or to Vienna, although the latter is not part of official Germany. And the fact that there may be large centres of English culture outside of England proper — using "England" here as synonymous with the United Kingdom — does not alter the situation. New York or Boston might be centres of English culture. But their position is utterly different from that of Vienna.

They are offshoots of the old trunk; parts of a *colony* in the Greek sense of the word. A child begotten of the mother-country, but big enough to lead an independent existence, and actually leading an independent existence notwithstanding sameness of language and affinity of culture. Not so with Vienna. It is not an offshot of Germany. It is not part of a German country at all. It is the capital of an Empire mostly Slav and predominantly non-German. This incongruity of Vienna being non-German is enhanced by the fact that it is nothing else. It is not "Austrian" in the national sense — as Boston is American, for instance, notwithstanding its English speech — because there is no such nationality, Austria being merely a politico-geographical designation. The truth is that from a national point of view *Germany is not yet.*

The same is true of Germany when viewed from an economic point of view. It is true that Germany has reached the sea. But it has reached it only partly. A glance at the map will show that from any national-economic point of view Holland belongs with Germany, and the Dutch sea-coast is the natural western boundary of the German Empire; and the same is true to some extent at least of Belgium.

Germany is, therefore, still in the first warlike period of capitalism, — the *formative* period, the period when great national states are forming by absorbing all kindred groups and marching to the sea. As such it should be Germany's natural and legitimate ambition to include German-Austria within her boundaries; and it may be equally natural for her, though not as legitimate, to desire to absorb Holland too and part of Belgium, and to make them part of the German Empire. And there is no doubt that until recently such was the ambition of all good German patriots.

A united Germany was the ideal, also, of all revolutionary and radical Germans. It is well-known that the best men in Germany considered Bismarck's policy, which excluded German-Austria from the German Empire, little short of criminal; and they fervently hoped for the day when this crime would be atoned for by the organization of a German Republic which should include all German lands. Those who had an eye more to the economic than the cultural questions involved, undoubtedly hoped that Holland, which is racially near kin to the people of Germany, would be glad to come in of her own free will in such an efficient and highly cultural state as a United German Republic would un-

doubtedly be. The organization of such a state pre-supposes, of course, the break-up of the Austrian Empire. But what good German cared for the existence of that Empire,—that “political monstrosity”, that crazy-quilt of a state, the creation of outworn political ideas, political intrigue, and the political crimes of a by-gone age?

Then came the new spirit,—the spirit of the Era of Imperialism, and all this changed. The dream of a United Germany was forgotten before it was realized. And Germans suddenly discovered that they had a vital interest in the continued existence of the Austrian Empire which makes a United Germany impossible. As is frequently the case with countries which came late into the whirlpool of capitalistic development, Germany's economic development during the last half-century or so has been proceeding hot-house fashion. With the result that the different periods of capitalist development — which in older countries have lasted through many generations, and therefore have had a chance fully to develop their special characteristics — here crowd one another, so that these characteristics become blurred and obliterated or do not develop at all. So the textile-peace period has been “skipped” by Germany, and she walked into the Imperialistic era before she

was out of the first, the formative, warlike era of Capitalism. And the place of honor which United Germany for a while occupied in German political thought is now occupied by *Pan-Germanism*.

Pan-Germanism is the political expression of Germany's economic aspirations. And here it is well to note that the expression is somewhat misleading. It does not mean what its etymology would indicate. It does not mean a union of all German peoples. And it is, therefore, entirely different from Pan-Slavism, for instance, which means the union of all Slav peoples. As an abstract proposition it is merely another expression for the sentiment Deutschland über alles — Germany (should be put) above every other country. It is the dream of world-empire, with the old Roman Empire as a model. A world-empire presided over and ruled by Germany, with the assistance of its legions, as Rome ruled her dominions. It is for this hideous dream of a military world-empire that Germans have given up their cherished hope of a United Germany. It is for this that they are willing to let some fifteen millions of Germans and the oldest center of German culture remain outside of Germany. For

such are the dictates of Pan-Germanism when translated into practice.

As a practical proposition, Pan-Germanism — in so far at least as it has assumed definite practical forms as a political project — means the creation of a world-empire the main element of which shall be a continuous body of territory containing the principal parts of the mainland of Europe and Asia and stretching from ocean to ocean. Roughly outlined this body of territory would begin at the Atlantic Ocean, having the coast line from the Strait of Dover to the Scandinavian mainland as its Northwestern boundary; it would then run in a general Southeasterly direction, and include Belgium and Holland, Germany and Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and India, reaching the Pacific at the Indian Ocean, which would form its Southeasterly boundary. Of course, there would be trimmings and outlets on all sides and in all directions as befits such a giant body. But above all, in order to insure its being an economic entity as well as a political one, it would be welded together with an iron ring of railroad lines running through its entire length and having the necessary ramifications.

Of course, this requires considerable recon-

struction of the present map of the world. It requires the snuffing out of the breath of life of some independent states, whose people may be stupid enough to prefer independent existence in a ridiculously small way to being part and parcel of such a wonderful world-empire. But no matter: we have our professors to explain to them the superior beauties of German Culture, and we have our bayonets to enforce their arguments in a most convincing manner. On the other hand, we shall have to keep alive, for a time at least, some moribund political bodies by artificial stimulants. In this, too, our great scientists and our great army—the most wonderful military machine the world has ever seen — will undoubtedly succeed.

That we have a right to do all this goes without saying. The very fact that we have the power to do it shows that we have the *right* to do it. In fact, we are bidden by our Destiny to do it. For we must have it done. Otherwise, we shall fail in our mission of making Germany dominate the world, and having German Culture obliterate and take the place of every other form of civilization.

Antwerp and Rotterdam are absolutely essential to the scheme. Germany wants its “natural” ocean front, which includes the Belgian and Dutch coast lines, as a glance at the map will show. As

it is, these two little countries levy toll on German commerce. Antwerp and Rotterdam have grown immensely rich because of it. There are probably no two other cities in the world, certainly not in Europe, which have grown so rich in so short a time as have Rotterdam and Antwerp in the past fifty years. But it is the German hinterland that has made them grow so fast. Between them these two cities control the avenues which lead from the Rhineland and South Germany to the ocean and into the wide world. It is the height of absurdity that a great empire like the present Germany should permit the mouth of its "national river", the river which not only bears a large portion of its commerce, but most of its legends and traditions, to be controlled by a handful of recalcitrant Germans who imagine themselves to be a separate nation and refuse to come into the Empire out of stupidity or greed. With this empire turned into a world-empire this anomalous situation, then absolutely unbearable, will simply *have to cease*.

The Balkans, too, are indispensable to this scheme. The great strategic and commercial importance of the Bosphorus-Dardanelles has already been explained. Its importance is decisive in this world-empire scheme, whose chief economic weapon is to be the creation of the fastest

route from the Atlantic to the Pacific, tapping the richest Asiatic countries on the way. The Balkan Peninsula—through which the road which is to span the Bosphorus must run—is peopled mostly by Slavs. Hence the necessity of keeping alive the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which forms the political connecting link between the German Empire and the Slavs of Southeastern Europe. Hence, also, the necessity of supporting Austria in her Balkan policy, which includes two points essential to the success of the Pan-Germanistic scheme: Keep Russia from Constantinople, and keep the Slavic principalities on the peninsula weak enough so that they can not offer any resistance to the German-Austrian plans. Austria is simply Germany's outpost,—the political means by which the German Race is to control the Southeastern Slavs.

With the Balkans dominated by Austria, there is practically no further obstacle to the carrying out of the great scheme of Pan-Germanism. It is true that Turkey is still in possession of Constantinople, and of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. But "The Sick Man of Europe" has long ago been convinced that unless he casts his lot with Germany his lease of life is likely to be cut very short. There is, therefore, very little difficulty to be ap-

prehended from Turkey,—if the Sultan and his advisers were permitted to follow their own inclinations. Unfortunately, the Sultan is not master of his own destinies. He is not strong enough to stand on his own legs. And the question is: Will the other powers, particularly England, stand by and permit this great scheme to be carried out without a fight?

The realization of this scheme would change the commercial routes of the world; it would probably destroy England's carrier-trade by sea and deprive her of India. Incidentally, it would make England contribute to the expense of building those very railways whose chief object is to put her out of business. England must, therefore, fight. And the great problem, from the Pan-German point of view, is to make her fight under circumstances that will insure her defeat.

This can be accomplished by isolating her. Alone she would, of course, be no match for the Austro-German-Turkish combination. But these very schemes compel England to abandon her traditional policy of "splendid isolation", and join hands with her traditional enemy across the channel, and even with her great rival in Asia, the Russian Bear. Politics make strange bedfellows : this applies particularly to world-politics. Eng-

land and France have never been known to be great friends. The Hundred Years' War is, of course, a matter of ancient history. The wars of the Age of Louis XIV and the Seven Years' War which culminated in the cession of France's American possessions to England, may, perhaps, also be considered too ancient to be a living influence. But the Napoleonic wars are of comparatively recent date, and the Fashoda incident happened but yesterday. English and Russian rivalry in Asia is not only century-old, but has been continuous and persistent. England has been chiefly responsible for the thwarting of Russia's designs on Constantinople. To-day England is united with France and Russia in the so-called Entente Cordiale, and the ancient enemies are fighting shoulder to shoulder one of the greatest fights that the world has ever witnessed.

I have already intimated that England was forced out of her "splendid isolation" and into the Entente Cordiale by the schemes of Pan-Germanism which threaten her present position as an industrial and commercial nation. I may add here that the beginnings of the Entente Cordiale can be traced directly to the first practical step in the realization, or attempted realization, of the Pan-Germanistic dream — the Bagdad Railway. The

Bagdad Railway was, in my opinion, such an important factor in bringing about this war, and its history illustrates so well what I have said about the economic causes of modern imperialism, that I think it worth while to give it a few moments of our time, so as to examine it in outline at least.

Some time in the eighties of the last century, about the time when Germany started her imperialistic career, a group of German capitalists and promoters obtained from the Sultan a concession to build a railroad which was to extend, ultimately, from Constantinople, through Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, to Bagdad, and from there to the Persian Gulf. Building on some sections of this territory began not long afterwards; but very little progress was made until well into this century, owing to difficulties of a financial as well as of a political nature.

When the project was first given to the world it was hailed as one of the greatest cultural undertakings as well as one of the most promising from an economic point of view. This railroad would not only connect the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, but would traverse regions which were at one time the seats of the highest civilizations of their day,—

regions whose natural capacity to support a busy and thriving population has already been demonstrated. Some of the territory was at one time accounted among the most fruitful in the world. It was in Mesopotamia, now to be tapped by this railroad, that the Biblical paradise was located, according to tradition. It is true that large portions of this territory have since turned waste. But with the new culture that the railroad was to bring into this part of the world, its fruitfulness and great economic value would return,—that is, after a time and after the expenditure of some capital for irrigation works and similar permanent improvements.

Nevertheless, the problem of building the railroad was not a simple one, even from the purely financial point of view. You certainly cannot lure capital into a railway enterprise by the prospect of “redeeming” Nineveh and Babylon. Nor can you get the necessary capital for such an enterprise when the prospect of large dividends which are to accompany the redeeming of old cultures, or the propagation of new ones, is too distant to be comfortable. Capital is proverbially “timid”.

So that, notwithstanding the great economic prospects of this railroad — perhaps the finest of their kind in the world — “capital” wouldn’t

bite. That is to say, on the strength of the "prospects" alone. But capital, or at least capitalists were very anxious to bite, if the road was to be built on the terms which I have mentioned in a preceding lecture as the proper terms for railroad building of the "redeeming" and "civilizing" kind. The German Government, therefore, bestirred itself on behalf of its culture-bearing railroad-builders, with the result that the Turkish Government agreed to subsidize the enterprise to such an extent that, as far as the German capitalists were concerned, the fruitfulness of the country and profitableness of the enterprise were to become immediate and assured.

But that was not the end of the matter. "The Sick Man of Europe" is not exactly his own master. His health is under the supervision of a committee of doctors known as the Great Powers. Turkey is so heavily indebted to foreign capitalists that her revenues were many years ago placed under the supervision of an international commission representing the great European Powers, who see to it that no part of these revenues are applied to other purposes than those agreed upon,—current expenses and the payment of interest. The duties which Turkey can levy on imports is prescribed for her by

the same Great Powers, and she has no right to increase her revenues by increasing these duties, without their consent. And as an increase of duties on imports was practically the only source out of which Turkey could pay the subsidy to the Bagdad Railway, the financing of that railway became largely a matter of international politics. The increase of duties on imports in order to provide a subsidy for the Bagdad Railway was manifestly to the disadvantage of those powers who were not directly interested in that enterprise: their merchants who exported to Turkey would actually be bearing the cost of the building of that railway, the profits of which would be reaped by the German *entrepreneurs*. And as England was doing the largest export business to Turkey, England vetoed the plan of paying the subsidy out of increased import duties, and thereby endangered the entire enterprise.

But this was not the only source of difficulty. At first Russia and then England had other objections to the Bagdad Railway scheme, besides the purely financial ones just mentioned. Russia's objections were mostly of a military-strategic nature, and they were obviated by shifting somewhat the line of the road. England was at first rather favorable to the plan, and even helped the

German concessionaires at the initial stages of the enterprise with her influence at the Porte, which was then very strong. This was at the time when England was still dreaming pacific dreams, and was making Germany gifts of such strategic positions as Heligoland. But by the time the project began to be realized and assume its true proportions, England was herself in the throes of Imperialism, and she assumed an attitude of unalterable hostility.

This hostility led to what is known as the "Koweit Incident". As I have already stated, the Bagdad Railway was not to stop at Bagdad, but was to run on to the Persian Gulf. Its terminus on the Gulf was to be Koweit, the very best, if not the only possible terminus for such a railroad. The principal objection to the entire scheme, from the English point of view, was this very feature,—its terminating on the Gulf, which also made it so important from the Pan-Germanistic point of view. England was therefore resolved to prevent this at all costs. And she did,—for the time being at least. When it became evident that Germany was reaping great "diplomatic" victories at Stamboul, and that the Sultan was irrevocably committed to Germany's plans, England discovered that Turkey's title to suzerainty over the

Province of Koweit was of doubtful character, and that her interests demanded that she take a hand in the quarrels of some native chieftains with a view to eliminating the Sultan from the situation. One fine morning an English man-of-war appeared in the harbor of Koweit, and Koweit was declared an independent principality, care being taken that its "independent" ruler should look upon the Bagdad Railway scheme from the English point of view.

The Koweit incident stopped the progress of the Bagdad Railway. Work continued on different sections of the road, but it was quite apparent that the original scheme, with those features of it which were so important from the "world-politics" point of view, would have to be abandoned, unless Germany could score some more "diplomatic" victories and compel England to abandon her opposition. But after many vicissitudes German diplomacy was decisively defeated by the *rapprochement* between France and England, and the "Entente Cordiale" which followed it. This defeat was formally acknowledged by Germany in the agreement made in 1911,—the year, it will be recalled, of the Agadir Incident, in which Germany's diplomacy suffered another signal defeat at the hands of the "Entente Cordiale". By that

agreement Germany practically gave up the Persian Gulf end of the enterprise, in return for England's formal approval of the remainder of the plan. This makes the road end nowhere, and robs it of its great importance as a part of the "Ocean to Ocean" world-empire scheme.

In the meantime history was being made on another part of the great field of operations encompassed in the Pan-Germanistic scheme.

As we have already seen the Balkans form an indispensable link in the same scheme of Pan-Germanism, of which the Bagdad Railway is so important a factor. And this railway itself loses its entire importance, as a part of the Pan-Germanistic scheme, if it cannot be joined to a trans-continental European railway under the complete domination of Germany. Such a railway must, of course, run through the Balkan peninsula. The fight for the Bagdad Railway was therefore carried on simultaneously on both sides of the Bosphorus. And it was the fight on the European side that first led to a resort to arms, and led directly to the present war. It may be said truthfully that the present war was declared not on August 1st, 1914, but on October 7th, 1908, when Austria announced that she had annexed

Bosnia and Herzegovina, two Balkan provinces populated mainly by Serbs.

In 1878, after the Russo-Turkish War which led to a re-arrangement of Balkan affairs, these two provinces, which formed part of *Turkey in Europe*, were placed under Austrian administration, although they nominally remained Turkish dependencies. These two provinces, together with the little patch of land known as the Sanjak of Novibazar, immediately adjoining these provinces to the south, and similarly placed under Austrian control in 1878, formed the chief and immediate bone of contention between Austria and Servia; a contention which received world-wide importance through the Pan-Germanistic scheme. We shall, therefore, consider these Provinces from their local as well as their general aspects, so that we may form an opinion of their role in the specifically Balkan complications as well as in the war which is now waging.

Bosnia and Herzegovina have a population of nearly two millions, mainly of Servian stock. The Sanjak of Novibazar has a population of less than two hundred thousand, about three-fourths of which is Serb. The first two provinces are important in themselves, at least from the Servian point of view, as an addition to the present King-

dom of Servia of the territory of these two provinces with nearly two million population would mean a great increase of its power. The importance of Novibazar is chiefly strategic. And the three together possess particularly great value from the Pan-Germanistic point of view.

The Sanjak of Novibazar is a small, and in itself unimportant territory. Its importance lay in the fact that it was shoved in like a wedge between Servia and Montenegro. It separated these two racially related Kingdoms, and kept the more important of them, Servia, from the sea-coast which it would get by a union of the two. On the other hand it connected the Ausro-Hungarian Empire, through Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the North of it, with the Turkish Empire to the South. Bosnia and Herzegovina lie immediately to the north of Novibazar, bounded by Austria-Hungary, Servia, and Montenegro, except at the point where the Sanjak separated these two Kingdoms, where it formed the boundary of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

From the local, or Austro-Servian point of view, the importance of these territories lay in this: The possession of the Sanjak of Novibazar by Servia would permit the union of Servia and Montenegro, uniting their divided strength and

presenting a solid front against Austria in case of trouble. The possession by Servia of Bosnia-Herzegovina would mean an enormous accession of power for Servia, besides tending to unite Servia with Montenegro, and the creation of a great Slavic centre immediately to the South of the Dual Empire, a centre to which the Slavs of that Empire, and particularly the Servians, of whom there are many in that Empire, would naturally gravitate. But most important of all,—the possession of either Bosnia-Herzegovina or the Sanjak of Novibazar by Servia or Servia-Montenegro would form an impassible barrier between Austria-Hungary and the lower Balkans. That is, it would exclude the Dual Monarchy from participation in the division of the Turkish Dominions in Europe when the time came for such division, thereby forever checking her designs on the lower Adriatic and the Aegean Sea.

From the larger, Pan-Germanistic point of view, the possession by Servia or Servia-Montenegro of either Bosnia-Herzegovina or Novibazar would stop the march of the German Empire southward to the Bosphorus, and would break the great German chain which is to unite the Atlantic with the Pacific in one world-empire.

In 1908 Germany and Austria thought the time opportune to check Servia's ambitions and to approach the final realization of the Balkan end of the World-empire scheme (and, incidentally, of the Bagdad Railway project), by formally annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina. The time was deemed opportune because Russia, who had been weakened by the Japanese War, was too weak to offer any opposition alone, and France, her only ally, had neither sufficient power nor sufficient interest in the subject-matter of the quarrel to risk a war with Germany. In order to further weaken Russia, and prevent any union of the Balkan nations in opposition to the grab, Bulgaria was won over to the plan, her remuneration being complete independence from Turkey, who up to then had a formal suzerainty over the principality. And so, on October 7, 1908, the simultaneous announcements were made, by Austria, that she had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina; and by Bulgaria, that she no longer recognized the Sultan's overlordship, and that Prince Ferdinand had assumed the title of Czar of Bulgaria.

The *coup* succeeded. Nobody dared do anything in opposition to the German-Austrian schemes, and they seemed on the way towards complete realization. But there followed unlooked for con-

sequences: The Dual Alliance between Russia and France became the Triple Entente, with England as the third member; the two Balkan Wars—the second practically the direct result of Austrian intervention, carrying out the policy which indicated the annexation—with the defeat of Bulgaria by Servia; followed by a strong Serb national movement culminating in the Serajevo shooting.

Some of these events were not only unlooked for, but almost unbelievable. That England should abandon her century-old policy of opposition to Russia was amazing. That Servia should defeat Bulgaria was contrary to the best military opinion.

The net result of these events was a distinct weakening of the international position of the Austro-German combination, particularly with respect to its Balkan Peninsula-Bagdad Railway interests; at least as viewed from the Pan-German view-point. We have already mentioned the fact that in 1911 Germany was compelled to accept defeat and abandon the Bagdad-Persian Gulf extension of the Bagdad Railway in so far as its political control was concerned. The same year saw the German diplomatic defeat in Morocco, following the Agadir Incident. The

situation on the Balkan peninsula after the conclusion of the Second Balkan War was anything but satisfactory. It is true that the German powers had succeeded in arresting Servia's march to the sea by the creation of the Albanian Kingdom. But the new Kingdom was evidently still-born and destined to fall a prey to Servia or a Serbo-Greek combination. Turkey was eliminated from the Balkan situation, except at the Bosphorus-Dardanelles Strait. But most important of all, the Vienna-Constantinople-Bagdad chain was broken. Unless, therefore, Servia was reduced to an Austrian dependency, she would interpose an insurmountable barrier to the ambitions of Austria, and the abandonment of the entire scheme of Pan-Germanism seemed only a matter of time.

Something had to be done, and done at once: Before Servia gathered sufficient strength to fight her way to the sea. Before Russia completed the reorganization of her military forces, in which she was busily engaged. Before the influence of the Triple Entente, which was evidently growing, had grown much further, and had broken the awe in which Germany's power was held. While the Triple Alliance, whose bonds were perceptibly loosening, owing to the acuteness of the Balkan

situation in which the interests of Austria and Italy were irreconcilable, had not yet completely broken down. While Turkey—now completely under the thumb of Germany, but whose actions could not be foretold a few years in advance—still remained dependable. It was evident that if Pan-Germanism was to be realized it had to be fought for with arms,—as diplomacy had completely failed. And it was equally evident that if it was to be fought for, the sooner the better. Germany had failed diplomatically, but as an armed force she was at the height of her power, while her opponents were unready and as yet disorganized.

At this juncture came the Serajevo shooting. This made the crisis inevitable. Again speaking from the Pan-Germanist point of view: On the one hand, it furnished an excuse for war that could perhaps never be duplicated. And on the other, a failure to act now would be such a diplomatic defeat as would make all future attempts to gain anything in that way impossible, and would compel the definite abandonment of all thoughts of world-dominion for a considerable time to come at least, if not forever. It meant the abandonment of the attempt to dominate the Balkans by means of Austria, and with it the beautiful vision of a German world-empire, with the

unlimited possibilities of railroad building in the Balkans, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Arabia, India; not to mention the deflection of the principle trade route to the East from the Suez Canal and into German-controlled territory, thus driving England out of the world's carrying trade.

So the blow was struck. In the interest of German railroad building, ship building, and of the export of German capital generally for the permanent improvement of "unimproved" countries; under the stimulus of an enormous production of iron and steel, but in the name of German Culture and of Germany's Destiny. And the blow was struck back in the name of liberty and independence, but really to protect the great material interests which the different nations have at stake. England and France have their own railroad and ship-builders to protect, their own iron and steel to sell; and these would be in grave danger if Germany were permitted to carry out her world-empire schemes. And not only would these particular interests suffer, but owing to the development of modern production and in the inter-industrial distribution already mentioned, their entire economic life might be endangered if the development of these industries were artificially interfered with. Russia and Servia, on the

other hand, are seeking the extension of their territory in an effort to reach the sea, which is an imperative law of capitalistic development enjoined upon all countries which desire to develop an absolutely independent capitalistic economy. Belgium wants to keep for her own capitalists the lucrative trade of Antwerp which Germany would fain transfer to German capitalists.

V.

THE WAR AND THE SOCIALISTS

IN the preceding lecture I have attempted to treat the present war as a scientific problem only, as a question of cause and effect pure and simple. This is in accordance with what I believe to be the spirit not only of true scientific method, but also of Socialist philosophy. Now there are people who believe that because a phenomenon is treated scientifically, as a problem of cause and effect, it excludes the "human" element so-called,—the questions of judgment and sympathy. These people believe that when we have stated that a certain historical phenomenon is the result of certain economic or social forces, we have thereby foreclosed ourselves of all right to approve or disapprove. That we have thereby eliminated the element of individual or group responsibility, because we have reduced the humans involved therein to mere automatons devoid of any will-power and therefore not morally responsible for their acts.

The question of the relation between the general forces, social, economic, or otherwise, which determine the general course of historic events, and the human beings who are the actors in those events is a very important and intensely interesting philosophic problem. This is not, however, either the time or the place to enter upon a discussion of that problem. Suffice it to say, that we who consider ourselves the followers of the philosophic teachings of Marx, which are generally known under the name of the Materialistic Conception of History, believe in the moral responsibility of the individual for his actions while participating in the historic process; although we believe that the general course of history is determined by social and economic forces beyond the control of the individual. There is, therefore, in our way of looking at the historical process, room not only for the scientific investigation of cause and effect, but also room for our sympathy and the passing of moral judgment. And since the human beings who are "making history" are not mere automatons but may profoundly influence the process, there is also the possibility of "learning a lesson". It is with these latter "human" and "practical" aspects of our problem

that we shall concern ourselves in this and the next lecture.

The first question that presents itself to us when we come to consider the war as the result of human conduct, instead of that of blind economic forces, is: *Was the war justifiable?* And the answer that naturally suggests itself to us, in view of the awful carnage and devastation, the incalculable waste of human life and treasure, is that it was not. Nothing, it seems, could *justify* the killing and maiming of hundreds of thousands, nay, millions, of human beings, the flower of the human race intellectually as well as physically. Nor, it seems, could any possible advantage to be gained by war be *sufficient to recompense* for the enormous waste of property, the accumulations of the toil, the industry, and the intellectual genius and artistic inspiration of the race during many generations past.

I said this answer naturally suggests itself to us. Because it is only natural that we who are look at it from the purely humanitarian point of view. This point of view is particularly not directly interested in the conflict, whose passions have not been inflamed thereby, should natural to us Socialists who profess to be lovers

of peace, and claim to be the only real social force making for peace.

And yet, I must state at the outset that this is not my point of view. I do not deprecate the humanitarian point of view. In fact I recognize its legitimacy when viewed purely as a psychological phenomenon. But I cannot recognize its cogency as a guide to action. Now, I do not want to be misunderstood; and I therefore want to differentiate my point of view not only from the purely humanitarian but also from that of the militarists. The militarists' point of view is best exemplified by that oft-quoted saying attributed to Von Moltke: "Perpetual peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream at that." To the militarist war is therefore beautiful in itself, "the finest expression of human personality", — as one of our own militarists recently put it. In absolute contrast to this stands the purely humanitarian point of view which sees in war nothing but hideous butchery and criminal waste.

As distinguished from both of these points of view I hold to the belief that war, while abhorrent in itself, may nevertheless become an engine of human progress. In fact, in the past it frequently has been so. Whether or not it can still be so is a matter to be carefully inquired into. The

present war is therefore not merely a matter to be abhorred, but also one to be studied and understood. And studied and understood not merely as a scientific problem, but as a matter throbbing with the interest of a life-problem awaiting solution at our hands. To my mind this world is not a place to play in, but a place to work in. And it is so peculiarly arranged that we can only work to a purpose by making great sacrifices. Whether or not the time will ever come when we can work without sacrifices is a matter that cannot be inquired into here. One thing is certain: that time is not here yet. We cannot therefore give up the work that we may deem our task here because it may involve some sacrifice, even if that sacrifice be that of human life and individual human happiness.

I am not a believer in the theory that human progress is possible only at the expense of the lives or welfare of millions of people, either in peace or war. But it is undeniable that in the past at least some progress has come through wars. The point of view that this war, like other wars, might be a necessary engine of human progress is, therefore, at least a *permissible* point of view. In fact it is the proper point of view as long as it retains the "might" in

it. And you cannot dispose of it by the purely humanitarian argument of the awfulness of war. You might as well argue against the continued existence of the race because of the awful pains of childbirth. We must therefore put our humanitarian sentiments aside, and try to grasp the meaning of this great historic event as a factor of social progress or reaction. Sentiment has of course its place in our life, but it should not be permitted to run away with our judgment.

And when you have put aside your sentiment, and try to examine the question dispassionately, you will find that the question of the justifiability of the war is not easily answered. In fact, *the answer will depend entirely on the views you hold with respect to the question of races and nationalities and their function as agents of human progress.* That is, it will depend on whether or not you accept the ordinary Nationalist and Modern Imperialist position as to the historical progress of the Race and the Nation.

Once you have accepted the Nationalist point of view that a nation is an entity used in the historical process as a medium of progress, necessarily having interests separate from other nations but common to all of its members, his position becomes impregnable. You may still argue with

him as to what is the wisest policy for a certain nation to pursue under certain given conditions in order to preserve or advance its national interests. But you must admit that *whenever war becomes necessary* in order to preserve or advance these interests, war should be resorted to. The question of war then ceases to be a question of *principle*, and becomes a question of *policy*. War ceases to be a wrong *per se*. Each war must then be judged *on its own merits*. And in judging it you cannot be guided by purely humanitarian considerations; nor by considerations of abstract principles of justice which are applicable to international relations, no more than there are any abstract principles of justice between the different species of animals or between the animal and the vegetable kingdoms. The most just of men and the most kind—men who scrupulously refrain from doing an injustice to their neighbors and who wouldn't "hurt a fly"—think nothing of killing inoffensive animals in order to obtain the food that they think is good for themselves or which may simply serve to tickle their palates. We think nothing of killing, maiming, enslaving or torturing those belonging to a "foreign" species of animals whenever such a course is necessary for the "progress" of the human race, which we identify

with the "progress" of the world. The struggle between species, we say, is the law of animal existence — the law by which the animal world "progresses".

Similarly, struggle between races and nations is the law of existence — the law of "progress" — *within* the human world, according to the nationalist point of view. A nation's duty is only towards itself. It has no duties towards other nations; except such as it voluntarily assumes in order to further its own interests, and which cease to have any meaning when that interest ceases, which is the case in war. Hence the old maxim : *inter arma silent leges*. At most there may be a self-imposed duty not to commit wanton, that is *unnecessary* and *unprofitable*, waste; a duty which may be enforced by a nationalistic Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Humans. The rest is mere matter of policy. As to the so-called *inferior* races which cannot offer any effective resistance and are therefore at our mercy, it may be good economy to follow a wise conservation policy, to have "closed seasons" when hunting is forbidden, and generally to avoid what Germans call "*raubwirtschaft*" — that is, that *excessive* greediness which kills the goose that lays the golden eggs. A war may therefore be wise or unwise, but never

right or wrong; never "criminal", except in the sense that an action may be "criminally foolish", — the "crime" being against your *own* national interest, not against the other nation. In other words, a war is "wrong" when it leads to failure, does not justify the *expense* in life and treasure necessitated by it; it is "criminally wrong" or "foolish"—these being convertible terms—when it not only fails of its object but reacts in a disastrous way. Success is the supreme and only test of the rights and wrongs of war. If you are an "enlightened" Nationalist and not an ordinary jingo, then you will use the term "success" in the broadest sense, taking a "long view" of the subject, and counting the cost as well as the results achieved. But the question is still one of success.

These considerations lead to a certain corollary: We all know that hindsight is easier than foresight. It is easy to tell after the event what wars were wise and what unwise. But some of these wars, even some which may after the event seem "criminally foolish", presented quite difficult problems before the event,—problems with many unknown factors and therefore difficult of solution in advance. The "statesmen" who guide the "destinies of nations" must solve these problems in advance of the event. *Risks must therefore be*

taken. Of course, a wise statesman will not take any unnecessary risks, nor any big risks when the object to be achieved is of small consequence. But great objects—"great" from the nationalistic point of view, which means the achievement by *the nation* of great advantages over other nations—justify great risks. War is therefore justifiable not only as a means to be resorted to in exceptional cases but *as a policy*.

Take the present war as an instance. And first the eastern end of it. Look at it from the point of view of the Russian or Servian nationalist. The march to the sea is, as I have already explained, the necessary concomitant of the fight for independent economic existence on the part of both Russia and Servia, particularly the latter, in a capitalistic world. But independent economic existence is indispensable to independent national life generally. There can be no political independence without economic independence. Nor can there be any independent intellectual and spiritual life without independent economic existence. This is apparent in the case of Servia. But it is also true of Russia, though the idea of Russian dependence, particularly political dependence, may strike us as rather strange on first presentation. Russian inefficiency, the "feet of clay" of the great

giant, even in military matters, is simply one of the expressions of Russia's economic backwardness, a backwardness which she cannot overcome as long as she is not complete master of her own economic destinies,—that is as long as she has no free and adequate access to the open sea and the world beyond. To put it in the phraseology of Russo-Serbian nationalistic ideology : The free and untrammelled development of Russian and Serbian "Nationality"—with all that that implies in the way of national "genius", national "culture", etc.—requires "freedom from foreign domination." Is it not clear that a war which would be the means of achieving such an object is perfectly justifiable, and that engaging in a war which makes the achievement of such a great national object possible is taking a "legitimate risk"?

Again, look at this war from the Pan-Germanist point of view, and you will find that not only the war as such is perfectly justifiable, but that everything Germany has done and would like to do in this war is justified by the "higher morality" which must guide the conduct of nations,—the law of self-interest. In justifying the invasion of Belgium, which must be admitted to be "wrong"—that is, without provocation on the part of Belgium—the Imperial Chancellor said that

“necessity knows no law”, and this was considered as covering the case by all good German nationalists. And a German Socialist editor in commenting upon the same incident said: “The violation of Belgium’s internationally guaranteed neutrality was an invasion of a legal right, but *morally it was justifiable*”—the justification being that Germany needed it.

This may sound cynical to us. But the Socialist writer in question deliberately waived all attempts to find cheap excuses for this action in the alleged actions of other nations, designed to cover the naked truth so that it should not shock the Mrs. Grundies of international law and morality. He proclaims boldly that the entire scheme of international law and international regulations is nonsensical, for the only law which a nation can recognize is *the higher law* of its own sense of duty,—which is, of course, to fulfil its mission, march boldly on the road of its manifest destiny, and so forth. That this man means what he says, and believes that Germany did what was unquestionably right, is beyond doubt. The argument from the Belgian or neutral point of view sounds to him as ridiculous as the argument of the anti-vivisectionist sounds to the scientific worker who believes he has a mission and is working for “progress”.

To the “humanitarian” scientist, working for the amelioration of the condition of *his* kind, the incidental sufferings of the poor “brutes” on whom he experiments is at most a disagreeable detail.

Most people will agree with the scientist. And all nationalists must agree with our Pan-Germanist. For, once you admit that the progress of humanity is effected by means of the development of different nations, having different, individual and independent cultures; each nation representing a certain individual culture which has a character of its own and is not merely a part of a common or general civilization; that each nation has the task and duty of protecting and developing its culture; — then you must admit that the protection of your culture can not possibly be left to international law, a code formulated, at best, by peoples alien to the spirit and real meaning of your national culture, and at worst, by its deadly enemies. This is exactly the meaning of the old maxim that questions of sovereignty cannot be arbitrated. And when you take the logical step from the basic nationalist position to that of the modern Imperialist position, and assume that your culture is *the culture par excellence*, and that it is therefore the mission of your nation to spread its culture everywhere in order to help it to the

dominance of the world, — you will find that it is perfectly justifiable for you to do it by all means possible, for you would really be working for the improvement of the entire human race, the perfection of the world at large, and the realization of the designs of the Creator.

To the mind of the honest German Imperialist of the idealistic turn of mind this is exactly what Germany is engaged in doing in this war. Can any work be more noble? And can any such petty considerations as the breach of a man-made paper-treaty about the neutrality of Belgium, or even the complete destruction of the nondescript Belgian "nation" — a country and a people manifestly of no "historic destiny" whatsoever — be permitted to stand in the way of its accomplishment?

And if this reasoning somehow fails to convince *us*, if *we* still feel that the invasion of Belgium was an outrage, and the prospective greatness of German culture leaves *us* unmoved, it can only be due to the fact that we do not accept the Pan-German's premise, and not because there is any flaw in his reasoning. Now, our non-acceptance of the German nationalistic premise may be due to one of two reasons : Either we reject the entire Race-National theory; or we simply deny the as-

sertion that the German race or nation is the chosen one. The latter is the position of the non-German nationalists. Their reasoning is exactly that of the German nationalists, except that where the latter says "German" they say "French" or "English" or some other national name. Of course, viewed from the outside it seems utterly absurd for one set of nationalists to complain of the "utter disregard of the rights of other nations" by another set of nationalists, since disregard of the rights of other nations is of the essence of nationalism; and the complaining nationalists would unhesitatingly approve of the acts complained of if they were committed by or in the interests of their own nation. But it is of the very essence of nationalism that its devotees cannot look at things from any outside, or extra-national point of view. As a German writer recently put it : Nationalism is a disease, the principle symptom of which is the inability to see the other man's point of view.

The position of the Socialists is totally different from the position of the nationalists. We reject entirely the nationalist ideas with respect to the role of races and nations in the development of the human species and its civilization and culture. But before proceeding to discuss what I consider

to be the Socialist view of the subject, we must dwell a while longer on the nationalist point of view,—which I believe to be the general bourgeois point of view.

In trying to get at the point of view of those engaged in the present war, I presented what I believe to be the extreme expression of militant nationalism, the point of view of the Pan-Germanist, which is, however, merely typical of the point of view of modern Imperialism. This is the attitude of aggressive nationalism. But not all nationalists are aggressive. Some of them are peace-loving, and abhor war and its horrors. That does not mean, however, that the peace-loving nationalists repudiate the basic principles of the bellicose nationalists as to the essential unity of interest of all those belonging to one nation against the rest of the world, which interest is to be protected at all hazards and by all means. It simply means that some nationalists differ from others as to what are the best means of preserving or promoting the national interest, which both agree to be paramount to any other consideration. When an English pacifist says he is opposed to the present war, he does not mean to intimate that he is indifferent to England's national interests. What he says, in effect, is that England's interests

would have been better preserved if she had stayed out of this war; *that it did not pay her to go into this war.* Your confirmed pacifist is nevertheless a good patriot and wants *his* country to win whenever it *does* engage in war, as it could not be to its interest to lose in war. The task of the bourgeois pacifist is therefore simple: As long as there is no war he works for peace, and after the war has broken out he works for its speedy termination. But so long as the war continues he "does his duty by his country" by ranging himself on the side of his nation and helping it to win. And even while working for the termination of the war he does his work with a view to his country's interest, and with a view to help it conclude a peace with honor and *profit*.

The question of justice to other nations — not as a policy that pays, but as a *right* — is no more part of the peace-loving patriot's creed than it is of the militarist's. For the simple reason that according to good nationalistic-patriotic doctrine the interests of one's own country or nation are the Supreme Good, and therefore the highest justice. This is well expressed in the famous dictum, which is taught to our children in the public schools in this non-militarist nation as the highest expression of noble sentiment: "My country

may it ever be right, but *right or wrong, my country!*"

Now, what is the position of the Socialists on this fundamental question of nationalism-patriotism? I said a while ago that the Socialists reject the nationalist's point of view *in toto*. I must say now that that was an over-statement, if taken literally at least. What I meant to say was not that they actually, in point of fact *do* so, but merely that they *ought* to do so if they followed out logically and to the uttermost consequences what I believe to be the true fundamentals of the Socialist philosophy. And I may add that until this war broke out many, if not most, people believed that what I consider to be the *proper* Socialist position was their *actual* position. It is largely due to this belief, equally prevalent among Socialists and non-Socialists, that there was a general expectation that the Socialists would prevent the war by refusing to engage in it. And it is largely due to this belief, that the seeming readiness with which the European Socialists entered into this war was felt to be a base betrayal of principle.

A careful examination, however, of the literature of the subject will prove conclusively that whatever may be the offense of the European

Socialists, or some of them, in failing to draw the proper conclusions from the fundamental ideas underlying their philosophy, they have not violated any prescribed rules of conduct, except one which will be discussed further below. The truth is that neither on the subject of nationalism nor on that of war and peace were there any established doctrines or any well-recognized canons of conduct. The views of many of the leading Socialists on this subject are utterly irreconcilable. But what is worse: most leading Socialists never clearly defined their position at all, and no Socialist congress ever attempted to deal with the subject adequately.

There is, indeed, an impression current that absolute opposition to war, at all times and under all circumstances, is one of the cardinal principles of Socialism. And it must be conceded that "the man in the street" was absolutely justified in his assumption that absolute pacifism was one of the chief tenets of Socialism, as their most important leaders were untiring workers in the cause of peace and their popular orators, when voicing their opposition to war, were not always careful to point out the distinction between opposition to war under certain given conditions and absolute opposition to it under all and any circumstances.

There can be no doubt, however, that the Socialists, particularly those of the Marxian School, the predominant school among present-day Socialists, are not absolute pacifists. Indeed, the cast of mind and mode of thought which would lead to absolute pacifism is utterly alien to them. They are not sentimentalists, and therefore could not be opposed to war on purely sentimental grounds. And they are rather close students of history, and are therefore aware of the important role of war in the past, a part which they could not always deprecate in view of the revolutionary character of their own doctrine. That force and bloodshed are not, as such, repugnant to the spirit of their teachings is well known. Marx himself assigned to force a very important place in the historical process. And most Socialists are enthusiastic admirers of the French Revolution and the Paris Commune, notwithstanding their bloodshed. It is also well known that these sympathies are not limited to internal "revolutions", but extend to wars proper whenever they have a "revolutionary" or progressive character, such as the wars of the French Revolution and the American Civil War. In fact they consider war a legitimate and sometimes unavoidable accompaniment of the revolution which they preach and advocate.

Furthermore, their approval of war is not necessarily limited to revolutionary wars properly so-called, but applies to all wars which they consider in the line of human progress. Marx is in this respect typical of the revolutionary Socialists generally. To him the question of war and peace was never an abstract question to be decided on *abstract principles*, but a question of *policy* to be decided according to the circumstances of each case. The *causes* which brought about the war, the *purposes* for which it was carried on, and the *results* which were likely to follow from it, were the determining considerations when he was called upon to judge of any war. *Was the war making for human progress?* If so, he was for it; if not, he was against it. And he not only approved of some wars when they came, but actually did all he could to bring at least one of them about.

His relation to the Crimean War is characteristic of his general attitude on the subject. As a result of the general political situation in Europe at that time, and the part which Russia played in the suppression of the revolts of 1848, Marx came to the conclusion that a war against Russia and a defeat of Russia by the western European powers was absolutely necessary in the interest of a democratic reorganization of Europe. When, there-

fore, Russia picked a quarrel with Turkey in 1853 and marched her troops in what was then known as the Danube Principalities, now Roumania, he demanded that England intervene in the war. England was then in her pacific era. Her most representative ideologist in the political arena was John Bright. Like the true representative of textiles and Manchesterism that he was, Mr. John Bright used his great eloquence for the propaganda of *peace* and *profits*. To offset the influence of Manchesterian pacifism Marx endeavored to arouse the English working-men to a support of his war-policy. And when the revolutionary working-men of England, under the leadership of the old Chartists, responded to the call, he expressed his exultation in a letter published in the *New York Tribune* of July 25, 1853, in which he says :

“While the English Queen is, at this moment, feasting Russian Princesses; while an enlightened English aristocracy and bourgeoisie lie prostrate before the barbarian Autocrat,—the English proletariat alone protests against the impotency and degradation of the ruling classes. On the 7th of July the Manchester School held a great Peace meeting in the Odd Fellows’ Hall, at Halifax. Crossley, M. P. for Halifax, and all the other

'great men' of the School had especially flocked to the meeting from 'Town'. The hall was crowded and many thousands could obtain no admittance. Ernst Jones was at the time at Durham. The Chartist of Halifax summoned him by electric telegraph, and he appeared just in time for the meeting. Already the gentlemen of the Manchester School believed they would carry their resolution, and would be able to bring home the support of the manufacturing districts to their good Aberdeen, when Ernst Jones rose and put in an amendment pledging the people to *war*, and declaring that before liberty was established *peace as a crime*. There ensued a most violent discussion, but the amendment of Ernst Jones was carried by an immense majority."

Of course, Marx did not expect for a moment that England would, if she went to war with Russia, carry on a revolutionary war, in the Socialist sense of the word. He knew full well that if he succeeded in getting England to intervene in this war, she would do so for the benefit and in the interest of her bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, he was in favor of that war, because in his opinion, it was in line with general political and economic progress, and therefore in the interest of the working class. We may therefore consider as

conclusively established, that, far from being absolute opponents of all wars, Socialists are in favor of all revolutionary wars, and also of those wars whose necessary *net result* would be a strengthening of the forces making for progress, and, therefore, in the interests of the working class. At least that was the position of Socialists fifty or sixty years ago.

Since then the position of Socialists on the subject of war has undergone a great change. The vast majority of Socialists of the present generation have completely abandoned the bellicoseness of Marx even against Russia and have become thorough pacifists. This is not due however to any change of opinion on the matter of principle involved, but to a change of the political conditions of Europe, which lead the Socialists to believe that the interests of human progress generally, and of the fight of the working class for its emancipation in particular, require continued peace *as a policy*. The change of conditions which led to the adoption of a general peace policy by the Socialists may be summarized as follows:

At the time Marx summoned Western Europe to a crusade against Russia, the latter was still a medieval state, whose great military strength and consequent political preponderance in Europe

were a source of great danger to the bourgeois-democratic development of Western civilization. It should be remembered that at that time Russia had neither an industrial bourgeoisie nor a modern working class. Her agrarian economy was based on a polity of personal servitude. Her government, which was sometime afterward described as "a despotism tempered by assassination" had at that time not developed as yet its "tempering" element, and was therefore a despotism pure and unalloyed. Moreover, it was a despotism of an aggressive kind, supporting by its military power every despot in Christendom. In Western Europe the bourgeoisie was then just getting on its feet, so to say, and if not interfered with from without was likely to gain the upper hand over the absolute-feudalist combination which opposed it. It had already gotten the upper hand in England, and to a considerable extent in France. The fight in Germany seemed to depend largely on whether the Western powers or Russia would lead the Concert of Europe. The bourgeoisie which was fighting the old feudal-absolutist order was in a revolutionary frame of mind, fighting for democratic political institutions. The working class had not yet achieved its majority, and had not, as yet, developed any political power

of its own,—its future, for the moment at least, hanging on the fortunes of the bourgeoisie.

Under these circumstances it seemed the imperative duty of the hour to crush the reactionary power in the East of Europe in order to permit the orderly development of Europe towards industrialism and political 'democracy,—the prerequisite to the emancipation of the working class and the inauguration of economic freedom and equality. Hence Marx's call to arms.

But during the half-century that has elapsed between the Crimean and the Russo-Japanese Wars all this changed. To begin with, the Russia of the Twentieth Century is not the Russia of the middle of the Nineteenth, either internally or as to her position as a world-power. The overshadowing predominance of Russia in European affairs which followed the Napoleonic Wars was rudely shaken in the Crimean War, and was completely destroyed by the Russo-Japanese War. At the same time she has been completely revolutionized internally. The freeing of the Serfs, which was one of the results of the defeat which she suffered in the Crimean War, set Russia definitely and irrevocably on the high-road of capitalist industrial development which transformed the stagnant medieval state of 1853 into

a rapidly-developing modern state, with a strong bourgeoisie and a revolutionary working class. Not only was the "tempering" influence of assassination introduced into her political system during the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century, but a real revolution occurred early in the Twentieth. This revolution, although it failed of accomplishing its entire purpose, has nevertheless proved two things: First, that the old political order is as dead in Russia as is the old economic order. And second, that the Russian people can very well take care of themselves without any outside assistance. Russia not only ceased to be a menace to the democratic development of the rest of Europe, but her own absolutism, hard-pressed, is in need of outside help; while large sections of her people are among the foremost carriers of democratic ideals and disseminators of revolutionary principles the world over.

At the same time Western Europe has been changing too,—changing in the opposite direction. The bourgeoisie of Western Europe has succeeded in the years following the Crimean War in establishing its supremacy. But this has been accompanied by a complete abandonment of its revolutionary ideals, and a willingness to betray its democratic principles whenever such a course seemed

necessary in order to achieve or maintain that supremacy. This new spirit which has come over the bourgeoisie manifests itself particularly in Germany, which, as I have already pointed out, passed from one warlike period into another without the intervening peaceful period under the dominance of bourgeois-democratic ideas. The German bourgeoisie, coming upon the historic stage later than its more western neighbors, shamefully capitulated before autocracy and compromised with the remnants of feudalism in order to be in a better position to fight its capitalistic rivals of other countries on the one hand and the working class of its own country on the other. *The time when the bourgeoisie could go to war for liberty and progress is past, never to return.*

The guardianship of democratic ideas and ideals has passed to the working class, the only social class which seems to have an abiding interest in their realization and preservation. But while this class has grown immensely in power since the days of the Crimean War, it is still very far from controlling the politics of any country, and is therefore not in any position to impose its policies at home even, where it is stronger,—let alone imposing them on any foreign nation. Besides, this class, or at least its intellectual leaders, have

heeded the lesson of history, which is to the effect that so-called "wars of liberation" are a snare and a delusion. If the elements of progress working for the reformation of a people's institutions are absent from its life, all attempts to reform or revolutionize its institutions by the use of force from without will prove futile. Each people must be left to itself, to work out its own salvation as best it can.

The conditions for a war in the interest of progress are therefore entirely absent from our modern life, and the chances of their ever recurring are so remote as to be negligible. Hence the pacific mood of the present-day Socialists.

But this pacifism evidently does not exhaust the subject. Not being the result of principle, but merely a matter of policy, dictated by conditions, it leaves open a number of very important questions. To begin with, the changes which I have described as having taken place since the days when Marx called for a crusade against Russia militate only against any aggressive warlike policy on the part of Socialists. They should not desire any war. But what should they do when they are confronted with the actual *fact* of war? Is there anything in their principles which prohibits them from following their natural im-

pulses and fighting for *their nation*? Is a Socialist debarred from being a patriot? And if so, on what principle? This question becomes even more complicated when the socialist happens to belong to a nation which is being attacked by another nation. In such a case the requirements of justice seem to unite with the natural impulse in urging the Socialist to a defense of "home and country". How should a Socialist act in such an emergency? Are there any distinctively Socialist principles covering the subject, upon which a Socialist rule of action could be based?

Of all these perplexing questions only one can be answered definitely: It is the consensus of opinion of all Socialists, or at least *was* until the outbreak of the present war, that a Socialist could not be a "patriot" in the ordinary sense of the word, that he could not subscribe to the principle of "my country, right or wrong". The opposition to this principle proceeded, however, not from any radical dissent from the nationalist position on the role of nationalities as a cultural factor, but from a loftier *moral* sense than that of the ordinary patriot. It simply amounted to a declaration that a Socialist can engage only in a "just war",—"tempering patriotism with justice", so to say. But what is a *just war*?

Proceeding upon the assumption that no war could now be carried on in the interests of progress, and that the engaging in war aggressively is therefore necessarily wrong, August Bebel, the great German Socialist leader, announced the true rule to be that all wars of aggression are unjust, while all defensive wars are just. Socialists should refuse to join in the first, but should do their duty cheerfully for "home and country" whenever these are attacked. This rule of conduct was probably the most generally accepted among Socialists up to the outbreak of the present war. But it by no means received their unanimous approbation. Among those who were opposed to it was Karl Kautsky, the leading theoretical writer of the international Socialist movement of the present day. At the Congress of the German Socialist Party held at Essen in 1907, Bebel and Kautsky debated this subject at some length. Kautsky's main objection to the rule advocated by Bebel was that it was not a safe guide to go by, in practice, as a government could easily fool its socialists into participating in a war of aggression by making it appear to be a purely defensive war. To which Bebel retorted that if the working class and its leaders can be fooled in a matter like that no rule could save them from error.

The events of August, 1914, demonstrated that Bebel's neatly turned oratorial phrase was no adequate answer to Kautsky's objection. Although the element of "fooling" was perhaps unduly emphasized by Kautsky. The real trouble lies much deeper. The fact is that it is very often really impossible to tell, even with the knowledge of all the facts, and with perfect good faith, as to who is the real aggressor in a given war. But even if we should always be able unerringly, and at the very outbreak of the war, to detect the aggressor, the distinction between aggressive and defensive wars is entirely too technical and formal, and cannot be relied upon always to conform to the demands of that higher morality which is supposed to distinguish the action of the Socialist from that of the ordinary patriot.

Let me illustrate: In 1911 Italy declared war on Turkey for the purpose of despoiling her of Tripoli. Here was a clear case of aggression — aggression for the purpose of robbery. According to the rule laid down by Bebel the duty of the Socialists in the two countries at war was clear: The Italian Socialists were in duty bound to oppose the war, while the Turkish Socialists were bound to defend their country against Italian aggression. Now suppose that a year or two after

the conclusion of the war,—Italy having successfully carried off the prize which was the object of the war—a turn in the international situation should make it seem likely that Turkey could regain the lost province by making war on Italy, and that Turkey should grasp at the opportunity. What would then be the duty of the Socialists? If the rule were strictly adhered to, the Italian Socialists would now be bound to go to war in order to “defend” their country,—defend it in the possession of the ill-gotten gains of the war which only a short while ago it was their duty to oppose. Evidently the fact that a war is a “defensive” one does not necessarily mean that it is a just one.

It would seem that while Bebel permitted justice to “temper” his patriotism when his country was about to commit an act of injustice, his patriotism got the better of his sense of justice when his country’s misdeeds brought forth the inevitable consequences and her “safety” was threatened.

The reason for this rather contradictory position with respect to the relation of justice to “patriotic duty” is to be found in the fact that the basis of Bebel’s position, the point of departure from which the train of his thoughts on this sub-

ject starts, is the bourgeois theory of nationality. In common with the ordinary bourgeois nationalists Bebel believed that the "nation" was not merely an incident of historical evolution, but that each nation was a vessel especially designed for the purpose of carrying a certain brand of "culture" necessary for human progress, which culture would be lost to humanity if the nation ceased to exist or its independence were destroyed. He rejected the modern outgrowth of nationalist theory according to which each nation is to strive for world-dominion, but he believed that each nation was the carrier of a national culture and represented an entity which must be preserved under all circumstances. Granting his premises, his conclusion is perfectly correct: The fact that a nation may be wrong in a certain quarrel with another nation is certainly no adequate reason for permitting such an important factor of progress to perish or even its influence to be diminished.

And in so far as there was any Socialist theory at all on the subject it granted the nationalistic premises, at least in the Bebel formulation. It is true that there were heard some dissenting voices, but they were neither numerous nor very authoritative; for they usually lost themselves in generalities — and negative generalities at that—

without attempting to build up a solid theoretical structure which could replace the well-constructed nationalist theory. That does not mean that no work whatever had been done towards building up such a theory. On the contrary, as I shall endeavor to prove in my next lecture, the foundations for such a theory were laid long ago by the founders of what we Socialists are pleased to call "Scientific Socialism", and the materials for the entire structure were there, but they were in fragmentary form scattered throughout the length and breadth of the literature of Socialism, and had never been used to actually build the edifice.

In the debate between Bebel and Kautsky at the Essen Congress which I have already adverted to, Kautsky indicated the lines along which such a theory is to be constructed, when he insisted that the needs of the *working class* should be the only guide for Socialists to follow in matters of war and peace. By this declaration Kautsky took a position squarely in opposition to all nationalistic theories, including the pacific nationalism of Bebel. The logical implications of this declaration were that the interests of the working class may sometimes, at least, become fundamentally antagonistic to those of the "nation," and that in such an event the interests of the working class

should take precedence. In other words, that Socialists are bound to go to war, if at all, only in defence of the interests of the working class, and not in the interests of their "nation."

Unfortunately, Kautsky merely indicated but never elaborated his Socialist theory of peace and war, and never developed a Socialist theory on the subject of race and nation, which is the only basis upon which a Socialist theory of peace and war can securely rest.

Another attempt to lay down a Socialist rule of action on the subject of war which should be fundamentally different from the nationalistic position on the subject, is contained in the concluding clause of the resolution adopted by the International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart (1907) and incorporated in the resolutions adopted at the International Socialist Congress at Copenhagen (1910) and at the Extraordinary International Socialist Congress at Basle (1912). This clause reads as follows:

"In the event that war should break notwithstanding the efforts of the Socialists to prevent it, then it becomes the duty of the Socialists to work for its speedy termination, and *to use all the power at their command*, utilizing the political and economic crises produced by the war, *in an effort to*

arouse the discontent of the people so as to hasten the abolition of the rule of the capitalist class."

This resolution contains the same unpatriotic implications as the Kautsky declaration, which, by the way, was made only a few weeks after the adoption of this resolution at the Stuttgart Congress. The same emphasis on the working class interest; and the same utter disregard for the defence of nation and country. Instead of being in duty bound to come to the defence of his country, it is made the paramount duty of the Socialist to exert himself on behalf of the interests of the working class in the abolition of capitalist class rule. Instead of uniting with the other classes of his nation in defence of his country, he is to arouse the discontent of the people, presumably irrespective of what the consequences might be as to the "defence". This resolution has the advantage over the Kautsky declaration in that it prescribes a definite course of action, instead of merely laying down a principle the application of which might depend upon the interpretation of what is meant by "the interest of the working class." But it shares with the Kautsky declaration the unfortunate situation of not having any solid, well-recognized theoretical position on the underlying subject of race and nationality. Not being

founded on any such fully elaborated and well-recognized theory, and having among its sponsors such men as Bebel, who stood firmly on the basic nationalistic principle, it was liable either to be misinterpreted or to be regarded merely as a sop thrown out to Gustave Hervè and other anti-patriots, as a compromise, and having really no organic connection with the general position of the Socialists on the subject.

Such was the condition of Socialist theory at the outbreak of the great European conflict. Now let us turn for a moment to the practice. A survey of the actions of the European Socialists immediately prior to and since the beginning of the war will show conclusively that with few exceptions, they have all acted on the principle of nationalism, — a pacific nationalism, but nationalism nevertheless. By this I do not mean to intimate that I disapprove equally of all the Socialists who went into this war. I will anticipate my next lecture here sufficiently to say that the action of some of the Socialists who went into this war might be justified on correct Socialist principle. Only it is my belief that as a matter of fact they were not guided in so doing by correct Socialist principle, but by ordinary bourgeois-nationalistic considerations.

Let me illustrate what I mean, and at the same time offer proof of my assertion. In my opinion the positions of the Socialists in Germany and Belgium, respectively, were fundamentally different from one another, so that while the action of the German Socialists was utterly indefensible from what I consider to be the Socialist point of view, the action of the Belgian Socialists in coming to the defense of their country was perfectly consistent with Socialist principle. And yet, I cannot acquit the Belgian Socialists, or at least some of them, of the charge of having acted on non-Socialist principles in what they did. And for the following reason: During his stay in this country Vandervelde was asked what he thought of the conduct of the German Socialists. To which he replied substantially as follows: We (that is the Belgian Socialists) have no complaints to make against the German socialists. Until the outbreak of hostilities they did all they could to prevent the war; and after the outbreak of hostilities they were in a very difficult position, with Republican France on one front and the Czar of Russia on the other, and *had we been in their position we would have in all probability acted the way they did.* As we have no right to assume that Vandervelde would have made so serious a statement merely

out of international courtesy, we must adjudge him to be *particeps criminis* with the German Socialists in whatever they did, as an accessory after the fact,—which can only be due to a community of views.

And here I must tarry a while in order to dispose of a disturbing element in the situation—*the Russian Czar*. You will have noticed that Vandervelde refers to the Russian Czar as the justification or excuse for the German Socialists' conduct in supporting the German Government at the outbreak of the war. The German Socialists themselves asserted at the beginning of the war that the Czar was the real reason for their conduct with respect to the war, and they have called upon the shades of Marx and Engels to justify their action. I must say frankly that this attempt to make the poor Czar the scapegoat for the sins of the German Socialists is extremely disingenuous and not in accord with the known facts of the case; and the appeal to Marx and Engels smacks somewhat of the hypocritical, at least in the mouth of some of those making it.

I have already pointed out that the circumstances under which Marx called upon Western Europe to war on Russia were entirely different from those which prevailed at the outbreak

of the present war. I may add here that these differences had been repeatedly pointed out long before the present crisis arose and were well-known to all Socialists, particularly to German Socialists. Those German Socialists, therefore, who had always been upholders of the Marxian theories, doctrines, and policies refused to be caught by this bait thrown out by the German Government and warned their comrades against it. So the *Vorwaerts*, the central organ of the German Socialist Party and for years the rallying point of what might be considered the simon-pure Marxists in Germany, published a leading article on August 3rd, only one day before the fateful session of the Reichstag when the Socialist Parliamentary group joined in voting the war credits, protesting most emphatically against the attempt to use the Czar as an excuse for drawing the German working class into this war. As a result, we were therefore confronted with the curious spectacle of the alleged authority of Marx and Engels in favor of the war being invoked by that portion of the Socialist movement in Germany which ordinarily cared least about the opinions and example of the "revolutionary fathers", and being denied by the most revolutionary and consistently Marxist portion of that movement. This alone should be suf-

ficient to prove the vulnerability of the Czar as a shield for Socialist warlike operations.

But there is more direct proof of the fact that the Czar had practically nothing to do with the conduct of the German Socialists in the present war. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Had the German Socialists gone into this war *because* it was, or they thought that it was, a war against Czarism, they would have stayed in it only as long as the idea that this was a war primarily against Russian Czarism was actually entertained by them. Their support of the government would of necessity have been withdrawn the moment it became evident that this war was directed primarily against the Western Powers. But the pretense that this was a war mainly against Russia did not last longer than Jonah's leaf. Not only in the purely military operations, but in the avowed purposes of the war the German Government and the German Press, as well as all other organs of public opinion, set their face westward practically from the second week of the war. And yet the Socialists stayed on. After the first excitement was over, the entire bourgeois and governmental press declared in one voice that England was *the* enemy. Russia was practically forgotten. And yet the Socialists not

only stayed on, but actually joined the chorus of execration against England and announced their intention of staying in the war until *this mortal enemy* was completely vanquished.

It is therefore clear beyond peradventure of a doubt that the Russian Czar was not a determining factor in the support which the German Socialists have given to this war. By this I do not mean to say that a few individuals may not have gone into this war solely on account of the Russian Czar. But such individuals must have been very few, and they must have pulled out as soon as the true character of the war became apparent. Nor do I mean to say that the vast majority of German Socialists who stayed on, warring as enthusiastically against England as they did against Russia, were necessarily hypocrites when they declared, at the beginning of the war, that the Czar was the *cause* of their patriotism. That there were some hypocrites at work may be—probably is—the fact. But the great bulk of them were certainly sincere in their belief, as great masses always are. The explanation is simple enough,—although extremely interesting to the investigator of the relations existing between economics, psychology, and ideology: They went into this war for the same reason that other Germans went into it, just

because they felt and thought like Germans. Being also Socialists in their secondary character they honestly tried to square their Nationalism with their Socialism, and for a while at least were able to do so, thanks to the Czar. Some may still cling to him in a desperate effort to save their Socialist conscience. When this becomes impossible by the trend of events, which accentuate with ever-growing decisiveness the Imperialistic and anti-English character of the war, they will begin to revise their Socialism so as to bring it into grater conformity with their Nationalism. The process has already begun; when and where it will end it is difficult now to foretell.

VI.

SOCIALIST VS. BOURGEOIS THEORIES.

I STATED in my last lecture that, rightly understood, the basic theories of Socialism contain within themselves a theory of race and nationality, and therefore a theory of peace and war, which is totally different from and opposed to the current bourgeois or nationalistic theories on the same subject. And at the same time I stated that such theory had never been clearly elaborated, nor any definite rules of conduct based thereon established, and that when the war came the vast majority of Socialists acted not on any Socialist theory but on the current nationalistic theory just as if there had been no Socialist theory. It would seem, on the one hand, somewhat presumptuous in one man to assert that he is in possession of the true interpretation of the principles of Socialism, which escaped the notice of the vast majority of Socialists and their intellectual leaders.

even if he should admit a few other individuals into a sort of qualified partnership with himself in the possession of this precious truth. On the other hand, such a truth would of necessity seem to be of rather doubtful character: a truth that is neither clearly understood nor acted upon is certainly far from being a *living truth*, the kind of truth worthy of the name.

In answer to the first objection to the acceptance of what I have stated I will say that truth and the knowledge of truth—which is really one and the same thing, as truth only *lives* by its recognition and has no existence outside of it—grow as part of the general development of the human species and their growth depends entirely on the circumstances and conditions of that development. Not only are new ideas, new modes of thought—what we call new truths—the result of new social developments; but all the implications of radically new modes of thought only come to the surface, at least so as to become generally cognizable, with the development of particular conditions and the occurrence of the particular facts of life to which they are to be applied and which serve to accentuate them. The Socialist theories of race and nationality, war and peace, very naturally only developed slowly as the conditions of life called for

their application, except perhaps in the minds of some theoreticians and there only fragmentarily. The full scope and import of these theories can only be studied and understood now, under the enlightening influence of the present war. And there can be no doubt but that the present war will bring forth an enormous amount of Socialist literature which will serve to bring this phase of Socialist theory into clear relief,—these lectures being part of a general effort now undoubtedly making in all parts of the world.

As to the second objection, I may say that I can safely take my appeal from formal statements and resolutions to the general, I might almost say instinctive belief, current everywhere before the war, among Socialists and non-Socialists alike, that the Socialists would somehow or other prevent the war, or at least would not willingly participate in it. This almost universal expectation—and the feeling of surprise, disappointment and indignation which followed its failure of realization—must have had some basis of fact, some unconscious or half-conscious evaluation of the Socialist movement and its theory which was dimly present in the minds of all, even though it never reached the stage of full articulation. There must have been something which made the world put a dif-

ferent valuation on the Socialist declarations in favor of peace, from the valuation it placed on similar declarations emanating from the bourgeois pacifists. It is this which gives point to the sneers levelled at the Socialists shooting at their "comrades" while no one would think of sneering at the Christians for shooting at their "brothers in Christ" and getting "infidels" to help them in the shooting. By an almost universal consensus of opinion the Socialists' professions of peace were regarded as something more than a mere pious wish or an outward coat of veneer, meant only for dress-parade and of no account in the actual "business of life." They were supposed to mean real *business*, to be an integral part of the actuality of the Socialist labor movement.

The basis of this universal belief in the sincerity and the actuality-quality of the Socialist peace program is to be found in the *Class Struggle* which is both the theory and the practice of the modern labor movement. The *theory* of the class struggle is in absolute and irreconcilable opposition to the nationalistic theory of patriotism,—while its practice makes the practice of the patriotic virtues utterly impossible.

The theory of the Class Struggle is not merely a statement of fact as to the division of our pre-

sent society into hostile classes struggling with one another for the good things in life and for the control of the institutions of organized society which control the distribution of these things. It is primarily a historical theory, an attempt to explain the progress of mankind and the means whereby this progress is brought about. As such it denies the *role* ascribed to race and nationality as factors of human progress by the nationalistic theory, and considers these entities mere incidents in the evolution of mankind, brought forth at a certain stage of this evolution bound to disappear with it.

Briefly stated, the position of those who believe in the Class-struggle theory of progress—which is my position, and, I believe, the position of all true Socialists—is this: In the first place, there is no such a thing as a *Superior* or an *Inferior* race. All races are alike, with respect to their essential qualities,—that is in their *capability to develop* along those lines that we call civilization. Different races may at any given time be at different stages of this development, but they are all equally capable of achieving the highest point of this process of evolution. In other words the differences between them are of the *degree* of development and not those of essential *kind* or

substantive quality, so to say. It follows logically from this, (although this logical correlation has not always been recognized), that there are no separate national cultures, but only one human Civilization; that the so-called differences of national culture among nations at the same stage of civilization, are mere differences of local color, unessential and unenduring in character, and bound to disappear with the disappearance of the particular mode of life which has produced them.

This position is not exactly novel. It is in fact a further development and consolidation (to use an expression that has become familiar since the beginning of this war) of the theoretical position achieved during the peaceful epoch of capitalism of which I spoke in one of the earlier lectures. This is one of the instances when we Socialists stand for the achievements of bourgeois-capitalist civilization—achievements of the vigorous “classic” age of that order of things and accompanying ideology—as against the reactionary tendencies of its own later and more decrepit age. But we Socialists are never stand-patters. And so we do not simply stand pat on the achievements of capitalist civilization at its best, but are ready to develop them further to their logical conclusions and in consonance with the general trend of evo-

lution. We do not, therefore, merely take our stand on the essential equality of all races and nations, and the absence of any distinctive cultures; different in *kind* and therefore liable to differ in quality. We go a step further and say that while civilization is common to all mankind, this civilization is improving in quality and reaches higher levels as mankind surmounts the inherited difficulties of *historic differences* and approaches a *common type* superior to all localisms. Our goal is, therefore, not *cosmopolitanism*, a state when different cultures merely dwell side by side, but true *internationalism*, when all national cultural differences will be merged in a higher, pan-human, culture.

Now, I realize that I am treading here on extremely dangerous ground, for I am now bucking up not only against the nationalistic prejudice but also against the dread of many good souls in our midst against so-called "levelling". It is curious how even people who can see the utter absurdity of the "levelling" charge when brought against the economic and social aspects of Socialism, will still consider it a valid objection to a common, non-local, and non-national, culture. Somehow they cannot divest themselves of the absurd notion that a common, non-national, culture, means a less

varied, monotonous, *poor* kind of culture, at least from the artistic point of view. As a matter of fact such fears are utterly groundless, and we need not resort to hypothetical speculations as to a future state in order to convince ourselves of this. It is sufficient to examine intelligently the well-authenticated facts of the historic past. And we need not delve far into history either; it is sufficient to study the epoch of European history which closed but yesterday.

As I pointed out in an earlier lecture, the face of Europe was not so very long ago covered by a multitude of tribes, each having its own characteristics of speech, dress, and manner, which marked it off and set it apart from all other tribes. These tribes have now disappeared and their place has been taken by a few great nations. Will any one say that European culture, its literature, its art, have become poorer on that account?

Or, perhaps your fancy cannot carry you so far back so as to make the comparison. Take, then, the Germany of yesterday as an illustration. After emerging from the tribal state Germany still continued broken up into a number of fragments: Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons, Hessians, Hanoverians, etc., etc., and not merely in the sense that politically these sub-divisions of the German

people were independent of each other, but in the sense that there existed many particular patriotisms as a concomitant of these separate political entities. This condition continued until within the memory of living men. And their consolidation was opposed much on the same grounds, as the consolidation of all nations into a common, nation-less, humanity is being opposed now, that is to say, for "cultural" reasons. The Bavarian and the Saxon, the Swab and the Hessian, and the rest, were afraid that the culture of the world would grow poorer by the disappearance of the distinctive individuality of the three dozen different Germanic "cultures" and their merger into one "levelling" German culture.

Have these fears been justified? Has German culture grown poorer, or has the world at large lost any valuable cultural element by the disappearance of the duodez cultures of Hanover and Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, or even of the largest unit of them all? Ask the world of art and letters. Nay, ask these same former duodez particularists. Ask any one of the present day shouters for German Kultur, whether Germany has lost in culture since the particular culture of the shouter's fatherland of fifty years ago, be it Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, or Saxe-Meiningen,

has been merged in the general culture of Germany.

These examples prove two things: First, that it is utterly absurd to assume an intimate relation between certain political boundaries, which may be the result of historic accident, even if they coincide with some particular twist of the tongue, and human culture. Second, that the amalgamation of smaller units into larger ones is a means of progress and does not in any way retard or otherwise injuriously affect human culture. That, on the contrary, such amalgamations tend to broaden the vision and quicken the intellect, which of necessity results in a richer life and therefore in a richer culture.

To that extent nations have been the means of advancing culture. But to that extent only. Having reached the nation-stage, to insist on remaining at it is not merely to refuse to go forward but it inevitably means an attempt to go backward. Nationalism is as reactionary now, even from a purely cultural point of view, as was German particularism two generations ago.

But Socialist theory does not stop merely denying the nationalistic theory of progress. We have a theory of progress of our own, which we substitute for the national theory. The sub-

stance of our theory—which is a part of the theory of the class-struggle—consists in the claim that social classes and the struggle between them are a means of furthering the general progress of humanity. We believe that the fundamental division of the human species is not along racial or national lines, but along class lines, and that the great struggles which led to those social transformations which we call human progress were struggles along the class line of division. There is such wide-spread misconception of the Class Struggle theory that I think it worth while to spend a few minutes in giving you a general outline of this theory, as a clear understanding of this theory is necessary to an understanding of what I believe to be the true Socialist position on the problem of peace and war.

As commonly understood the theory of the Class Struggle “teaches” that Society is divided into two classes—the capitalist class and the working class—and that these two classes are, or should be, in a life-and-death struggle with each other. This notion of the Class Struggle theory may be considered a fairly correct approximation of one element in that theory. But it does not exhaust its meaning by far. Indeed, as so stated, it leaves out its most essential feature.

For this theory is not merely a statement of things as they are in our society, but a generalization of all past history, a theory of historical progress, a philosophy of history. This philosophy may be thus summarized:

Ever since human society has been based on private property, which means practically ever since there has been any written history recording the progress of mankind, this society has been divided into classes, the upper classes always representing a certain social economy, and being in control of the principal instruments of production and distribution of that economy. These different social classes are in an continual struggle among themselves; not merely the upper classes with the lower, but the upper classes among themselves, each one of them struggling to make its economy *the dominant economy of the community or nation* and make every other economy subservient to it. In this struggle for economic supremacy each class endeavors to gain control of the political power of the community in order to use the entire collective power of the social organism to further its own cause. More than that: each class tries to give the social organism such an organization—*as best suits the economic order*—that is, it tries to establish such political in-

which it represents. Each class therefore represents a distinct economic and political order of things, which implies also a distinct moral and intellectual outlook upon the world. In other words, — *a distinct phase of civilization or culture.*

The important classes, representing as they do, different social economies, appear on the historical arena successively. The appearance of a new class upon the arena of human history therefore means not only a new struggle but the beginning of a new epoch, a new advance, in our civilization.

At first blush there seems to be a striking analogy between this theory and the nationalistic theory. The same idea of advance by struggle between different cultures or phases of civilization. The same idea of a certain part of the human species being the *carrier* of a certain culture or phase of civilization, and the necessity of that particular portion of mankind obtaining political dominion over the rest of mankind in order to permit the entire human race to take a step further on the road of progress by giving this particular culture or form of civilization the upper hand in the struggle of ideas and points of view. It would seem in fact that all that we Socialists did, in our boasted advance upon the

) nationalistic point of view, was to substitute the class for the nation. But upon a closer examination of the subject we shall find that the substitution of the class for the nation as the carrier of progress involves a fundamental change of view in the outlook upon the world and its meaning, and has a most far-reaching effect upon the decision of all practical problems with which we are confronted in our daily life, both as individuals and as members of an organized community, including the great problem just now engrossing the attention of the entire civilized world, — the problem of peace and war.

In the first place, the nationalist theory is a conservative one, if not actually reactionary; while the Class Struggle theory is evolutionary and progressive. The Nationalist looks upon the world through the naive eyes of the author of the Book of Genesis, as the same was understood before any attempts were made to square its story of Creation with the results of modern science: The Creator, in his wisdom, created a number of nationalities, and endowed each of them with certain characteristics and capabilities; some were intended to serve and others to rule; the ruling nationalities were each made the carrier of a certain brand of culture; and these nationalities are

therefore by the law of their creation and existence to carry on a struggle for the supremacy of particular cultures.

The Class Struggle theory does not look to Genesis but to Darwin and Science for an explanation of the existence of races and nations and their different endowments and characteristics. It believes in the theory of evolution and applies it to social phenomena. *Races* are the result of the natural conditions of the existence of the human race in different natural environments, and *nations* are the result of these "natural" conditions *plus* the *social* conditions under which the different groups of the human family live and work. Neither is a permanent entity. Both are subject to change and transformation when the conditions of their existence change. And these conditions, particularly the *social* conditions, do constantly change. But not only are race and nation changeable entities, the *class*, likewise, is a changing entity; its existence being the result of social evolution and its character constantly undergoing a process of evolution.

This difference in the point of view as to the origin and character of the divisions existing in the human family has a direct bearing upon the

subject which is uppermost in our minds to-day: *the nationalist theory is warlike, while the Class Struggle theory is peaceful.*

We have seen that the basic idea of nationalism is that the Creator has created different nationalities, carriers of different cultures, and set them to fight each other. The idea of *one Chosen People*, the carrier of *the Culture*, is not only the logical corollary of this basic idea, but is practically inseparable from it. And the idea of a Chosen People is inseparable from the ideas of war, conquest, dominion. The Chosen People of Genesis and what follows it are a warlike, ferocious, conquering, exterminating, people. Their God is the conquering Lord of Hosts,—the cruel, ruthless War Lord. And properly so: *The Culture* can be established only on the ruins of the inferior cultures contesting its supremacy. It must exterminate them root and branch. What matters it, if in the process some, or even many, human lives are destroyed? Destruction is the law of life, and the progress of the species is worth any sacrifice. Particularly if the sacrifice is of *inferior* human beings and it rebounds to the welfare of the *superior* race, the Chosen People. And the modern adepts of the Chosen People idea, with its cultural mission, have shown in theory and practice the

acceptance of the idea that the War Lord and his ways are still the proper, if not the only, means of carrying out this cultural mission.

The Class Struggle theory stands in absolute contrast to this. Not only are there no inferior races or nations: *there are no inherently inferior classes.* The class representing the old and antiquated order of things, the class against whom the new and progressive class is fighting, does not consist of inferior individuals, individuals in themselves less useful or less worthy members of the social organism. It is only their social position within a certain social order that makes the rising class fight them. The fight can, therefore, never be directed against them as individuals, there can be no personal hatred against them, and therefore no desire to encompass their destruction. The fight is merely against their social position; and that not with a view of *supplanting* them, but for the purpose of abolishing that position itself and place them in a position of equality with the members of the attacking class. The class struggle is, therefore, from the point of view of the attacking force, not a fight for *superiority* but for *equality*.

Furthermore, even as a *class* the class attacked is not supposed to be an inferior class, in the eyes

of the attacking class;— *but merely a superannuated class, a class that has outlived its usefulness.* As was already pointed out, the Class Struggle theory, when rightly understood, ascribes to each class an important historical part, a cultural mission. And while each succeeding class represents a higher phase of civilization, it does not mean that the earlier one was of less importance in the general development of human civilization. Its domination is to be abolished, but it is to be neither hated nor despised.

And this brings us to the most important difference between the national and the class point of view with respect to the “enemy culture”. We have already seen that the nationalist superior culture fights to destroy its opponents. That is perfectly proper from its point of view, because the enemy culture is an utterly *alien* and antagonistic entity. Not so with class culture. From the point of view of the Class Struggle theory, the new culture, represented by the rising class is not something utterly alien to nor something entirely independent of, the culture of the class which it is fighting. On the contrary, it is intimately connected with it, being merely a further step in the same process of development. With all its enmity to the order to be abolished,

is does not mean to destroy it entirely, only certain of its attributes. The good that it has brought, the real cultural advances that it has made are to be retained and made permanent.

The enemy class is to be fought and its social dominion abolished, but its cultural work is not to be destroyed.

In fact its cultural mission is to be helped along, whenever it needs our assistance in order to accomplish this task. And whenever the enemy class should prove false to its own ideals and cultural mission, and abandon its historical task in the advancement of civilization, it becomes *our* mission to accomplish this task and finish the work thus left undone.

But there is another important distinction between the historico-cultural conceptions of Nationalism on the one hand, and the Class-Struggle theory, adopted by Socialism, on the other. A distinction which colors the entire outlook upon the world and its doings, and therefore of the greatest practical importance. It is this:

According to the Nationalist-Imperialist idea of historical progress, races and nations have not only always existed, but will always exist. This is the only possible *modus vivendi* of the human species. The nations were put there not merely to

fight for supremacy, but also to preserve their identity. And this applies to superior and inferior races alike, to conquering as well as vanquished nations. The super-race or super-nation is to impose its will and culture upon the other races and nations, but it must not assimilate them, absorb them into its own body, on pain of itself degenerating and losing that position in the world for which it was intended by the act of Creation. I have already mentioned the fact that according to the nationalistic theory the chosen race or nation is the only *carrier* of its particular culture. The inferior races and nations may accept it by submitting to it and live under its beneficent rule, but they can never become its living carriers and propagators. Purity of race is itself a sign of superiority, while "mongrel" races are necessarily inferior. The maintenance of the chosen race or nation in its pristine purity is therefore the first commandment in the nationalist code.

The practical ideal of the nationalist philosophy is the perpetuation of races and nationalities with their existing divisions into superior and inferior, ruling and servile; the perpetuation of strife among them in its double aspect of an attempt by all the so-called superior nations to enslave the inferior ones, and of the struggle of the alleged

superior nations among themselves for first place, for domination of the entire world. In other words — *the perpetuation of war.*

Not so the Socialist theory of the Class Struggle. The class is not an essential and immutable element of progress in this theory in the same sense that the Nation is in the nationalist theory. I have already pointed out the fact that according to *our* theory classes are not eternal, but that each class is destined to occupy the historical arena only for a given time, accomplishing its historical mission, which is only a temporary phase of the evolution of the entire species, and then disappearing within the bowels of the human race which gave it birth. I must now call your attention to another important feature of our theory: Not only is each class merely a passing phenomenon of human evolution, but progress-by-means-of-the-class-struggle is itself only a phase of human evolution, the class struggle being the means of human progress only during a certain epoch of the history of the species,—the epoch in which private property is the basis of the social-economic order. There were epochs of human history when society was not divided into classes, and when human progress was therefore effected without the intervention of the class struggle. And we are looking forward

to a time when classes will again disappear, and when human progress will be effected by other and more peaceful means than the struggle of the classes. Instead of preaching or teaching a perpetual struggle of the classes, the most essential feature, the cardinal doctrine, of the Class-Struggle theory is *the abolition of classes and of the class struggle.*

Applying these theoretical distinctions to practical problems we find the following *differences of policy* between the Nationalists and the Socialists:

The Nationalist is a reactionary or conservative, while the Socialist is a progressive. The Nationalist does not merely look backward for the purpose of discovering the origin of races and nations in the act of Creation, but also to discover his ideal of the future. *His future lies in the past.* It is in the past that the race or nation existed in unquestioned purity. It was then that its true characteristics, its essential qualities, its true spirit, manifested themselves—in its old and time-honored institutions. It is therefore his manifest duty to strive to preserve these institutions; and the older the institution the greater the duty of preservation. *To conserve the past*, with its outlived and outworn institutions, is the practical program of Nationalism. And wherever the old and hoary institutions have been encroached upon

and their efficiency impaired by recent innovations, this program includes not merely conservation of what is, but also a retracing of steps in order to regain what was. *Conservatism is followed logically by reaction.*

A glance at the world around us, and a look into the history of the past fifty years, will prove the correctness of this assertion. I stated in one of the preceding lectures that the republican-democratic form of government was an essential element of bourgeois-capitalistic philosophy during its peaceful-cosmopolitan epoch, when that philosophy reached its highest cultural level. During the fifty years or so that have passed since, there has been considerable filling and backing, and considerable retracing of steps in that particular. Instead of forging forward towards a realization of its ideals, the bourgeoisie, under the influence of the Imperialistic trend, has entirely abandoned its demand for a republican form of government, not only as a practical program but as an ideal. At no time within the past century and a half were monarchical institutions so popular among the "educated classes" as at the present time. This is particularly true of those parts of Western Europe where republicanism was strongest half-a-century ago.

Some of us old-fashioned Americans who have failed to read the signs of the times may have been rather surprised to hear Prof. Münsterberg of Harvard tell us soon after the outbreak of the present war that in Germany they considered a republic "reactionary"; that not only did *they* (that is, the German educated classes) not aspire towards a republic, but that they would consider the introduction of the republican form of government as a relapse into a lower cultural level. Perhaps some of us even jumped to the conclusion that the learned Professor was libelling his countrymen. But to those who are familiar with the latest fruits and flowers of Imperialistic culture, there was nothing new or startling in the gentleman's declaration. His was the true voice of the new trend. A new trend which is not peculiar to Germany, but is common to all up-to-date Europe. And while this trend is stronger in Germany than elsewhere, the difference is merely one of *degree* and not of *kind*. As the foremost representative of the modern Imperialistic spirit, as the principal expounder of the race-nationalistic theories which form its base, Germany naturally leads in this *march backwards*. But the others follow, and not so very far behind either.

The only ones that have refused to follow were

those portions of the working class who, following the leadership of the Socialist theorists, accepted the doctrines of the Class Struggle philosophy and the practical program dictated thereby. Facing forward, they care very little for the cast-off clothes of the past; nor have they any particular attachment for present-day institutions either because of their age or supposed connection with a particular national spirit or so-called genius of the race. Furthermore, believing in a steady *forward* march of the human race as a whole, they do believe in the achievements of the entire human race, including certain forms of social and economic life, which we ought to maintain and develop further. Among these are republican and democratic forms of government. The Socialist part of the working class therefore considers itself in duty bound to cherish the ideal of, and carry on the struggle for, republicanism and democracy wherever and whenever the bourgeoisie, the class whose mission it was to introduce these forms of government into modern society, has gone back on them.

And here I must stop for a moment in order to explain what, according to the Class Struggle theory, was the historic mission of the *capitalist class*—in the broader meaning of those words

which makes them co-terminous with the word bourgeoisie—as that has an intimate relation with our position on the war question as I understand it.

Briefly speaking, the historic mission of the capitalist class was to establish *political liberty* and freedom of *economic intercourse*. I do not want to be misunderstood: I do not use the word “mission” in the same sense as the nationalistic theorists use that word, — in a teleologic sense. What I want to say is this: In order to fully develop those economic forces which gave birth to and attained their development during the epoch known as the capitalistic era, two things were necessary: *personal, and economic freedom*. The capitalist class needed these two things in order to overthrow the political rule of the feudal class, which preceded it in the rulership of society, and abolish the economic order known as feudalism. These two things therefore became the essential features of its ideology,—its way of looking upon the world. Driven by its *economic interests*, and its *ideals* born of those interests, it strove to accomplish these two purposes, which, when accomplished, constituted an absolute and permanent gain for human civilization.

By “economic freedom” I mean here freedom of

economic intercourse, which must be reckoned among the great achievements of capitalism, along with political liberty. For freedom of economic intercourse, both within the nation and between nations, is absolutely necessary for a full and rational development of all the economic forces latent within our social system. Unfortunately, the capitalist class fully accomplished these achievements only in theory, and not in practice. For a short time and in a limited area it came near accomplishing it fully, when it suddenly halted and turned back upon itself.

The working class, which considers itself the heir to all of the cultural achievements of the past, which it must use as a foundation in building its own cultural edifice in the future, therefore finds that the two cultural ideals of capitalism have been placed by fate in its keeping. Besides doing its own work proper it must carry to a finish the task left unfinished by the capitalist class, as well as protect against all attack whatever has already been accomplished.

Now, what is the application of the theoretical positions of those who accept the Class-Struggle Theory of evolution to the subject of war?

It is self-evident that those who accept the theory of the Class Struggle cannot possibly be for

war in the same sense and for the same reasons that the Nationalists may be, and usually are, for war. War is, at best, carried on by a nation for national purposes. Denying as the Socialists of that school do the importance or legitimacy of the national purposes, they cannot, of course, favor such wars. Whatever valid argument the Nationalist may advance on behalf of war, applies, from the Class Struggle point of view, only to "the war of the classes", but not to war among nations. They cannot, therefore, have any valid reason for the awful destruction of life and property which war occasions, and must therefore be opposed to war for purely humanitarian reasons. The humanitarian point of view is in itself a perfectly legitimate one, and is the only one naturally taken by us when there are no reasons sufficient to outweigh it. The nationalistic philosophy presents such outweighing reasons in the "national interest". Take away the validity of the "national interest" reason from our feeling and our judgment, and we are thrown back on our common humanity, supported by our personal interest which is nearly always against war because of the great sacrifices which it brings with it. I am speaking, of course, of really popular wars, in which the number of those who go into the war either

because of an excess of "fighting blood" or because of actual pecuniary interest must be a negligible quantity

But the Socialists who accept the Class Struggle theory of progress must be opposed to war for other than purely humanitarian reasons. In fact, all the valid reasons which the nationalist advances in favor of war are to the Socialist so many reasons why he should be opposed to it. Nay, all the reasons which the nationalist can advance in favor of the *peaceful acquisition of power* by his nation, whenever peaceful acquisition of power is possible, are to the Socialist so many additional reasons why he should be opposed to war.

I have already stated that whatever valid reasons the nationalists may advance in favor of war apply, from the Socialist point of view, only to "the war of the classes". It goes therefore without saying that whatever valid ground there may be, from the nationalistic point of view, for the desire to increase the power and extend the influence of one's nation by "peaceful" means, that is all means short of actual wholesale destruction of lives and property, are, from the Socialist point of view, so many grounds for the desire to increase the power and extend the influence of one's

class. From the Class Struggle point of view the class does in fact occupy, for the time being, that is as long as society is divided into classes, the same place that the nation does in the most ultranationalistic philosophy. The welfare of his class is a "good citizen's" chief concern. The good class-patriot will therefore labor incessantly for the increase of the power and the extension of the influence of his class. Paraphrasing the national-patriot he says: "My class may it ever be right, but right or wrong *my class*". And when it comes to the choice of means in order to further the cause of his class, he again follows the lead of the good national-patriot and says: "I shall use peaceful means if I can, *but any means that will serve the purpose if I must*". The *class-interest* is paramount to him to any other consideration, just as the national interest is paramount to any other consideration from the standpoint of the national patriot.

But national wars are *always* opposed to the class-interests of those engaged in the class-struggle *from below*, wherever "the war of the classes" is in progress. Just as the class-war is opposed to the national interest when a national war is in progress. The divisions along class lines on the one hand and national lines on the other are

fundamentally antagonistic to each other. It may be stated as a general proposition, to which only few, if any, exceptions can be found, that their interests are in deadly antagonism, in the sense that whatever intensifies one line of demarcation—strengthens one line of division—necessarily impairs and weakens the other line of division. War conducted along one line of division necessarily crosses, and therefore impedes, war conducted along the other line of division.

When the present war broke out, the national interests which dictated and directed it immediately demanded a cessation of the class war as detrimental to the prosecution of the national war. And those who accepted the nationalistic point of view in this war agreed to suspend the class-war, as a subordinate struggle, in view of the presence of the national war, which they consider the paramount struggle. And, assuming the paramountcy of the division along national lines over the division along class lines, and therefore of the national interest over the class interest, this action was absolutely correct. The "Burgfrieden", as the suspension of hostilities along class lines is called in Germany, is an official acknowledgment of two things: first, that the two struggles—national struggle and class struggle

—cross each other's path, interfere with each other, are inimical one to another; and, second, that the national struggle is recognized as of basic importance, besides which the class struggle is a mere family squabble.

And just as the *Burgfrieden*—*interclass peace*—is the logical position for those who believe in the paramountcy of the national struggle and therefore of national interests, so is *international peace* the only possible position of those who acknowledge the paramountcy of the division along class lines, and therefore of the class struggle and of class interests.

Just as the national interest demands the suspension of the class struggle in order to effect the unity of the nation, which it considers not only necessary to actual success in the national war but the only basis for a real national war; so the class interest demands the absolute suspension of all national hostilities, the unity of the class irrespective of conflicting national interests, as the only basis upon which the class struggle can be conducted either logically or successfully. It is because of this that the call “Workers of the World Unite!” has become the battle-cry of the working class when it *consciously* entered upon

the warpath in the class struggle now waging in our society.

Active, unrelentless opposition to war, irrespective of the demands of so-called "national interests", is therefore the "natural state" of the Socialist who accepts the Class Struggle theory. Believing as he does that the basic division of mankind is along class lines, and that it is that division which counts principally in all questions affecting the progress of humanity, the so-called "national interests" seem to him a snare and a delusion. A snare, because instead of promoting progress the division which is the foundation of these interests lies across its path and interferes with the prosecution of *the* struggle which really does promote progress,—the class struggle. And a delusion, because there is in reality no such thing as a "national interest", in the sense of an interest which affects equally the entire nation and the preservation of which is equally important to all classes within the nation.

Under certain exceptional circumstances all the classes within a nation may have a *common* interest in a certain result, which each may consider desirable from its own point of view. But such common interest is not therefore or necessarily a truly *national* interest, that is an interest

which reposes in or adheres to the nation *qua* nation. And, therefore even when working for such a common end, the class point of view which makes this end desirable for the members of each class must never be lost sight of. If the class point of view is lost sight of, and the national point of view adopted in such a case, infinite harm is likely to result to the under-class struggling for supremacy and therefore interested in pushing the class fight. Let me give you an illustration: Supposing the carnage of the war in the Western battle area had caused the plague to appear in Belgium and Northern France. The civil population of Belgium as well as the German army of invasion now occupying Belgium, would be interested in stopping the ravages of the plague. These inimical parts of the present population of Belgium would then have the *common* object of exterminating the plague germ, or whatever else has to be done in order to stop the further progress of the scourge. But it is evident that this would neither unite the inimical portions of the present population of Belgium into one harmonious whole, nor would it turn this *community* of interest into an *identity* or *solidarity* of interest.

And don't imagine that this is a distinction

without a difference. On the contrary, the difference is a deep-rooted one and likely to have very important practical results. Supposing it were discovered that the surest and most effective way of combatting the plague would be for the German army to withdraw from Belgium, a real identity of interests would of course make the German army withdraw at once, but a mere community of interest in fighting the plague wouldn't. Again, suppose that the ravages of the plague were particularly strong in the army camps, so that there was danger of the army becoming so weakened as to be compelled to withdraw into Germany. A real identity of interest would evidently dictate to the Belgians an entirely different policy from the mere community of interest in fighting a common enemy. Woe to the side that would mistake *community* for *identity* of interests! You may be sure the German army wouldn't. The upper-dog never does.

In the foregoing I have attempted to give the Socialist position on war generally and uninfluenced by local conditions; the Socialist position as it would be in a case where the issue between national struggle and class struggle would be squarely presented by the absence of complicating circumstances. But in the actual world of fact

issues are very seldom presented in a simple form. In most cases issues are obscured by extraneous matter, and complicated by secondary issues. As far as the subject which we are now discussing is concerned the issue may be complicated, principally, by three kinds of facts or considerations: (1) Facts relating to the stage of development of the countries coming into question in any particular war, and the influence that the war may have on the development of those liberties which, as I have pointed out before, we Socialists regard as the cultural achievement of the capitalist epoch to be cherished and preserved for the future in the countries affected by the war. (2) Facts relating to the condition and development of nationalistic tendencies, and the manner in which they would be affected by the war, or by a particular manner of its termination. (3) General considerations of justice, and the influence that the war may have on the general development of the principles of liberty.

To take up the last class of facts first: As I have already stated, the Socialists do not believe in any superior and inferior races. They therefore cannot see any *reason* for the subjection of one race or nation by another. On the other hand their ideal looks towards a time when there will

be no struggle and no subjection of any kind of one part of the human race by another. They even want to abdicate the predominance of their own class after it shall have achieved supremacy in order to accomplish this result. Any kind of subjection, and for whatever cause, be it sex, race, color, religion, or "previous condition of servitude", is equally abhorrent to them. They therefore believe in national freedom, in the right of each nation to be master of its own destinies, so long as nations do exist. This includes political, economic, as well as spiritual and intellectual freedom.

And they are ready to go to war for it when necessary. That is why the Socialists have always been in sympathy with all "wars of liberation", although they well knew that a "war of liberation" always meant to the great masses of the people the liberation from a "foreign yoke" so that they might be exploited by their own ruling class. It must be stated, however, that by reason of this latter fact, which made the "liberty" in question a pure fiction, the Socialists' enthusiasm for a "war of liberation" always depended largely on whether or not it accorded with the development of liberal institutions generally, and the requirements of the class struggle. To the

same category, although somewhat exceptional in its facts, belongs our Civil War, which was on the part of the North a "War of Liberation" for the Negro race in its results at least. It therefore evoked the enthusiastic support of Karl Marx, who did much to uphold the cause of the North by marshalling on its behalf the advanced portion of the English working class, at a time when the ruling classes of England were favoring the South, and although the *immediate* interests of the English workingmen were on the same side. Such wars are now, however, practically a thing of the past; at least until the dawn of a new revolutionary epoch.

A fair example of the first class of cases referred to by me above is the situation in Europe as it existed immediately prior to and at the time of the Crimean War, when Marx was in favor of a war by the Western European powers against Russia. As I have already stated in my last lecture the differences in the economic development between Russia and the West of Europe, and their international balance of power as it then was, seemed to Marx to demand a war by a Western European coalition against Russia, as a means of insuring the unhindered development of free institutions in Western Europe. I have already

pointed out, in the same lecture, that European conditions have changed so much since the Crimean War, that a war against Russia is now in no way different from a war against any other "civilized" nation. And I may add here that the general situation the world over is now such that no war could be planned that would serve to advance the cause of free institutions either in any of the warring countries or anywhere else in the world. On the contrary, the most probable, if not the inevitable result, of any war waged at this time would be a considerable strengthening of the powers of reaction everywhere, and almost of all naturally in the warring countries. The present war has already furnished abundant proof of the correctness of this assertion. And I venture to assert that we have not seen the end of it yet, nor the worst of it.

The present war also furnishes indisputable proof, if any proof were indeed necessary, that every war serves to accentuate national divisions, intensifies national animosities wherever they existed before and creates new ones where none existed before, and generally gives new life and impetus to the nationalistic spirit; and, correspondingly, lowers the vitality of the forces

carrying on the class struggle on behalf of the working class.

It may therefore be confidently asserted that no matter what causes Socialists may have had for desiring war *in the past*,—in our own day and generation, at least, no combination of circumstances is at all likely to arise which could outweigh the great objections which Socialists must have to war. The present-day policy of Socialism must therefore be *unalterable opposition to all wars of aggression*.

And not only before war has broken out, but all the time.

And now as to *defensive wars*. I have already stated that up to the present war the rule of action most widely accepted among Socialists was based on the distinction between wars of aggression and defensive wars. Its greatest champion was Bebel, and it found its classic expression in his announcement, that—“Wenn wir werden angegriffen dann wehren wir uns”,—if we are attacked we shall defend ourselves. I have also mentioned already the criticism which Kautsky passed on the distinction between aggressive and defensive war as a rule of action. Since the commencement of the present war it has been repeatedly stated that this war has conclusively

demonstrated the untenability of that distinction. These statements, usually made by the apologists of Germany and of the conduct of the German Socialists in this war, must not be confused with Kautsky's criticism of Bebel's position at the Jena Congress.

Kautsky's contention was that Bebel's distinction was an unserviceable one in practice, because of the fact that if we adhered strictly to the policy that "if we are attacked we shall defend ourselves" it lies easily within the power of any government, particularly such a government as the German Government which can back up its lies by a forcible suppression of the truth, to make an aggressive war appear to the majority of the working class as a defensive one, and thus drag us into an aggressive war. *He therefore sought for a rule of conduct which would leave us our liberty of action even in case of a defensive war.* The present German apologists do exactly the reverse. Asserting that the present war has demonstrated the lack of all distinction between wars of aggression and defensive wars, they proceed to disclaim any obligation on the part of Socialists to refrain from engaging in any kind of war. In other words, they dwell on Kautsky's criticism of the distinction between aggressive and defensive wars

not for the purpose of emancipating ourselves from a doctrinaire rule of action which might in practice turn us over bound hand and foot to our enemies, the militarists; but for the purpose of throwing aside all restraint of Socialist principle or policy, so that we may join in the militarist revels even to the extent of joining in avowedly aggressive wars. We know that the devil can quote Scripture. Socialist opportunists who chafe under the restraints imposed upon their conduct by Socialist principles are past masters in quoting Marx, Engels, and other Socialist authorities, to cover up their—from a Socialist point of view—thoroughly disreputable conduct.

As a matter of fact, far from proving that there is really no difference between aggressive and defensive war, the present war has proven just the contrary. There can be no doubt but that the decidedly unfriendly feeling against Germany which now prevails all over the world is due in a measure at least to the fact that the world believes Germany to have been the aggressor in the present war. And the strong feeling of resentment prevalent among Socialists the world over against the German Socialists over their conduct in this war, a feeling which pervades circles hitherto most friendly to the German Socialists, is due al-

most entirely to the fact that they are believed to have engaged in aggressive war. All the protestations of Germany and of German Socialists that this is a defensive war on Germany's part could not affect the world's judgment, arrived at without great difficulty, on the question of fact as to who is the aggressor in this war. Nor could any specious arguments to the effect that there really is no difference between aggressive and defensive war affect our instinctive feeling to the contrary and the consequent judgment of the world at large, including the Socialists, on the moral questions involved.

That does not mean, however, that from a Socialist point of view every defensive war is right,—that we can subscribe to the rule that "if we are attacked we shall defend ourselves". And quite aside from the fact that this rule may be impracticable as a guide to action, as pointed out by Kautsky. The real trouble with this rule is that it is wrong in principle. It is based on the nationalistic principle that the "nation" or "country" must be preserved in all its vigor and power; any attack upon it must therefore be repelled, as it is likely to diminish that power. But once you cast the nationalist principle aside, and substitute class-interest for national interest as the basic principle

determining conduct, why should the members of the working class go to war with other members of the working class in order to defend the power of their respective “nations”. Marx said that the working man has no country. Nor has it any nation. In the sense in which the words “country” and “nation” are used by nationalistic patriots,—that is to say in the sense that *their* “power” is *his* power, which it is in *his interest* to defend.

Why, for instance, should English workingmen go to the defence of “*their country*” if the United States were to attack England for the purpose of taking away Canada? What *interest* has the English working class in the “power” of the British Empire which expresses itself in the possession of Canada, Egypt, South Africa, or India,—that would not only be worth the sacrifices which a great war entails upon the working class of the country engaged in war, but also the weakening of the working class generally by a war among its different local divisions, which is equivalent to “*civil war*” in the domain of national interests? Similarly, why should French workingmen go to the defence of “*their country*” in order to preserve their “national power” which expresses itself in the possession of Algiers, Morocco, or Tunis,—if France should be attacked by some

power coveting the same? And why should the German working class rush to the defence of Germany if that "country" should be attacked by Japan for the purpose of wresting from it Kiauchau, or by England for the purpose of dispossessing it from Southwest or Southeast Africa, or even by Russia for the purpose of despoiling it of the Polish Province of Posen? What *interest* have German workingmen in "Germany's" possession of Posen, even though it has been part of Prussia and therefore of "Germany" for more than a hundred years?

In general what *interest* has the working class of any country in the so-called "power" or "greatness" of that "nation" or that "country", which would make it worth—to paraphrase a famous saying of Bismarck—the bones of a single workingman?

Evidently the fact that "we" are attacked does not at all impose upon us the duty of defending "ourselves". As a matter of fact, *we*, that is the working class, are never attacked, in any war, for *we* have nothing worth taking; and *we* never defend *ourselves*, nor anything belonging to *us*.

Does that mean that the members of the working class have no interest whatever in their country, and that they need not, or should not,

defend it under any circumstances? Not at all. But it does mean that they have no interest in the ordinary sense to preserve; no such material interest as the capitalists or members of the middle class have, nor such spiritual interests as the nationalists profess to have. His interest is a broadly human one, although it is dictated by his class interests and the necessities and requirements of the class struggle. I have already pointed out that, broadly speaking, the interests of the working class engaged in the class struggle and the interests of humanity and progress are identical. Identical, not in the Pickwickian or Nietzschean sense of the nationalists, according to which it is to the interest of humanity that the vast majority of humankind should be degraded into an enormous pedestal upon which a Super-man or Super-nation could stand up in his or its glory, but in a real human and common-sense way. The human ideal of those engaged in the class struggle on the side of the working class therefore abhors all and any kind of subjection and exploitation of man by his fellow-men, including the subjection and exploitation of one race or nation by another.

Furthermore, any inequality among human beings and the subjection of *any* part of the

human family by another interferes in a very real and practical sense with the successful prosecution of the class struggle. Such subjections and inequalities lead to struggles which cross the path and tend to obscure, hamper and delay, the class struggle of the working class and its successful issue. As long as nations do exist in fact and in the consciousness of people, the class struggle can only be carried on successfully within free nations. A nation, or part of a nation, subject to the enforced dominion of an alien nation is unfit for the class struggle, because that struggle is obscured and complicated by the national struggle which is inevitable in such a case.

The working class of any nation or country is therefore vitally interested, in *preserving the freedom from alien dominion* of that nation or country. And the Socialist is ready to go to war in order to defend that freedom. His readiness to go to war in defence of his country is however strictly limited by his desire to preserve this national freedom. The words "nation" and "country" therefore have for him a different meaning from that currently given to them. To begin with he draws a distinction between his nation or country and its government. An attack upon the armed force of "his" government is not

necessarily an attack upon his nation or country. Nor is an invasion of his "national territory" as the same is shown on the map necessarily an attack upon his nation or country. The invasion by the United States of Canada, for instance, would not, from his point of view be an attack upon the English Nation nor the invasion of an Englishman's country. Nor would the invasion by Russia of the German Province of Posen inhabited by Poles be an attack upon the German Nation or the invasion of a German's country.

But there is another and even more important aspect of the class-conscious workingman's readiness to come to the defence of *his* country which must not be overlooked. When he does come to the defence of his country, it is not because it is *his*. He is not actuated by the narrow and selfish motives of your nationalistic patriot, but by the broad "humanistic" motive that a part of the human race is threatened with subjection, and that another obstacle is being placed in the path of the final emancipation of the entire human race from the inequalities, degradations, and miseries incident to class-society.

And this, again, is not a mere metaphysical distinction without any real, practical difference. The difference is both practical and far-reaching.

The theory of nationalism and “national interests” in whose behalf wars are to be fought, has its logical complement in the theory of *neutrality*. We go to war when our “national interests” demand it. But when we have no “national interests” to preserve, we don’t care what becomes of the human race. We are not our brother’s keeper. *We are neutral.* So any nation may rob, pillage, destroy or subjugate any other nation without it being the least of our concerns, *so long as our national interests are not in any way injuriously affected thereby.*

The Socialists reject this doctrine as a monumental monstrosity,—the acme of selfishness, conceived, nurtured, and reared in the atmosphere of nationalism, an atmosphere surcharged with selfishness and deadening to all sense of justice and the higher impulses of humanity. In its place we substitute the doctrine of *international solidarity*. The human race is one family, in a real sense of the term. *An injury to one is the concern of all.* When, therefore, war is upon us, and its conditions are such that the working class of any warring nation is properly called upon to defend that nation, or any part of it, from subjugation and domination by another nation, *the working class of the entire world has an interest in the*

defense of the nation whose independence and liberty are attacked, and it should rally to prevent the outrage.

That does not mean that in every such case the workingmen of all “neutral” countries should rush their governments to war. Like practical people we must always count the cost. Not, indeed, selfishly,—the cost to *our nation* or *our working class*, in the old nationalistic way. But the cost to the international working class, the cost to the world and its future progress. Every war, as has already been pointed out, has an injurious effect upon general progress and affects most disastrously the class struggle of the working class,—the hope of humanity. Every extension of the war usually and almost necessarily means an increase of these injurious effects. These must be carefully weighed as against the injury that is desired to be averted, to which should be added the salutary effect which true *international* action, based not on a chance *community* of interest of the different nations but on the *identity* of interest of the proletariat of all the nations, must have on the class-struggle, and which may compensate in whole or in part for the increased national hatreds engendered by the extension of the war.

These things should be carefully weighed, and no decision, particularly no decision in favor of war, lightly made. Where chances are to be taken we should take the chance of erring on the side of opposition to war rather than in favoring it. *But whatever the decision, it must be controlled exclusively by considerations of its results upon the international working class and its struggle for emancipation.* Indeed, the considerations leading to the action taken may, nay, *will*, have much to do with the results flowing therefrom as far as the working class is concerned. The same action may have different, or largely differing, results according to the motives which actuated it. Any action taken in a honest endeavor to act in accordance with, and in the interest of, international solidarity, and with a total exclusion of selfish national interest—no matter what the action is—must by reason of the very fact that it was intended to further the cause of internationalism, further the struggle of the working class, and give an impetus to its upward march, with all that that implies for the progress and regeneration of the entire human race.

The considerations which limit the occasions when Socialists may give their support to war, also prescribe the manner in which that support

may be given. Socialists engagaing in war are still Socialists,—that is to say, provided they enter into the war from Socialist and not from nationalist considerations. The reasons which actuated them in entering the war will therefore control their actions and shape their policies during the war.

To begin with, they will give the war their support only as long as that is necessary for the purpose of achieving the object which made the war a proper one from their point of view, and they will withdraw their support the moment that object is achieved. And while they are giving the war their support they will insist that it be conducted in a manner that would insure the pursuit of this object and no other. A defensive war may easily turn into an aggressive one. They must therefore be on their guard that they should not by their action inadvertently help in a war of conquest. Before giving their support to the war they must therefore exact from their government proper guarantees that the war will under no circumstances be turned into one of aggression. And while the war lasts, they must watch the manner in which it is conducted with that end in view, and keep their government to a strict accountability in that respect. In addition to that

it is their duty to carry on an educational propaganda which would make the turning of the war from one of defence into one of aggression impossible should the government ever be tempted to break its promises.

At the same time they must carry on their regular Socialist work, in so far as their energies are not taken up with the special propaganda against any war of conquest. Or, rather, they should make the propaganda against a war of conquest part of their regular work in furtherance of the class-struggle, making a special effort to show the general connection between war and capitalism, and teaching the Socialist principles of internationalism which would make all wars impossible. *For the class struggle and the propaganda of the principles and policies of the class struggle, must be kept up.* The belief that the class struggle interferes with the successful carrying on of war is true enough, if war is to be carried on for nationalistic purposes, that is for the *acquisition of power*. But it is utterly false in so far as purely *defensive* war is concerned,—using the word defensive in the limited and circumscribed sense mentioned above. And for that very reason the carrying on of the class struggle is the best means of preserving the defensive character of the

war. Besides,—the support of the war being itself only permissible as a means of furthering the class struggle, it would, of course, be utterly absurd to suspend the class struggle in order the better to carry on the war.

But this is not all. The same principles that define and limit for the Socialist the meaning of "country" and of "defensive war" also define and limit for him the meaning of the word "enemy". The Socialist supporting a war must always bear in mind that the "enemy" against whom he is arrayed is not a certain *nation* or *country*, but a *certain government, representing at most the governing class* of that nation or country. Bearing this in mind will have most important practical results. It will prevent atrocities, for one. It will prevent the passions of war venting themselves on the members of the enemy nation as such either in speech or in deed. This will make it possible for the war to terminate the moment it becomes apparent that the aggressor's lust of conquest is not likely to succeed, thereby preventing useless sacrifice of life and property on both sides. And, most important of all, it will make possible the conclusion of a *real peace*. Of a peace that will not merely be a cessation of armed combat, but a real cessation of *all hostilities*, a resump-

tion of neighborly and friendly relations between the members of the erstwhile "enemies", and a co-operation between them in those peaceful pursuits on which alone can be built the happiness of the human race.

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